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A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software,
hardware and conﬁguration of peers. Thus, each peer can selﬁshly adapt its behaviour to maximise its
beneﬁt from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms
for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives,
while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay.
The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution
accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism
to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services.
This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to
achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource
allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive
mechanism by providing efﬁcient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing
service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lag-
sensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions.
When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a
client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between
them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microe-
conomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply
it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required,
along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a
probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions.
Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We
propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely
allocate their trafﬁc ﬂows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility
function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares ﬁtting of the
cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP proﬁt maximisation.
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Incentives in QoS Overlays: Problem Space and
Summary of Contributions
Since its inception, the Internet has furthered an open philosophy based on highly intelligent endpoints
communicating across a minimally intelligent, transparently interconnected collection of packet switch-
ing networks. Through the ubiquitous use of Internet Protocol (IP) and its associated core network
protocols, the Internet acts as a substrate on which advanced application layer services can be deployed
incrementally and with minimal intervention by network operators.
Initially, mostInternetservicesassumedasymmetryintheirprotocolparticipants, withlow-capacity
clients requesting services from high-capacity, ISP owned and operated servers. However, as the cost
for computation resources and access bandwidth decreased, and thus Internet connected hosts became
increasingly powerful, new Internet services arose that shifted from away from this model and towards a
much more user-centred one. First enterprises and then individuals started deploying their own servers,
thus making the network edge more and more important for the provision of services. This continuing
trend persists today in the shape of massively distributed, global-scale systems based on peer-to-peer
protocols. The techniques on which these protocols are based have led to many innovations in dis-
tributed systems theory and practice, particularly in regards to content search, distribution, replication
and caching (see Chapter 2 for an overview of some of these techniques).
Although peer-to-peer protocols provided great scalability and enabled the distribution of large
ﬁles on a scale not seen before, they also made it clear that the task of designing and testing peer-to-peer
overlays is far from complete. In addition to well-known (but yet unsolved) problems in distributed
computing such as reliably synchronising state between peers (the consensus problem) and the analysis
andreductionofmessagingandcomputationoverhead(computationalandcommunicationscomplexity),
the design of reliable distributed incentive mechanisms remains an important open question in the peer-
to-peer systems research agenda that has proved challenging in its analysis (for instance, from the point
of view of Distributed, Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) [111, 304, 241]).
We are interested in the study of application layer overlays, in which sets of Internet hosts deﬁne
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logical, application layer topologies that use the Internet as a substrate. We shall pay particular attention
to the decentralised construction and maintenance of this overlays, since this will provide greater relia-
bility under conditions of peer failure and churn (see Chapter 2 for perspectives on this issue). Finally,
we further narrow down our interest to the study of QoS overlays, deﬁned as decentralised application
layer overlays which provide services which require predictable quality, even as the conditions of their
underlying networks change.
This thesis will focus on the design of incentive mechanisms for these QoS-sensitive peer-to-peer
networks, and in the modelling of peer preferences which is the basis for such a design. By relating
incentive mechanisms to overlay resource allocation, we shall discuss their implications for various
network design objectives and we shall present algorithms and models to solve the incentives problem
in various scenarios. This will be achieved by drawing connections to social theory and economics, and
to previous work in the modelling and analysis of peer-to-peer networks.
In addition, we will apply these general models to speciﬁc cases within the broad class of peer-to-
peer overlays with QoS constraints, such as time sensitive media streaming systems.
1.1 The Incentives Problem and QoS Overlays
We now discuss, in an informal manner, the motivations behind the contributions presented in this the-
sis, leaving a detailed analysis of our contributions (and their role in the design of incentive mechanisms
for QoS overlays) for Section 1.2. We start by considering the need for incentive mechanisms to con-
trol freeloading in peer-to-peer systems, which has been the most widely analysed aspect of incentive
mechanism design for peer-to-peer networks (see Chapter 2 for an in-depth analysis of this issue).
Historically, freeloading was identiﬁed as a problem for peer-to-peer systems because many early
peer-to-peer protocols allowed non-excludable [144] access to overlay resources1. This meant that, in
these systems, all peer requests were served indistinguishably, regardless of the amount and quality of
the contributions that the requesting peer had made to the overlay. Since peers could get access to
overlay resources without contributing anything back, many chose not to contribute at all. Predictably,
this externalisation of contribution costs led to widespread service degradation [167, 27].
Some early attempts to control freeloading focused on resource contribution accounting by elimi-
nating peer anonymity. These were based upon the premise that, lacking stable peer identities, it was
impossible for decentralised overlays to associate with each peer a measure of their contributions and
refuse service if these were too low. Unfortunately, solving the identity identity management problem in
peer-to-peer systems is challenging, particularly if one insists that proposed solutions are free from cen-
tralised components or trusted third parties. Furthermore, even if peers are bound to a particular identity
at some point, it is an easy matter for them to bind to a new identity once the old one is no longer useful
or has been labelled as a freeloader.
Thus, later proposals for the control of freeloading relied not on the control of peer identities, but on
making resource consumption contingent upon resource contribution. The well-known Tit-for-Tat policy
of BitTorrent falls in this category, as do many other schemes detailed in Sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and
2.8. Alternatively, there has been work in protocols that make the use of multiple identities unproﬁtable
[323, 262, 203] (see Section 3.2 for an in-depth analysis).
The practical motivation behind the aforemetioned work is clear: since the prices for computation
resources and bandwidth have continued to go down, the potential gains in aggregating Internet end-
hosts into large QoS overlays have become increasingly attractive. As the development of robust and
reliable incentive mechanisms is a precondition for these gains to be achieved, the research community
1 In economics, excludable goods are those for which access can be denied, particularly if payment has not been received.
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has given this problem increasing attention (see Chapter 2 for an introduction to the very large research
literature on the subject). One of the main contributions of this thesis will be the development of an
indirect reciprocity mechanism to prevent freeloading. This mechanism relies only on self-certifying
identities, and is resistant to many identity-based attacks without requiring any trusted third parties or
certiﬁcation authorities.
Although freeloading is a fundamental issue for peer-to-peer overlays, it is only a symptom of a
much deeper problem: that Internet end-hosts are not under the administrative control of the overlay
protocol designers. This means that, since it is usually impossible to force them to behave in any given
way, they can impose their own preferred behaviour on the system. This happens because, in general,
the only pre-requisite that peers need to satisfy in order to function within the peer-to-peer overlay is
that they respect the relevant protocol deﬁnitions in their interactions with other peers; beyond that, they
have absolute freedom concerning the software logic they execute locally.
Thus, in the same way as it happens in standard economic settings, even if a protocol is designed
to optimise some system-wide measure of performance, peers can choose to behave differently in order
to maximise their own utility, with no regard for the utilities of other peers. In this more general setting
protocol design is further complicated, since the self-utility maximisation behaviour of the peers might
not be compatible with the welfare-optimisation objectives of the system designer.
The aforementioned problem is the main challenge underlying the design of incentive mechanisms,
which, formally, seek to align the utilities of the system and each individual peer participating in it (a
shared objective with mechanism design techniques [160, 111, 241, 77, 232, 136, 304]). Thus, when
engineering overlay network protocols for self-interested agents (and their associated incentive mech-
anisms), the protocol designer must deﬁne a set of protocol rules that include the desired outcome as
an equilibrium, while at the same time, ensuring that individual or coalitional deviation is unproﬁtable.
This is, in the general case, a very difﬁcult problem (see, for instance, [174, 220] and Chapters 2 and 3
of [242]).
In most settings of interest to peer-to-peer designers, and in many models presented in this thesis,
it is assumed that the only way that a peer can provide value to the overlay is through the contribution of
some of its resources, and the only way that a peer can extract value from the overlay is by consuming
the resources of other peers. Thus, the contribution and consumption of resources become the most
important elements in deﬁning peer utility, and an incentive mechanism becomes a set of rules that
deﬁne the relationship between the contributions that a peer provides to the peer-to-peer overlay and
the resources that it consumes from it. Thus, in this particular case, the problem of aligning selﬁsh
peer behaviour with desired protocol behaviour becomes one of resource allocation, and an incentive
mechanism becomes a set of of rules that stipulate which peers can gain access to which resources, and
under what circumstances.
If we consider the main design objectives of a peer-to-peer overlay, we see that it usually involves
the the efﬁcient distribution of content in a self-organising, scalable way. This is particularly important
in the case of QoS overlays, whose resource allocation is driven by complex protocols in which the
performance of the entire overlay becomes a function of which peers get service from which other peers,
and the large-scale service distribution topology induced by this (see Section 2.3 for speciﬁc examples of
how peer selection and resource allocation are adapted to a particular deﬁnition of service quality). Thus,
the execution of efﬁcient resource allocation functions is the explicit design objective (the raison d’ˆ etre)
of QoS overlays - which brings us to one of the central problems addressed in this thesis: as resource
allocation is the fundamental design tool for QoS overlay protocol design, resource allocation rules
related to the provision of incentives must coexist with those responsible for optimising the performance
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Conceptually, we can see the design of an incentive mechanism as an optimisation problem, where
the objective function is the alignment of peer and system incentives. On the other hand, the design of
the peer-to-peer protocol itself can be imagined as an optimisation problem where the objective function
is the performance of the overlay in the efﬁcient transport and caching of content. These two objective
functions might be very different indeed, leading to a conceptual model where overlay performance and
incentive alignment need to be jointly optimised, with the appropriate tradeoff between the two being
the main question to be answered in any particular proposed design.
In other words, since efﬁcient and decentralised resource allocation algorithms are the basis for
the design of QoS-overlay protocols, incentive mechanisms need to take their objectives and demands
into account, providing a way for tradeoffs to be made between the provision of incentives and the
optimisation of the peer-to-peer overlay. This will be denoted as the incentives problem, and proposing
a particular algorithm for its solution will be another main contribution of this thesis.
In addition to the incentives problem, QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet have
speciﬁc characteristics that set them apart from other peer-to-peer systems. In particular, when the
deﬁnition of a resource contribution is extended to include some notion of quality, a question arises
on whether the service quality received by a peer is representative of the behaviour of the peer serving
it - or just a consequence of the behaviour of the network between them. Thus, there is uncertainty
on whether the effect of a given action by a certain peer is a consequence of its own decisions (up
to and including deviation from the overlay network protocol) or a consequence of extrinsic factors,
such as prevailing network congestion. The ramiﬁcations of this uncertainty in the context of incentive
mechanism design are far-reaching, since it has an impact not only on the determination of how much
value do the contributions of a given peer actually have for the peer-to-peer overlay, but also on the
predictability and the quality guarantees that the overlay can ultimately achieve. Since the accurate
modelling of peer contributions and their effect on the quality levels that the peer-to-peer system can
deliver is central to the design of incentive mechanisms, another core contribution of this thesis is a
possible solution to this problem.
Although a large proportion of this thesis will be concerned with the analysis of the incentives of
individual peers, it is possible to apply the same modelling and analytical techniques to other situations
where incentives tensions surface. One of these is the interaction between managed overlays and their
underlying network connectivity providers (ISPs). In this case, however, our interest on incentives is
not related to protocol deviation or freeloading. Instead, our main question will revolve around the
predictive capabilities that an ISP could have on the incentives of a set of managed overlays that use
its infrastructure to deliver QoS-sensitive services. Thus, rather than modelling the incentives of single
peers and their alignment with the goals of a protocol designer, we postulate an incentives structure for
the managed overlays, and then attempt to formulate models for their behaviour as a function of the
behaviour of their underlying ISPs. We do this by proposing a utility function, and then obtaining the
optimal managed overlay behaviour given the incentive structure of the ISPs, as expressed by a set of
end-to-end prices. In particular, this utility optimisation framework can cast light on the load balancing
and trafﬁc ﬂow allocation incentives of managed overlays, while at the same time providing indirect
evidence that a particular economic framework provides ISPs with an incentive for the provisioning of
high quality, low price links. The development of such a model, as well as its analytical solution, will be
the fourth and ﬁnal contribution presented in this thesis.
1.2 Desired Properties for QoS Overlay Incentive Models
As previously discussed, peer-to-peer systems for which there is no contribution accounting and an
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degradation. In addition, the objectives of an incentive mechanism not always align with those of the
request scheduling and distribution topology construction algorithms employed on a given peer-to-peer
system. Again, a conceptual framework that explains this is simply that each of these two algorithms
optimises different objective functions: in the ﬁrst case, one related to ensuring fairness in the access to
resources, and in the second case, one related to maximising some quality measure.
Thus, as previously discussed, the task of achieving a balance between provisioning incentives for
participation and building efﬁcient distribution systems (what we have called the incentives problem)
takes the conceptual form of a multi-objective optimisation problem with complex constraints, usually
with “tradeoff” solutions that embody some degree of arbitrary assumptions (usually in the deﬁnition of
the peer and system utility functions). Thus, in presenting the contributions made in this thesis, it will
be advantageous to deﬁne which were the engineering objectives and assumption that guided the model
decisions presented in the next chapters.
The following objectives were the outcome of the literature review presented in Chapter 2. Es-
sentially, when assessing the state of the art, we found that a large proportion of the research literature
on incentive mechanisms failed to cleanly delineate the incentives problem, instead focusing on either
participation incentives or topology construction. Customarily, this main focus is then extended with
ad-hoc extensions to solve the incentives problem.
Furthermore, only a minority of studies focus on the provision of incentives for the speciﬁc case
of QoS-enabled peer-to-peer overlays deployed over the best effort Internet. Thus, by exploring the
application of traditional microeconomics techniques to guide the design of protocols that use QoS as
a tool for incentives provisioning, we aim to identify fruitful areas for further research. We aim to
capture this particular research inclination by establishing some traditional results from microeconomics
as desirable engineering objectives, when applied to QoS-enabled overlays.
Our basic assumption is that the main goal of any incentive mechanism will be to elicit peer be-
haviour that leads to the continued availability of overlay resources. Thus, as the resource demands
that a given peer imposes on the overlay grow, the incentive mechanism must ensure that its resource
contributions grow proportionally.
Property 1 (Fundamental Property of Incentive Mechanisms). An incentive mechanism makes the level
of access to overlay resources, including the service quality obtained from the system, contingent on the
amount and quality of the resource contributions that peers have made to it.
This means that one main objective of the incentive mechanisms to be presented is to account for
resource contributions, and then use this information to drive quality and resource allocation decisions.
We now present some other properties that we consider as desirable on a QoS overlay, and that are
therefore present as motivating assumptions in the contributions that we summarise in Section 1.3.
1.2.1 Deferred Indirect Reciprocity
Although many incentive mechanisms have focused on the instantaneous reciprocation of overlay con-
tributions (for instance, [84, 248] and [201]), we consider it advantageous to allow peers to decide when,
and with which peers, will their contributions to the overlay be reciprocated. We consider systems that
enable peers to use their contributions to obtain services from a set of peers different from those to which
contributions were made, and at a different time.
One of the reasons why contributing to a given peer while obtaining services from a different one
is useful involves user consumption patterns. In particular, it is advantageous for users (particularly
those in asymmetric connections) to contribute over long periods of time (during the time the user is not
actively using her computer, for instance), store these contributions, and consume them at a later time, at1.2. DESIRED PROPERTIES FOR QOS OVERLAY INCENTIVE MODELS 7
a possibly much higher rate. This allows peers to consume resources at their download rate, even if they
are unable to contribute to the overlay (upload) at this same rate.
An additional beneﬁt of a scheme like this is that it allows peers to contribute resources to the
system even if they are not interested in consuming those resources available at the time, thus reducing
the need for a simultaneous coincidence of wants between peers that are capable of providing a service
and those that require it. We state the following desirable property for our incentive mechanisms in light
of the discussion above2.
Property 2 (Deferred Indirect Reciprocity). The incentive mechanism is designed to allow peers to
contribute services to a set of peers at a given time, and obtain resources corresponding to those contri-
butions from a different set of peers at a different time, with no previous direct reciprocity requirement
between them.
1.2.2 Resistance to Identity Attacks and Untruthful Peers
The usual technique to achieve Property 2 is through the use of reputation systems (see Section 2.7),
where peers implement extended recommendation networks. However, most reputation systems are
vulnerable to sybil, slander and whitewashing attacks. While sybil attacks (the creation of arbitrary
numbers of identities) and whitewashing attacks (the discarding of identities that have been labelled as
malicious by other peers) depend on the very low cost of generating new identities [203], slander (lying
regarding the contributions of other peers) depends on the capacity of peers to modify protocol messages
as they forward them.
Since we do not assume a-priori that infrastructure is in place to aid in the solution of any of these
problems, we state the following desirable properties for our incentive mechanisms.
Property 3 (Resistance to Identity Attacks). The incentive mechanism is designed to be resistant against
sybil and whitewashing attacks, by ensuring that the proﬁt that peers can obtain from assuming multiple
identities is limited.
Property4(ResistancetoUntruthfulPeers). Theincentivemechanismisdesignedtoberesistantagainst
untruthful peers, by ensuring that peers are unable to proﬁt from modifying or discarding the protocol
messages sent by other peers.
1.2.3 Decentralisation
Since it is impossible to ensure the continuous presence of every peer in the overlay, peer-to-peer systems
need to be inherently resistant to peer churn, random peer failure and even denial of service attacks. This
is much easier if single points of failure can be avoided.
We will aim to design resource allocation protocols that are as decentralised as possible, and thus,
in general we will not assume that central control points are available. Furthermore, we note that one of
the most important characteristics of a peer-to-peer network with regards to the development of incentive
mechanisms is that each peer can potentially be under the control of a different administrative authority.
This implies that federated approaches that rely on arrangements between administrative domains might
be impractical in this context. We state the following desirable property in this regard.
Property 5 (Decentralisation). The incentive mechanism is designed to operate without need for cen-
tralised or federated infrastructure relying on agreements between administrative domains.
2It is interesting to note that Property 2 does not require any speciﬁc indirect reciprocity scheme. We shall present an speciﬁc
proposal based on arbitrarily long transitive contribution chains in Chapter 4. In practice, it may be that small transitive chains are
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From a system design point of view, we place the additional restriction that peers only keep track
of the contributions that they have given or received, so that only the two peers involved in the event of
providing a resource contribution (the peer who gives it and the peer who receives it) store a record for
it. This will make system design much simpler, and eliminate much of the trafﬁc that is necessitated by
distributed peer banks [132, 307] or threshold cryptography techniques [328].
Property 6 (Private Storage). The incentive mechanism is designed so that peers store a record only of
the contributions that they have given to other peers and received from other peers, not the contributions
between third parties.
1.2.4 Swarming and Overlay Topology Formation
We are interested in the development QoS-aware peer-to-peer protocols that use resource allocation both
for the construction of efﬁcient distribution overlays and to provide incentives for resource contribution.
We approach these two problems simultaneously because, as has been discussed before, incentive mech-
anisms must take into account the resource allocation particulars of the overlay network for which they
are being designed. We will call a decentralised resource allocation mechanism a swarming protocol,
and now discuss some desirable properties that a it should have.
The ﬁrst property that we address for the overlay construction protocol is that it should be efﬁcient.
This means that the system should be biased towards maintaining overlay associations between peers that
give each other good quality service, and avoid maintaining overlay connections for which the quality is
bad. Related to this, the system should provide peers with an incentive to shift their service requests from
peers who experience high load to other peers who can provide the service, but that have lower utilisation
levels. We call this property load awareness, and swarming algorithms having this property will be able
to provide peers with hints on what the balance between the load and the capacity of each peer is, and
thus, which are the peers with a higher probability for obtaining good quality service. Of course, we
seek these properties to be achieved simultaneously with Property 1: the incentive mechanism must still
provide peers with increasing beneﬁts as their contributed resources increase.
Another desirable property under consideration is that the system should allow peers to estimate
the beneﬁt that an interaction with another peer might give them. This will allow peers to trade off
contribution costs with service quality in an individualised fashion, allowing a great degree of ﬂexibility
in the system. We shall call this property preference freedom, and in practice it will mean that we do not
require all peers to calculate their utility from the system in the same way - the system should allow each
peer to have its own utility function. We now formalise these properties.
Property 7 (Efﬁciency). The system maximises the aggregate value that the peers obtain from it, by
giving priority to those service requests that bring the most beneﬁt to other peers.
Property 8 (Load-Awareness). The cost of obtaining services from a peer increases as its usage level
approaches its capacity.
Property 9 (Preference Freedom). Each peer is able to deﬁne its own set of preferences over possible
resource allocations. Equivalently, the beneﬁt that a given peer obtains from the system is only decided
by that peer.
1.2.5 Adherence to Advertised Service Levels
The earliest peer-to-peer networks did not include the notion of multiple levels of quality of service, other
thattheability(orlackthereof)tomakeuseofthesystematanessentiallyrandomlevelofquality. When,
however, one considers peer-to-peer networks with QoS classes deployed over the best effort Internet,
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between the situation where a QoS contract was breached because the serving peer delivered degraded
service itself, and an alternative situation where the serving peer delivered the service according to the
QoS contract, but its quality was degraded by the network path between itself and the client.
Two independent properties are required to address this issue. These do not have the same level
of generality as the previous ones, but will be nevertheless included as they are useful design objectives
addressed by contributions in this thesis.
Property 10 (Network-Based Service Quality Model). The incentive mechanism includes a model of the
inﬂuence of network conditions on the service quality received by a peer, as a function of the behaviour
of its serving peer and the prevailing network conditions.
Property 11 (Resistance to Hidden Action). The incentive mechanism provides an incentive to serving
peers to deliver their advertised service quality accurately, even if non-compliance could be in theory be
attributed to the prevailing network conditions.
1.2.6 Incentive Tensions Between Managed Overlays and ISPs
Most game theoretical models of peer-to-peer overlays focus on the incentives tensions between peers
(see, for instance, [141, 61, 35, 63] and Chapter 2), thus not including the ISP as an active player
(interesting exceptions can be found in [31, 211] and the selﬁsh routing literature). However, given the
large amount of bandwidth that peer-to-peer systems can command, the ISPs have taken a much more
active role in the management of peer-to-peer, spanning from techniques such as bandwidth capping or
throttling [312, 322] to cooperative approaches such as P4P/ALTO [320, 252].
Although the modelling of the incentive dynamics of coexisting managed overlays with a single
underlying ISP is interesting in its own right, we seek to model the preferences of overlays in the more
general setting where they can choose to allocate their trafﬁc matrix between a set of different ISPs. By
considering such an “unbundled ISPs” model together with multiple competing P4P-enabled overlays, it
becomes possible to consider a much wider array of preferences, thus achieving a more general model
for the incentives of managed overlays.
We consider that a model of managed overlay preferences that allows ISPs to predict the trafﬁc
matrices that an overlay will demand as a given of a given price structure by itself and its competing
ISPs would be of great help for network dimensioning, proﬁt optimisation and trafﬁc engineering. We
present the following desirable properties on the basis of which such an overlay preference model can
be scrutinised.
Property 12 (Flexibility). The preferences model for the managed overlay can be applied to a situation
where there is only one overlay and multiple ISPs, multiple overlays and a single ISP, and both multiple
overlays and ISPs.
Property 13 (Ease of Computation). The preferences model for the managed overlay should be scalable,
so that situations with thousands of network endpoints and hundreds of both ISPs and overlays can be
considered.
Property 14 (Parsimony). The preferences model for the managed overlay should make use of the min-
imum number of parameters.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
We now turn to a summary of the main contributions found in this thesis, and relate them to the desirable
incentive mechanism properties deﬁned in Section 1.2. A condensed representation of this can be found
in Figure 1.1, that shows the relationships between the chapters in this thesis, and the contributions that
can be found in each one of them.1.3. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 10
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Chapter 3
Theory
Chapter 4
Contributions: A sybilproof, 
distributed contribution transfer 
technique that becomes an 
incentives mechanism when 
coupled with indirect reciprocity
Chapter 5
Contributions:  Analytic models 
for an auction-based swarming 
protocol with QoS-based 
incentives, and a chunk 
swarming example 
Chapter 7
Contributions: Analytic models for 
ALTO managed overlay utility 
maximisation, overlay demand 
function ﬁtting and ISP proﬁt 
maximisation
Chapter 6
Contributions: An analytic hidden 
action model for chunk streaming 
based on a probabilistic model of 
service quality as a function of 
changing network conditions
Figure 1.1: Relationships between the chapters in this thesis.
1.3.1 Identity, Accountability and Sybil Attacks
We directly address Properties 1, 2, 6, 3, 4 and 5 in Chapter 4. Essentially, we propose a robust con-
tribution accounting system that allows indirect reciprocity without requiring peers to rely on possibly
false third-party information about the contributions of other peers. The system relies in a contribution
transfer operation based on path-wise maximum ﬂow, and is designed to be sybilproof [71, 262]. This
operation allows the transfer of previous contributions using source-routed messages over the contribu-
tion network of the peer-to-peer system.
The system uses self-certifying identities, is decentralised, bootstraps using reciprocative altruism
and is designed to be resistant to sybil and whitewashing attacks. Since the system relies on decomposing
indirect reciprocity as a routing problem, we present a biased sampling scheme to extract contribution
subgraphs over which contributions can be transferred using self-avoiding, truncated random walks for
topology discovery.
Our contributions in Chapter 4 are presented in three main parts. Firstly, we present the generalities
of our accounting system (Section 4.3), our proposed probabilistic topology sampling algorithm (Sec-
tion 4.4.1) and our contribution transfer protocol (Section 4.4.2). Secondly, we present our proposed
algorithm to seed the contribution network by identifying trust cycles (Section 4.5). Thirdly, we describe
our incentives system (Section 4.6). In Section 4.7 we present the attack resistance properties of our
proposed scheme, and in Section 4.8 we present some evaluation results.
1.3.2 Overlay Performance Optimisation
In Chapter 5 we address Properties 7, 8 and 9. The main objective for this chapter is to present a general
model for resource allocation and incentives in QoS overlays, and then apply it to one speciﬁc exam-
ple. This is done by leaving the QoS deﬁnitions for the speciﬁc services in question open, to be deﬁned
through the use of a valuation function and a quality mapping function. The resource allocation model
presented, based on multi-item Vickrey auctions, balances overlay optimisation with incentives by mak-
ing access to resources contingent on service value to the receiving peer, thus giving preference to those
overlay links that increase overall system utility the most, while at the same time giving peers with1.3. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 11
greater contributions to the overlay better quality service. In this case, the resource allocation tension be-
tween the incentive mechanism and the maximisation of overlay utility is resolved by breaking resource
allocation in two phases (access and quality mapping) and allowing each one of the aforementioned
processes to drive one of these phases. The system uses Vickrey auctions to decide which requests to
accept, a greedy utility maximisation heuristic to decide to which peers to send requests and how many
requests to send, and a ranking procedure for the contribution-based assignment of service quality to
service requests.
The structure of the Chapter 5 is as follows. In Section 5.1 we present the basic elements of an over-
layoptimisationtechniquebasedonmulti-itemVickreyauctions. Aspartofthistechnique, inSection5.2
we present closed form formulae for the estimation of parameters of interest such as the expectation of
the number of service units that a peer will win and the expectation of its utility, taking into account both
the beneﬁt it obtains from the system and the cost it needs to pay for it. In Section 5.2.2 a ranking-based
incentive mechanism is presented that operates in conjunction with the aforementioned auction-based
overlay optimisation technique. In Section 5.3 we present a peer selection algorithm that proceeds by
local maximisation, sending each additional bid to that peer that offers a larger utility for it. Finally, the
framework presented in Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 is applied to a simple chunk swarming scenario, and
some characteristic performance measures are presented for different peer delay distributions.
1.3.3 Non-observability of Peer Behaviour
The derivation of models that satisfy Properties 10 and 11, is the main contribution of Chapter 6. By tak-
ing a hidden action model usually used in microeconomics for the control of externalities in managerial
contracts and adapting it to be used in an overlay network setting, we present the optimal payments that
provide an incentive for the server peer to deliver its advertised service quality, even if failure to do so
could be misinterpreted by the client as a consequence of ﬂuctuating network conditions. We apply this
model to a chunk swarming scenario, and as part of the optimal price calculation we present a statistical
model for the quality outcomes of the client peer as a function of the behaviour of the server peer and a
model for the effect that the network has on service quality.
We propose a principal-agent model for hidden action that gives server peers sufﬁcient incentives
to meet their advertised effort levels, without client peers having to decide for each transaction whether
the outcome was due to server behaviour or network conditions. This allows peers to draft contracts that
provide incentives for truthful revelation of QoS capabilities, and to have predictable transaction quality.
The structure of Chapter 6 is as follows. In Section 6.2 we approach the general problem of hidden
action in QoS overlays, and present the optimal differentiated payments that a client must offer to provide
a server with the incentive to deliver its advertised level of service. In Section 6.3 we apply the model to
a delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlay for media streaming, and show how the model parameters
can be deﬁned in terms of observable network measurements.
1.3.4 Price, Proﬁt and Managed Overlays
We address the development of managed overlay incentives models in Chapter 7, where we present two
alternative models for overlay preferences and consider them in light of Properties 12, 13 and 14. These
models can be used by an ISP to optimise its own operation, since they allow the ISP to anticipate overlay
bandwidth demand as a function of the prices and overlay link qualities that it and its competing ISPs
offer. The ﬁrst model is based on postulating a utility function that has desirable characteristics, and
then solving it to obtain the maximal overlay network utility in a constrained optimisation problem (we
consider a budget constraint).
Since it is not always possible to measure the parameters of the previous model reliably, a second
model which is entirely based on curve ﬁtting is also presented, and then used as a restriction for a1.3. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 12
proﬁt-maximisation problem for the ISP. This model is based on the estimation of the cross elasticity of
demand between overlay ﬂows using least-squares regression.
The structure of Chapter 7 is as follows. In Section 7.1 discuss the situation to which we aim to
model: multiple overlays can compete with each other, and can choose from between various ISPs to
route trafﬁc between their participating sites. In Section 7.2, a model of an utility-optimising managed
overlay is presented for the situation described above, and solved in closed form, both for an ESP with
inﬁnite wealth and an ESP3 with a binding budget constraint. In Section 7.3 a model based on Cobb-
Douglas constant elasticity utilities is presented to ﬁt the overlay demand function experimentally, and
this model is later used in Section 7.3.3 to present a solved model for a proﬁt-maximising ISP.
3As deﬁned in Chapter 7, an ESP is an Edge Service Provider - a managed overlay.2
An Overview of Solutions to the Incentives
Problem
2.1 Why Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer Systems?
TheInternet, asanopenplatformforcommunicationsservicesinnovation, hasbecomewildlysuccessful.
As most of its intelligence is delegated to the user-controlled endpoints, it can quickly and ﬂexibly use
a set of core communications services, like network layer routing, to implement all kinds of application
layerservices. However, thissameopennessimpliesthatsomeofthemostimportantprotocolsoftwareof
the Internet resides outside the network, like the TCP implementations on the diverse operating systems
present in Internet-attached hosts. Thus, much of the behaviour of the Internet is under the control of end
users. This is particularly true with respect to peer-to-peer technologies: even though they are limited
in their expressive capability by the services that their underlying Internet provides, they still have great
freedom to interact with each other in almost arbitrary ways.
If overlay peers in the Internet could be considered obedient, they could be easily designed to
maximise the global utility of the system: the greatest good to the greatest number of peers, one may
say [48]. However, this might not lead to an equilibrium state where each agent is “content” with the
cost-beneﬁt it extracts from the system. Thus, if one considers strategic peers that will adapt to extract
as much beneﬁt as possible from the system while at the same time attempting to minimise or at least
control their contribution costs, protocol design becomes more difﬁcult - in essence, an exercise in the
prediction and control of the emergent properties of a complex dynamic system.
There are two fundamental instances in which these kinds of problems have been studied in the
broader context of human history: the understanding of the production, distribution and consumption
of goods and services (i.e. economics) and the structure and stability of human societies (sociology and
anthropology). In both cases, human beings are considered autonomous agents with volition: capacity
to exercise will, choice, and decision, but subject to motivation and coercion.
In [86], Coleman makes this distinction explicit:
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There are two broad intellectual streams in the description and explanation of social
action. One, characteristic of the work of most sociologists, sees the actor as socialised
and action as governed by social norms, rules, and obligations. The principal virtues of
this intellectual stream lie in its ability to describe action in social context and to explain
the way action is shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context. The other
intellectual stream, characteristic of the work of most economists, sees the actor as having
goals independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-interested. Its
principal virtue lies in having a principle of action, that of maximising utility.
(quote from [86]; emphasis added)
The analysis of strategic behaviour in complex systems has also been approached by biology, as it might
be argued that ecosystems have important commonalities with peer-to-peer systems. The non-random
survival of individual traits acted to ensure that those genomes that equipped organisms with more suc-
cessful strategies (those more capable to protect themselves, procure food or shelter, avoid detection or
ensure the survival of their young) were selected over the rest. Evolution by natural selection is, in a
way, a model of how to ﬁnd utility-maximising strategies, as measured by survival and reproduction
probabilities.
The parallel between human societies and peer-to-peer systems with strategic agents is clear as well.
Game theoretical models of political and economic situations routinely model humans as utility max-
imising autonomous agents. Humans will seek to maximise their utilities, and sometimes this will imply
the so-called price of anarchy: the optimality gap between a global social optimum and the aggregation
of local optima where each agent maximises its own utility, taking the actions of other agents as given.
Thus, protocol design for strategic agents has much to learn from biology, economics and sociology.
Unsurprisingly, some of the problems that had already received attention in these disciplines in the past
have resurfaced in the context of peer-to-peer systems. Take, for instance, freeloading on so-called ﬁrst
generation peer-to-peer networks. In his classic article, The Tragedy of the Commons [158], Hardin
analyses the inefﬁciencies of free access and unrestricted demand on shared resources. Hardin argues
that private utility maximisation by each one of the peers might drastically reduce the global utility of
the system, eventually decreasing every peer’s utility. This can be clearly seen in a ﬁle sharing, voluntary
swarming peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing system [167, 27]1.
Usually the Tragedy of the Commons is used as an argument for centralised economic control, as
it shows that systems of agents guided by private utility maximisation can converge to very suboptimal
outcomes (which are instances of market failure), and thus need external guidance in the form of taxation
incentives: the actions of self-interested individuals do not promote the public good.
However, implementing a trustworthy central authority capable of performing this taxation in a
peer-to-peer system is sometimes not only difﬁcult, but counterproductive: the reliability, scalability and
manageability gains stemming from a peer-to-peer distributed implementation are severely impacted
by the introduction of single points of failure, such as this central policing authority2. Thus, the idea
is to engineer behavioural patterns for peers that allow them to guide each other to an economically
viable, sustainable equilibrium that has appropriate fairness and efﬁciency properties, without the need
of a central authority. In some sense, we seek to engineer software agents that interact freely while
implementing Hardin’s solution to the Tragedy of the Commons: mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.
How to accomplish this and the situations under which it is feasible are part of the objective of this study.
1An example would be eMule[7], but with no credit buildup.
2This limitation is of interest even in the case of ofﬂine systems where punishment is not immediate, since in those cases greater
overlay resistance to auditing point failures can only be accommodated in detriment to the capacity of the overlay to dynamically
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2.1.1 Peer-to-Peer Resource Allocation with Strategic Peers
From the earlier discussion, it is clear that the control of externalities is a prerequisite for the implemen-
tation of Internet-scale, sustainable peer-to-peer systems. One way achieving this is to allocate system
resources preferentially to those peers that contribute more to its operation. Thus, we start our study of
peer-to-peer incentive mechanisms by considering distributed resource allocation mechanisms, so that
we can later on guide their operation as indicated by the peer resource contributions.
In general, resource allocation architectures can be classiﬁed as centralised, decentralised, hierar-
chical, and hybrid. Centralised schemes usually involve complex combinatorial optimisation algorithms
(see [72] and references therein). As a consequence of scalability and reliability issues, centralised re-
source allocation has not been widely used in peer-to-peer systems. Decentralised schemes, on the other
hand, usually require higher communication overheads [289], but these can usually be accommodated
withthecurrenttechnology. Thus, mostofthecommerciallysuccessfulpeer-to-peersystemsusethissort
of resource allocation strategy. Hierarchical systems have a rich tradition in the classical distributed com-
puting literature, as they approach the tight performance bounds of centralised systems while achieving
much greater scalability. Some examples can be found in Web caching architectures [331], grid com-
puting [62], fair packet queueing [46] and ﬁle sharing in peer-to-peer systems [195]. Napster, based on
a hybrid resource allocation system, uses a large cluster of dedicated servers to index the ﬁles that are
being shared by active peers at each moment in time. When a peer searches for a given ﬁle, it queries
these central servers through a set of dedicated connections. The servers then cooperate in a distributed
fashion to process the query and return a list of matching ﬁles, and their locations, to the peer. After
receiving the results, the peer may then select one or more ﬁles and locations from this list and initiate
ﬁle exchanges directly with other peers. Another instance of hybrid resource allocation is BitTorrent,
that relies on centralised trackers to point peers to other peers in a swarm, but from then on, uses a fully
decentralised data transfer paradigm.
A common underlying theme to many of the approaches above is that they assume the peers to be
either obedient (always following the prescribed protocols) or adversarial (seeking to actively disrupt
the protocol). Incentive-based mechanisms take a different approach, by considering peers as rational
protocol entities that will behave strategically3(see [241] and [111]). We cannot simply expect each
Internet host to faithfully follow the designed protocols or algorithms. It is more reasonable to expect
that each computer might try to manipulate them for its owners’ beneﬁt, and factor this in as part of the
engineering process.
2.1.2 Freeloading
Freeloading in peer-to-peer networks is a well-known problem (see [27, 277, 100, 276, 114, 181, 186,
209] and references therein, and [114] for a review of the literature from the standpoint of accountability
and externality elimination).
Freeloading has been problematic in the context of peer-to-peer networks because many of them
have been built around the assumption that peers would derive enough beneﬁt from the system to will-
ingly donate their resources for the common good. However, if a peer is able to enjoy the resources
of the peer-to-peer system without giving anything in return, the cost of its own contribution could be
bypassed to increase its utility. Thus, for each peer individually, the rational choice is to freeload, and
be supported by other contributing peers. If, however, an increasing number of peers take this stance,
a shrinking amount of resources will be shared among a growing number of users, until an eventual
system collapse when the costs of the users donating their resources outweigh the beneﬁts they reap
from other donors. This is an equilibrium condition: once a critical level of freeloaders has made the
3Strategic peers pursue their own purpose, and will use any resources available to them to increase their utilities.2.2. A TAXONOMY OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 16
system unusable, there is no incentive to donate resources until the freeloaders leave the system. This
freeloading behaviour has been conﬁrmed for many peer-to-peer systems, including Napster[277] and
Gnutella[27, 167].
There are many reasons why strategic peers would choose not to contribute resources to the system.
One such reason is the performance impact that its own downloads might suffer as a result of its uploads.
In [115], Feldman et al. explore the interference of uploads with download TCP acknowledgements
as a disincentive for sharing. As upload bandwidth utilisation increases, the queueing latency of TCP
acknowledgements increases, and thus the RTT for the connection as well. This decreases the download
throughput, acting as a disincentive for the peer. Feldman et al. derive simple models for latency on
source and destination dominated congestion scenarios, and conclude that the cost of sharing increases
with the average level of sharing, and thus with the general performance of the system. This would imply
that the prioritisation of acknowledgements in the peer’s upload would signiﬁcantly increase their utility
in large peer-to-peer systems. However, in general terms, there is a disincentive for users to devote their
entire upload capacity for the beneﬁt of the peer-to-peer overlay; that is the reason why a vast number of
peer-to-peer client users choose to rate-limit their peer-to-peer uploads.
2.2 A Taxonomy of Peer-to-Peer Systems
Peer-to-peer systems are conventionally deﬁned as Internet-wide distributed systems formed by the pool-
ing of resources of large numbers of low-cost, off-the-shelf systems, each under its own administrative
control (usually individuals with basic computation and Internet connectivity resources). Although they
can command formidable resources, due to to the sheer number of members that comprise them, they
incur signiﬁcant communication and processing costs in doing so. Reducing the inefﬁciencies related to
their distributed resource allocation protocols is still an ongoing research problem.
The high degree of decentralisation of peer-to-peer overlays allows them to achieve very high levels
of scalability at very low cost, but demands advanced search and content transfer protocols in order to
achieve sufﬁciently high levels of efﬁciency. Because of this, many peer-to-peer system designers opt
for hybrid architectures where some functionality is centralised.
In terms of the content dependency of their overlay topologies, peer-to-peer systems can be either
structured or unstructured. Structured overlays are characterised by their strict control of the over-
lay topology, usually following the keyspace structure of an underlying DHT (Distributed Hash Table)
which deﬁnes where media content is stored (this reduces content search to a routing problem). On the
other hand, unstructured overlays use adaptive routing and ﬂooding algorithms to implement topology-
independent functionality.
The design of high-performance overlays for delay and QoS-sensitive content has been a very active
area of research in the last 10 years [208]. In general, research has moved from a tree-based [98,
325, 42, 166, 175] to multi-tree based architectures [65, 66, 182, 247], and lately to mesh-based ones
[75, 327, 37, 214, 300]. The mesh and multi-tree architectures have been compared [215], with the
mesh systems exhibiting superior performance when evaluated under conditions of continuous churn.
This happens, predominantly, due to the static mapping of content to a particular tree, and due to the
deﬁnition of each peer as an internal node in one tree and as a leaf in all the others.
A further distinction is usually made between systems in which peers pre-arrange with their down-
stream peers which data subsets will be forwarded (push systems, such as [282, 42, 281, 65, 66, 166,
247]) and those where peers explicitly request data subsets from their upstream peers (pull systems, such
as [327, 163, 253, 213]). The use of features from push systems to alleviate performance bottlenecks in
pull systems has created a new class of peer-to-peer streaming algorithms, known as push-pull or hybrid
algorithms (see [300, 215, 326, 194]). These algorithms combine deterministic topology formation and2.2. A TAXONOMY OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 17
chunk scheduling (the push elements) with arbitrary chunk negotiation and explicit requests (the pull
elements) in order to achieve highly efﬁcient swarming with low delay and a small number of repeated
or delayed chunks.
There is an evolving drive towards the design of locality-aware peer-to-peer overlays (see, for in-
stance, [50, 67, 271, 270, 64]). One particular solution to this issue that leverages advanced mathematical
techniques is the deployment of synthetic coordinate systems, such as [94, 280, 200, 239].
A necessarily brief overview of peer-to-peer overlays follows, focusing in speciﬁc examples rather
than an exhaustive enumeration (the reader is pointed to the many surveys on the area, such as [210] and
[208]).
2.2.1 Structured Peer-to-Peer Techniques
In structured peer-to-peer systems, each data object is stored in a peer (or set of peers) in a deterministic
fashion according to a unique key that resides in the same space as the unique peer identiﬁers (peer-IDs).
The underlying DHT implements deterministic storage and retrieval operations: the key of the data object
deﬁnes the ID of the peer where it will be stored, and the overlay route that searches for such a data object
will follow. Thus, all peers must maintain routing tables that allow them to forward data object queries
efﬁciently, so that they are received by the peer whose peer-ID is responsible for the keyspace slice to
which the requested key belongs.
Where the various structured peer-to-peer systems differ is in the construction of the routing tables
and the topology of the underlying keyspace. As there is usually no correlation between the topology of
the keyspace and the delay characteristics of the Internet between any two peers on an structured overlay,
the routing and search delay for these systems might be large when compared to a centralised data
repository. However, their distributed nature makes them much more scalable and resilient to targeted
attacks.
One early example of a DHT with some degree of locality awareness is CAN [260], a structured
overlay whose keyspace is organised as a d-dimensional multitorus. Each peer is responsible for the
management of a slice of object IDs (its zone), and routes object queries using greedy forwarding to the
peer closest to the key. The system uses DNS for bootstrapping, and soft state coordinate maintenance
messages for churn management.
In [329], Zhao et al. present Tapestry, an overlay system where a circular keyspace is organised as a
Plaxton mesh: a static architecture for peer-to-peer search where peers route queries by forwarding them
to the node whose ID is numerically closest to the destination of the query. The tables to achieve this
have multiple levels, one for each digit of the key. Similarly to Chord, the number of hops that a query
needs to reach its destination grows logarithmically with the number of peers.
Chord [231] uses consistent hashing techniques [188] to distribute subsets of the keyspace amongst
a changing number of peers, so that the keyspace under the responsibility of each peer is approximately
equal in size. The keyspace in Chord is the set of integers modulo 2m - a unidirectional circle formed by
2m keys. Peers in this keyspace then form an overlay network of logarithmically spaced chords, which
ensures that a given query will reach its destination after O(log(n)) steps, where n is the number of
peers in the overlay. Another system very similar to Chord is Pastry [64, 270], whose main contribution
is the implementation of a routing overlay using a Chord-like DHT as a substrate. Since the weights for
this routing overlay are supplied by the applications who use the system, any combination of metrics can
be used - an obvious choice is the use of latency measurements to implement network locality awareness
in content replication scenarios.2.3. SWARMING TECHNIQUES FOR STREAMING OVERLAYS 18
2.2.2 Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Techniques
In unstructured peer-to-peer networks there is no emphasis on prescribing any network topology to ﬁt the
structure of a keyspace. Thus, there is no deterministic way to ensure, ahead of time, the overlay route
that a request must take in order to be received by the peer which might answer it. To make up for this,
peers use optimised ﬂooding techniques in conjunction with routing tables linking data object identiﬁers
and “next-hop” peer identiﬁers. Thus, unstructured systems have markedly different performance as the
replication of the data objects increases: popular objects are more densely replicated, and thus found
quickly and efﬁciently, while unpopular objects are found either slowly or not at all. A by product
of this independence between the position of a peer on the overlay topology and the keys of the data
objects under its control implies that queries for unpopular data objects could be received by a large
proportion of the peers in the overlay, and thus the routing and replication of ﬂooded queries can place
high computation and bandwidth demands on the peers. On the other hand, unstructured systems can be
designed to incorporate network proximity in a natural way, and are inherently more robust against peer
churn.
One of the earliest peer-to-peer systems, Gnutella, uses unstructured overlay techniques to imple-
ment distributed data object location capabilities over a ﬂat peer topology4. Thus, it has no control over
data object placement or overlay construction. Data object search is resolved using query ﬂooding, lim-
ited by TTL. When peers receive queries, they check for matches with the data objects under their control
(when necessary, data objects are assigned arbitrary IDs) and respond to the query originators if a match
is found. Bootstrapping is accomplished with a set of infrastructure peers.
Another unstructured overlay is BitTorrent [20, 21]. While Gnutella provided distributed content
location with point to point transfers, BitTorrent was developed to provide massively distributed ﬁle
transfers (swarming), relying on centralised systems for peer location (via servers called trackers) and
for content search and indexing, through off-protocol websites such as [13, 15].
BitTorrent is designed for the distribution of large ﬁles. The metadata related to a single ﬁle is
stored in a torrent ﬁle, which includes the URL of a tracker. The tracker uses a simple HTTP-based
protocol to maintain and communicate information on the all the peers participating in the torrent. After
obtaining a peer list from the tracker, the peers can contact other peers directly for data transfer.
InBitTorrentdataobjects(ﬁles)aresubdividedinconstantlengthchunks, thatareindividuallytrans-
ferred through the overlay. When peers ﬁnish downloading a given chunk, they announce its availability
to their peers, so that they can request it. Using these announcements and partial maps downloaded when
initially contacting their peers, peers can build fragment chunk availability maps.
Data exchange in BitTorrent proceeds in 10 to 30 second window intervals. During each interval,
peers measure the throughput obtained from their peers, and refuse to upload to those peers whose
performance is unsatisfactory (this is called choking). In this way, peers use their own upload bandwidth
as a resource to obtain as high download bandwidth as possible (details on this application of Tit-for-Tat
as an incentive mechanism can be found in Section 2.6.1).
2.3 Swarming Techniques for Streaming Overlays
2.3.1 Push Peer-to-Peer Streaming Systems
In a push peer-to-peer streaming system each peer agrees on a long-term contract with its “upstream”
peers, so that they will continue to forward streaming content continuously, with no re-negotiation or
re-requesting needed. Thus, after a relationship between peers is deﬁned, it will remain stable for a
continued period of time. The content to be streamed is deﬁned at the moment of contract creation, and
does not need to be re-negotiated.
4Version 0.6 of the protocol does include superpeers, but in the original implementation all peers (servents) were identical.2.3. SWARMING TECHNIQUES FOR STREAMING OVERLAYS 19
Early systems for peer-to-peer streaming were based in the concept of chaining [282], where a
centralised server ofﬂoads some of the streaming upload effort to downloading clients which also do it
in a recursive fashion, building a long streaming chain. Although chaining is simple, it suffers from very
high end-to-ed delay (in fact, near the maximum possible) and very small resilience towards churn or
QoS instabilities in the distribution chain.
To reduce the playback delay from the stream source and increase efﬁciency, techniques were devel-
oped based on the construction and maintenance of an Application Layer Multicast (ALM) distribution
tree. For instance, in [42, 281] Sherwood et al. present a streaming system (NICE) where a distribution
tree is built by aggregating peers into clusters, which then are represented by a cluster head. The cluster
heads aggregate themselves into clusters as well, which then elect a cluster head. This process continues
until every peer is reachable by every other peer through a path composed uniquely of cluster heads. Al-
though NICE had desirable delay, stretch and stress properties5, it suffered from lack of resilience against
churn and peer heterogeneity, which could lead to unbalanced tree constructions and thus unpredictable
end-to-end QoS.
A direct way to improve the performance of a tree-based approach is to use, instead of a single
application level multicast tree, a number of trees that have disjoint topologies. A system of this kind is
SplitStream [65, 66], where a stream is divided in substreams (stripes) that are carried over independent
application layer multicast trees. In order to prevent correlated failure of many trees given a single peer
failure or churn event, SplitStream requires every peer to be an inner node in just one tree, remaining a
leaf in all the rest. By applying this idea to the transport of video streams, CoopNet [247] delivers greater
resilience at the cost of increased delay and signalling overhead (see Section 2.8 for a more complete
description).
2.3.2 Pull and Hybrid Peer-to-Peer Streaming Systems
In a pull peer-to-peer streaming system, peers only agree to very short contracts - of possibly a single
chunk in length. Thus, contracts need to be continuously re-negotiated in case of long interactions.
The typical example of this is per-chunk requesting, where peers will only forward chunks if the “down-
stream” peer explicitly requests it. Pull architectures require much greater signalling overheads (possibly
including increased delay), but are more resilient to peer churn and erratic peer behaviour, and more re-
sponsive to network congestion and loss events. Another beneﬁt of pull architectures is that they can
be naturally applied to arbitrary overlay topologies using gossip (epidemic) algorithms [108]. Thus, the
pull architecture is favoured by mesh systems like PROMISE [163] or PULSE [253]. Another example
is CoolStreaming [327], where Zhang et al. describe a peer-to-peer streaming system in which peers
begin with a random set of neighbours from which they can request chunks, and progressively reﬁne it
depending on the QoS that they experience. Further, they present a heuristic scheduling algorithm to
maximise the QoS that a peer can obtain from its neighbours, and algorithms to deal with node churn.
Recently, hybrid systems have been developed that take advantage of the beneﬁts provided by both
the push and pull architectures. In [326], Zhang et al. describe a mesh-based system where an un-
structured overlay is formed using a gossip-based protocol, which is then used to implement a push-pull
streaming mechanism. After an initial negotiation, sending peers begin pushing chunks to receiving
peers, until they decide to re-negotiate their relationship (possibly with a different sending peer).
5Stretch, from [42], is deﬁned as the ratio between the distance between two peers over the overlay tree and its distance over
the physical network topology. Stress, from [166], is deﬁned as the average number of identical copies of a packet that are carried
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2.4 Network Locality Awareness
2.4.1 Application Layer Anycast
Although there has been some research on anycast services at the network layer [41, 189], the difﬁcul-
ties in establishing such a service have pointed researchers to application level solutions. In [324] and
[110],the authors discuss anycast resolvers similar to those currently used by DNS. In the application
layer, Content Distribution Networks (e.g. [2]) can be used to to implement locality-aware DNS resolu-
tion. However, they rely on a network of proprietary servers and have shown widely varying efﬁciency
[291].
The Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3) [288] proposes a generic indirection mechanism sup-
porting unicast, multicast, anycast and mobility. In i3, group membership is not scalable, since a single
node maintains all members of a group. To support large groups, i3 uses a hierarchy of triggers that have
to explicitly constructed and balanced.
Many anycast systems based on peer-to-peer techniques have been proposed. In [67], Castro et al.
propose an anycast system to build and maintain application-level multicast trees for group management.
The system is based on the publish-subscribe functionality of Scribe[271], which itself uses Pastry as
an overlay substrate. As Pastry [270, 64] tries to minimise network delay stretch by using a scalar
proximity metric (like number of IP hops) and Scribe enables the formation of publish/subscribe groups,
the system in [67] is capable of performing anycast through Pastry using Scribe groups. Thus, the system
is designed to respond to queries with the location of a resource using a proximity aware metric, but not
necessarily to return the closest resource replica as measured in the proximity metric.
By framing the anycast problem as a constrained search problem, techniques based on content-
aware query routing become applicable. In [265] Rhea and Kubiatowicz propose an algorithm based
on attenuated Bloom ﬁlters to enhance the performance of Internet-scale location mechanisms. It
uses Tapestry [329] as a locality-aware DHT, and is thus capable of ﬁnding replicated content that is
proximity-metric “close” to any given query site. The system, however, might be insensitive to per-
formance penalties on congested or long-distance links. By using approximation heuristics to the well
known Steiner Tree Problem, Majumder et al. present a publish/subscribe routing technique [217] that
could be used to build locality-aware anycast system within a polylogarithmic factor of the optimum.
2.4.2 Network Coordinate Systems
Synthetic coordinate systems associate a coordinate with each peer in an overlay network, in such a way
that the distance between the coordinates is a good estimate of some network property measured between
the peers, predominantly round trip time (RTT). This can be achieved efﬁciently by using a limited set of
end-to-end measurements to extrapolate those distances between peers that were not explicitly measured.
Thus, synthetic coordinate systems use a limited set measurements to model the structural properties of
the Internet, and then use this model to predict end-to-end properties (such as RTT) between arbitrary
peers.
The ﬁrst step in the operation of a network coordinates system is generating a sampled distance
graph, where links between peers represent distance measurements. Of course, there is no requirement
on this graph to contain all peers in the Internet, nor for this graph to be complete - the point of this
techniques is to rely in a small number of measurements to ﬁt a distance model, which is then used as
an approximation. This ﬁtting process can be understood as metrically embedding the sampled distance
graph onto a space that integrates some of the structural properties of the Internet. Examples of these
include an standard Euclidean space [90], an Euclidean space augmented with a purely additive coordi-
nate [94] or a hyperbolic space [280]. The embedding process can be viewed as an error minimisation
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the measurements and the embedded distances is minimised. Once this embedding has been done, and
to the extent that the embedding space faithfully recovers the structure of the Internet for the measure
in question, geodesic distances over this space are good predictors of the actual end-to-end properties of
the Internet [200].
2.5 Incentives and Resource Allocation - Markets
The use of markets to solve resource allocation problems in massively distributed systems is by no means
a new idea [284], and it has been widely addressed in the literature. However, when compared to other
algorithm design methodologies, it has failed to spawn a large body of computer science research or to
achieve widespread distribution in end user applications.
As bandwidth and computing power become cheaper, many Internet connected computer systems
are experiencing a large surplus of bandwidth and processing resources, so that aggregated together, a
peer-to-peer system can harness a very large aggregated capacity. However, resource coordination at
Internet-wide levels can incur very large overheads. Market economies [284] have been proposed to
address this issue in the light of the following recent changes in the Internet landscape:
1. Flashcrowds: Even though there is an increasing amount of idle resources in end hosts, episodes
of enormously increased demand have been shown to require large over-provisioning in order to
maintain adequate quality of service (QoS) levels. This is compounded by the fact that, in many
situations, ﬂashcrowds are essentially indistinguishable from distributed denial-of-service attacks
[88].
Because in peer-to-peer systems server power scales directly with client power, peer-to-peer sys-
tems scale well with sudden increases in demand, allowing consistent QoS level to be presented at
the application layer.
2. Computational Power: End hosts have increased enough in their computing power to be able to
solve the combinatorial problems endogenous to pricing and best response function estimation.
Market-based solutions approach the resource management problem by assigning each peer the
responsibility of procuring its own resources in an optimum way. Thus, each possible solution to a
resource allocation problem will have a measure of how good it is for each peer, and each peer will adjust
its own actions in order to maximise its utility given the actions of the other peers. In an environment
with no scarcity, each peer would be able to access shared resources in such quantity and quality that its
utilitywouldbemaximal. However, ifresourcesarescarce, competitioncanbeusedasatoolforresource
allocation. In general, mechanisms based on competition tend to operate well, producing allocations that
are efﬁcient even if agents are not completely capable of determining their best courses of action [138].
Thus, market resource allocation can be studied through competition, and the study of competition
can be naturally approached from the perspective of game theory. Competition is then “a process of
strategic decision-making under uncertainty” [224]. Market competition allows the integration of private
information of all economic agents in a single information item (the resource price) that reveals its true
value to the set of consumers. Additionally, this price estimation can be more accurate that the best
estimation of any single economic agent in the group (for a very readable account on this, see [293]).
In one of the ﬁrst papers addressing the use of economic models for computing resources allocation,
[294], Ivan Sutherland describes a system in which different economic agents (research groups within a
university) periodically receive an allocation of virtual currency (called yen) that cannot be saved beyond
the period when it was received. This means that there is no incentive to hoard, and the economic actors
focus its usage on trading and pricing. To avoid currency depletion and starvation, yen are automatically
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In [249], Papadimitriou states that “the Internet is unique among all computer systems in that it
is built, operated, and used by a multitude of diverse economic interests, in varying relationships of
collaboration and competition with each other.” Thus, game theory and economics, with their fresh
supply of techniques applicable to ensembles of autonomous agents with conﬂicting and competing
interests, will be fundamental in the modelling, analysis and design of Internet-wide technologies. Some
interesting research questions posited by Papadimitriou include the Price of Anarchy (the difference
between the system-wide utility of an equilibrium attained without any central intervention and one
obtained through central optimisation), the performance analysis of market-based equilibria, the use of
mechanism design to ensure socially optimal equilibria, the role of externalities in privacy and security
issues in the Internet, the development of market-driven clustering algorithms and the modelling of
network topologies as equilibria of economic processes.
The idea that any consumption of peer-to-peer resources by a peer has a value, and can be there-
fore imbued with a price, is appealing. Thus, peers are provided with an incentive to devote resources
to the peer-to-peer system (acting as servers) because they will be paid by consuming peers (acting as
clients). This payment can be either in actual national currencies (pounds sterling, euros, dollars, etc) or
in intra-system currency exchangeable by electronic goods or services. In any event, the currency units
are assumed to have an intrinsic value, and game theoretical formalisms rely on the conversion of peer
utility in currency terms for the determination of appropriate payments (see, for instance, [141]). There
are a number of drawbacks for purely monetary systems, such as the need for a micropayment infras-
tructure, central usage accounting and contract dispute resolution, trust anchoring and delegation (in case
of distributed bank functions), economic cycle control (inﬂation and deﬂation avoidance), valuation and
pricing, and communication and computation overheads for market convergence.
These problems notwithstanding, market systems have been repeatedly proposed in order to solve
the incentives and resource allocation problem in an scalable fashion. In [121] Ferguson et al. use
economic models to coordinate the activities of strategic agents. A general framework is presented
and applied to load balancing, resource allocation, ﬂow control, data management and QoS enabled
queueing. Another example is [159], where Hardy and Tribble propose including in the header of Layer
2 frames a ﬁeld that describes the value of the frame, expressed in some fraction of an actual legal
tender currency. When these packets are transmitted through inter-operator boundaries, the costs are
accumulated and cleared periodically by using conventional electronic funds transfer. Thus, Hardy and
Tribble proposes the idea of micro-payment based inter-domain billing, with reputation systems used for
risk minimisation.
2.5.1 Early Market-based Systems - MojoNation
An early example of an actual peer-to-peer overlay implementation that included a market-based incen-
tive mechanism is MojoNation, described in [225] by McCoy and Wilcox. MojoNation used centralised
currency and credit windows to create an open market for ﬁle fragments, where fragment storage, track-
ing, search, caching and trafﬁc relaying were all services paid for in virtual currency (called mojo). Mo-
joNation attempted demand-informed caching in an attempt to achieve locality and performance gains,
and erasure coding to improve availability. Additionally, peers in MojoNation implemented a reputation
system that included QoS attributes and credit ratings. All these ideas notwithstanding, MojoNation was
unable to establish itself in the peer-to-peer market, and some of the reasons for its failure are discussed
in [316]. In particular, it was observed that users did not remain in the network for extended periods of
time. The most common behaviour was to join the network, stay for less than an hour, and then leave
to never return. In fact, more than 85% (and maybe up to 90%) of all users remained in the network for
less than 24 hours. Additionally, of those peers who did participate in the network for more than a day,
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peers had a tendency to be exceedingly unreliable, and strategies that relied on long-lived peers were
difﬁcult to implement6.
However, this study was carried out from October 2000 to February 2001, when the behaviour and
expectations of users were widely different than those of 2008: only around 9 million U.S. Internet users
had broadband connectivity then [250], compared to 84 million in 2006 [164] and around 122 million in
2008 [165]. In addition, most Internet users in 2000 and 2001 experienced time-based billing, whereas
most Internet users today pay ﬂat rates, with possible download caps [89].
Another issue raised in [316] is that, at any given time, around 30% of all MojoNation peers were
not Internet reachable due to NATs. An unknown number of additional users did have routable addresses,
but were not reachable due to ﬁrewalls. This continues to be a problem [122, 151].
Another reason why MojoNation experienced network-wide disruption was the peer bootstrapping
procedure. Initially, MojoNation used a centralised introducer server, which was easily overloaded
when a ﬂashcrowd hit the system after being advertised in a popular website7. Trying to solve this
problem, MojoNation substituted its original central server by a virtualised set of redundant servers
undercentralisedcontrol(thissolutionwasalsoimplementedbyFastTrack-basedsystemssuchasKazaa,
Grokster, iMesh and others, and also by Napster). Another way to set up the initial bootstrapping is to
bundle with the software an original list of contacts that may or may not be under central control (like
Limewire[12]), or requiring the user to obtain contact information for some peers manually, using out
of system mechanisms such as the personal social network of each user (like Freenet[10]). Another
design failure that Wilcox-O’Hearn discuss in [316] was the inappropriate use of erasure codes. The
design objective behind their use was to increase data reliability, even in the presence of high peer churn
and turnover: “...MojoNation used an erasure code to split the data into a set of shares such that any
sufﬁciently large subset of the shares would sufﬁce to rebuild the data” [316]. The system was designed
in such a way that only half the peers that were present when the content was initially replicated were
needed to retrieve it. However, if the number of peers is less than this critical number, no retrieval
is possible - not even partial retrieval. Given the enormous turnover rates experienced in MojoNation,
many of the peers that were online when some content was uploaded simply disappeared with the erasure
code pieces on them, permanently harming data availability. Wilcox-O’Hearn identify the need to give
preference to long lived peers to store ﬁle fragments, rather than treating newcomers and old peers as
equals when deciding where to place the erasure code replicas (a dynamic, adaptive coding framework
was not explored).
2.5.2 Market-based Systems in the Research Literature
Another currency-based system is KARMA [307]. In KARMA, each participant is assigned a single
scalar, called its karma, that is at the same time a currency amount and a reputation rating. Whenever a
peer contributes resources, its karma is increased (the peer is paid), and when it consumes resources its
karma is reduced (the peer pays). The karma of a peer is controlled by a bank set elected through Pastry
[270]. Each one of the member peers of the bank set of another given peer maintains its balance and its
latest transactions. If no peers left the system, the amount of karma in the system would remain constant:
KARMA does not allow peers to create wealth. Thus, when new peers join the peer-to-peer system and
old peers leave, the amount of karma decreases, increasing the risk of starvation. To prevent this, there
are periodic, network-wide signalling episodes where each peer learns the total amount of karma and
the total number of users in the system, and adjusts the karma accounts that they control to compensate
6 In a 2005 study [256], Pouwelse et al. track the distribution of a large ﬁle in a BitTorrent swarm, and state that less than 4% of
all BitTorrent peers remain in the swarm 10 hours after they have ﬁnished downloading the ﬁle. However, later studies [290, 311]
have reported increasing numbers of stable peers.
7From [18]: The Slashdot effect is the term given to the phenomenon of a popular website linking to a smaller site, causing the
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for any surplus or missing karma. This is, from a practical perspective, of limited efﬁcacy: any peer-to-
peer operation that requires network-wide coordination can be very difﬁcult to maintain successfully in
practice.
Ofﬂine Karma [132] extends KARMA by relaxing its online transaction veriﬁcation requirement
on the bank set of each peer, therefore enabling ofﬂine transactions. Double spending of currency is no
longer preventable, and thus the system is aimed at fraud detection and accountability. Ofﬂine Karma
uses partial hash collisions to limit the rate of currency minting. Currency in this system is transferable
by nested digital signing, in exactly the same way as iWat [273, 173] and SHARP [78, 125]. However,
Ofﬂine Karma limits the growth in coin sizes (which was ﬁrst encountered in the context of digital
cash schemes [69]) by forcing each coin to be “re-minted” periodically during the lifetime of the coin.
When a coin is re-minted double spending can be detected and its associated history, in the form of its
nested signature sequence, removed (this might be beneﬁcial for privacy reasons, as well). The peers
responsible for re-minting are elected in a similar fashion to the bank set in KARMA: by proximity in
the ID space of a DHT.
Another similar system, (PPay) [321], is a micro-payment scheme optimised for peer-to-peer ap-
plications. PPay seeks to eliminate the central bank bottleneck of common micro-payment systems by
delegating some of its functions to the peers. Each peer purchases raw coins from a central bank and
then is able to re-assign them to other users by digitally signing them. However, the coin growth prob-
lem of WAT tickets is avoided by implementing an online coin reassignment protocol, where the original
holder of the raw coin is required to reassign the coin after each transaction. This means that online
bank functions are taken by the peers themselves, and problems may arise if they are not continuously
available to manage their reassigned coins. To this end, an downtime protocol is used. As payments are
made ofﬂine, coin fraud cannot be prevented, but it can be detected and controlled. The system scalabil-
ity is improved by using soft credit windows, which essentially implements micro-payment accounts for
transaction amounts smaller that the minimum value of a coin.
One of the problems of market-based approaches is price determination, which can be addressed
in various ways. In [313], Wang and Li propose a market-driven bandwidth allocation procedure for
overlay networks with strategic peers. Peers trade bandwidth units (in the form of one-hop ﬂows) for
currency units with peers in their neighbourhood. Bandwidth providing and consuming peers and are
chosen so that a utility function that considers upload utilisation, download utilisation, paid currency
costs and earned currency income is maximised. Pricing is determined by using reinforcement learning
techniques, so that the price charged for each unit of bandwidth maximises utility in the light of past
system performance. The system uses the Receiver Only Packet Pair bandwidth estimation method
[197] to determine bottleneck bandwidth and thus feed this into the local utility functions.
There have been attempts to create a generic framework for the practical implementation of cur-
rency based systems. In [302] a generic public-key based protocol for pairwise resource trading with
strategic peers that deﬁne their own pricing policies, and where multiple competing currency systems
exist, is deﬁned. This protocol (LCP, Lightweight Currency Protocol) uses trust-based currencies in
a similar spirit to SHARP [125] and iWAT [273]. These currencies are exchanged by means of four
different primitives, each one implemented in a particular protocol message: transferFundsRequest,
transferFundsResponse, getDepositsRequest and getDepositsResponse. Currency issuers expose a
Web Services applications programming interface (API), by using WSDL (Web Services Deﬁnition Lan-
guage [19]) to bind a public key with a domain name, and SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol [17])
over HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol [11]) to exchange protocol messages. This means that any peer
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2.5.3 Systems based on Exchange/Barter Economies
The design of contribution accounting mechanisms can beneﬁt from the analysis of bartering schemes
for small communities, such local virtual currencies [173, 287] or peer-to-peer lending [192, 70]. The
WAT system was conceived and launched in 2000, and it enables Japanese farmers to issue self-certiﬁed
acknowledgements of personal debt (IOUs) that can be transferred along chains of trust, in such a way
that there is no superior administration group controlling the relationships between any two ordinary
participants [206]. Thus, in a way, the WAT system is a conversion mechanism between capital in
currency form and social capital. In practice, the WAT system works by providing enhanced bartering
possibilities for the users of the system, which is now spreading rapidly and widely in Japan (due to
its government-independent nature, it is difﬁcult to ascertain exactly what its scale of use is, and how
many participants are involved in it). Its users tout it as an effective means of payment, which in addition
creates and strengthens cycles of trust among groups of participants.
The operation of the system is simple. Any person can issue a WAT ticket, which becomes active
by being signed8. The ticket represents a commitment on part of the issuer to present to the bearer,
at redemption, certain goods (or to provide a given service). Each recipient of the ticket may pass it
on to other economic actors by signing the ticket with his/her personal signature. Therefore, the ticket
becomes a record of all the transactions that it has supported, and by navigating social trust chains, it
transforms reputation and trustworthiness (social capital) into economic solvency.
In [36] the WAT system is complemented by integrating self-guarantees, in the form of legal tender
currency. Thus, economic value on a given WAT system can be supplemented if necessary by tying
its value to other currency systems (maybe even other complementary currency systems). This means
that different currency systems can inter-operate with each other in a peer-to-peer fashion, by converting
their monetary value into trust (operationally, this is similar to the currency exchange procedures for
the Lightweight Currency Protocol [302]). Like KARMA (and conventional digital transferable cash
[69]), iWat, the digital implementation of the WAT system [273], has the property that as a WAT ticket
circulates the economy, it grows in size, as each participant peer adds its own digital signature. Another
very similar system is SHARP [78, 125], an architecture for a generalised computational economy based
on pairwise barter chains. It uses probabilistic assurance over resources9 and self signed identities, and
resource entitlement tickets that can be delegated through nested signing (this is identical to [273] and
[173]).
Another way of allowing peers to create their own currency is by deﬁning pairwise currencies: Each
peer will have a currency to transact with every other peer. In this case, all transaction state information
can be kept by the two interested parties (as opposed to [78, 125, 273, 173] where state is recorded in the
tickets/coins themselves), and the system demands in terms of cryptographic protection are alleviated.
One such system is SWIFT [295], where each peer maintains an account for each one of its market
peers. Trading on these pairwise currencies amounts to subtracting or adding to the other peer’s account.
By explicitly constructing trading strategies that take into account altruism and risk preferences, and
that track the contributions of each one of the peers to others, Tamilman et al. argue in [295] that
participation in the system is advantageous for strategic peers, and that moral hazard (strategic deviation
from protocol-deﬁned operation - see Chapter 6 and Appendix A.4) is avoided.
Many of the trade mechanisms that have been detailed so far fail to differentiate between the actual
tradeable resources of the peer (e.g. bandwidth) and the content that it possesses (e.g. media fragments).
In [131], Garbacki et al. propose the formation of alliance groups to allow peers to contribute upload
8In Japan, a personal seal usually takes the place of a handwritten signature.
9This means that if a peer obtains a signed certiﬁcate entitling it to a given resource, there is no hard assurance that it will get
it when the peer decides to make it valid. This is due to the fact that if the instantaneous rate of resource “cashing” exceeds the
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bandwidth to other peers even if they do not possess any content that the other peer might be interested
in. Basically, Garbacki et al. modify the BitTorrent protocol so that peers aggregate in trusted groups
where peers download fragments on behalf of each other. Each peer in the group then becomes, for
each particular swarm, either a collector that is interested in participating in the swarm, or part of a set
of allies that are not interested in the swarm but help the collector to achieve high download rates by
downloading fragments themselves (as instructed by the collector) and relaying them, in the expectation
of reciprocity at a later time. They name their approach Amortised Tit-for-Tat, because the allies collect
fragments on behalf the collector only out of a reciprocal altruism expectation. Since this reciprocative
altruism expectation is not managed by their protocol, Garbacki et al. assume that alliance groups are
formed only within a high-trust social network (e.g. between friends and relatives).
Another strength of [131] is that, by eliminating the assumption that sharing in peer-to-peer net-
works is done in terms of mutually useful content it decouples the problem of content search, distribution
and replication from the incentives problem. In this case, peers use their resources to download content
for which they have no interest, in order to “store” this contribution and use it later to download different
content. Although the set of peers with which it will interact directly is the same (its allies), the peers
with which the allies interact can be completely different.
2.5.4 Exchange Systems and Mechanism Design
There have been numerous utility-based analyses of the incentives problem with strategic peers from
the point of view of differentiated resource allocation. The rationale for these is evident by deﬁning the
solution of the problem to be the set of protocol primitives (game theoretical strategies) such that the
utility that a peer obtains from the system is a monotonically increasing function of its contributions to
the overlay. Due to its obvious relationship to resource allocation problems in economics, trading has
been repeatedly proposed as a viable strategy for the distributed solution of the incentives problem. For
instance, in [61] game theory is used to model the interaction of strategic peers (in this case the traded
commodity is disk space), and the possibility of using utility functions to drive the system to Nash equi-
libria with desirable properties. Buragohain et al. formulate the best response function dynamics as a
discrete time dynamical system, and the characteristics of the system while converging to the Nash equi-
librium is analysed by linearisation around the ﬁxed point. A similar model is presented in [141], where
Golle et al. apply a game theoretic model to a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing application, much like Gnutella.
Different strategies for sharing and downloading are deﬁned, and utility functions are proposed. Golle
et al. consider a payment term reminiscent of the payments used in mechanism design to align system
and peer incentives [304, 241]. Then, Golle et al. estimate the payment that each peer must receive for
sharing in order to make sharing at high levels a dominant strategy (see Chapter 3.1 for game theory
deﬁnitions). However, the proposed system requires a centralised server and logging of all peer-to-peer
transactions, making it of limited interested in a pure peer-to-peer context.
Another model based on economic models for the provisioning of public goods is [35], where
Antoniadis et al. consider an allocation mechanism in which a shared resource is divided among a set
of n peers in accordance with their utilities. Essentially, Antoniadis et al. propose mechanism-design
inspired system based on a system usage ﬂat fee. Participants in a Gnutella-like peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
system are forced to all share the same number of ﬁles, which is equivalent to imposing a constant and
identical cost upon all participants. Those peers with positive utility participate in the system, and those
with negative utilities do not, implementing the rationality system participation restriction in a natural
way. The authors extend the model to consider ﬁles with different popularity ratings, and consequently,
entailing differing costs to the peer hosting them.
The analytic model proposed in [35] describes a simpliﬁed scheme in which every peer i uses the
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multiplies it by a scalar θi so that ui = θiu(Q). Therefore, reporting ui to a central authority only
involves revealing θi. Each peer declares its parameter θi to a central authority which sets the level of
production Q, determines which peers can use the common good, and the price each one should pay for
access to it. The mechanism is designed to maximise the expected social welfare, expressed as the total
utility obtained by all the peers (those without access to the common good have utility zero) minus the
total cost incurred by all the peers. It is very important to note that, in the most na¨ ıve approach, there is no
guarantee that the welfare experienced by any single peer would be positive, that the peers will actually
reveal their true utility functions (rather than bogus ones that decrease their costs), or that the total cost
needed in the mechanism could be actually supplied by participating peers (the mechanism might not be
budget balanced). Thus, further constraints must be introduced: a feasibility constraint that caters for
budget balancing, a individual rationality constraint that caters for positive welfare for each single peer
as a precondition for participation in the system, and a incentive-compatibility constraint that ensures
that peers will have higher welfare if they truthfully report their utilities. Antoniadis et al. approach the
optimisation problem analytically, using Lagrange multipliers. Although the complete solution of the
problem is not presented, an approximate one when the number of peers n → ∞ is discussed. In this
case, a single beneﬁt multiplier θ is found below which no peer participates in the peer-to-peer overlay.
This implies that every peer that does participate in the overlay pays a ﬂat fee f = θu(Q). The authors
then apply the model to peer-to-peer incentives for ﬁle sharing, but keep the discussion at a strictly
theoretical level. There is no mention as to how payments could be implemented in a decentralised
fashion.
2.5.5 Systems based on Auctions
One of the problems that currency-based systems have is the pricing of peer resources. A simple way to
achieve this with no central control, and if the peers can calculate their own valuations for resources, is
through auctions. An example of this is CompuP2P [154], a system that implements an open market for
peer resources quantised into different markets. Each market is managed by a particular peer through a
Chord [231] DHT. Pricing is arrived at by using iterated single-item, sealed-bid, second price auctions
(known as Vickrey auctions [306]) as an information-revelation mechanism, and the system is designed
to be robust in the presence of self-interested decisions of resource providers and users.
Anotherauction-basedsystemisSpawn[309], whereadistributedCPUresourceallocationproblem
is solved by using an open market. Money in this virtual economy becomes an abstract form of priority,
so that better funded processes can obtain correspondingly better access to the computing infrastructure
than others. The system also uses iterated Vickrey auctions, and each of the economic actors taking part
in the economy for CPU cycles maintains a resource manager that manages auctions and assigns CPU
time slices accordingly.
The previous two examples of auction-based systems used only single-item auctions. This is repre-
sentative of much of the work in the literature - few studies use full combinatorial auctions, since they can
be very computationally intensive and involve large delays [91]. Sometimes, simpliﬁcations are made to
make combinatorial auctions tractable. In [119], each participant allocates its ﬁnite budget to bid on a
given resource set, and receives a proportion of each resource commensurate with the proportion of its
bid with the bids of other participants; this same technique was later on proposed by [201] as a replace-
ment for the unchoking policy of BitTorrent (see Section 2.6.1). The Nash equilibria of this game are
analysed, and it is unsurprisingly found that they depend on the precise structure of the utility functions
for the participants. However, for practical simulation cases, it is found that the Nash equilibria attained
have efﬁciencies close to the social optimum. Additionally, the equilibria are shown to exhibit good
utility uniformity (the difference between the minimum and the maximum utilities experienced among
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to the utility that it could have enjoyed had he received the outcome of any other participant).
Another auction-based resource management implementation is Mirage [79], where combinatorial
auctions using a centralised virtual currency environment are used for sensor network testbed resource
allocation.
Some peer-to-peer mechanisms use auction-based techniques, even without explicitly stating so.
One example of this is GNUNet [149], that uses iterated single-item, sealed-bid, ﬁrst price auctions
[227] to resolve resource contention (only the incentives aspects of the protocol are detailed in [149]; see
[47] for the anonymity related protocol aspects).
Essentially, GNUNet implements a trust-based economy, where each peer maintains a trust rating
for every peer it interacts with. If a peer takes the role of a client, it is making use of overlay network
resources and is expected to lose trust in the eyes of other peers, whereas a peer taking the role of a
server is donating its resources to the peer-to-peer system and is expected to gain trust in the eyes of
other peers. When a peer requests a protocol action that implies a cost (such as forwarding a given
message), it associates with the request a number (called the priority) that measures the importance that
the sender places in its request being satisﬁed. The priority becomes, essentially, its bid.
If the priority of the request is high enough to be allocated service, the peer servicing the request
then decreases its trust on the requester by subtracting the priority associated with the request (if a peer
is insufﬁciently trusted by another peer to carry this subtraction out, its request is treated as having zero
priority). When the requester receives the response, it will increase its trust in the responder by adding
to it the priority of the related request. In this way, a payment has been effected from the requester to
the responder by only modifying local accounts. Therefore, each peer’s trust is not under its control: it
is under the control of its peers. Additionally, given that trust itself encodes information regarding the
best peers with which to carry out transactions, it is to the best advantage of every peer not to arbitrarily
modify their trust in other peers (from the point of view of currency, this means that the wealth of
other peers is under its control - we expand more on this idea in Section 4.6, where we detail formal
mechanisms against this problem). In GNUNet trust is not used to store value, nor is it used to limit
access to resources. It is used to prioritise in case of excessive demand. In case of resource contention,
higher priority requests are served preferentially over lower priority requests, as long as their originating
peers are sufﬁciently trusted to support the corresponding priority. By allowing more trustworthy peers
to set higher priorities, the protocol rewards peers that have served urgent or important requests, and in
so doing, increased the utility of the peer-to-peer system.
In effect, the priority mechanism of GNUNet implements an iterated single-item, sealed-bid, ﬁrst
price auction where peers bid for service timeslots and pay using trust. In [149], Grothoff repeatedly
states that GNUNet is not based on currency, since each peer can arbitrarily increase or decrease the
trust it places in other peers, thus allowing wealth to be created (the responder can choose not to decrease
its trust on the requester, while the requester does increase its trust on the responder). However, if one
envisions a trust-based economy where currency represents trust and each peer is capable of printing its
own money as long as it can uphold the promises embodied in it (such as the WAT system [173, 273]),
it is clear that GNUNet is in fact a currency-based market that is able to transfer idle network resources
into monetary value (currency), and those peers that are able to command more resources for the beneﬁt
of other peers will become wealthier. Additionally, the system is self-policing given the rationality of
the participating peers: peers cannot “steal” money, and destroying other peers’ money is not in their
best interest as it destroys information that can be used to increase its own utility by preferring peers
that have provided better levels of service. GNUNet solves the “ﬁrst interaction cooperate” element of
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by allowing untrusted peers to send requests with zero priority and be
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up a reputation and become more competitive in the resource priority auctions. Unfortunately, GNUNet
is susceptible to collusion and sybil attacks.
2.5.6 Systems implementing demurrage
Usually, the use of currency in peer-to-peer systems has been based on a central bank issuing digital
cash and verifying transactions to prevent multiple spending of the same “digital coin”. However, there
are at least two different currents of research that enable single peers to operate their own currencies
without the need for a central banking infrastructure. One is based on nested digital signatures [274, 321,
302, 125, 273], while the other is based on small microcredit accounts that are periodically reconciled
[159, 248, 149].
Independently of the details of their implementation, markets based on virtual currencies offer the
unique possibility of trying out economic policies that would be difﬁcult to implement explicitly in the
“real” economy. One of these is the implementation of money with demurrage.
In its simplest sense, demurrage is a cost imposed on the accumulation of currency, which could
be interpreted as a negative interest rate (See Appendix A.2.6.1) or as hyperinﬂation. The main reason
why demurrage has been explored in the context of network resource allocation is that it provides a
negative incentive on the accumulation of wealth, which in turn makes currency closer in its character-
istics to network resources that are impossible to store (such as CPU cycles, bandwidth or transmission
spectrum).
We now present some attempts to use demurrage in the peer-to-peer system research literature. Sim-
ilarly to [294], in [171] Irwin et al. propose a scheme in which currency expires a ﬁxed time after being
spent, making hoarding difﬁcult. To avoid currency depletion and starvation, credits are automatically
recharged periodically. By using a central bank to process auctions, the system can implement ﬂexible
recharge time policies.
In [274], Saito et al. present a WAT system with demurrage as a basis for the exchange of atoms, bits
and presences - the three main kinds of digital goods, according to the authors. Atoms can be stored, but
are difﬁcult to duplicate. Bits can be stored, but they can be reproduced at negligible cost, and presences
cannot be stored nor reproduced (they are akin to labour). Saito et al. propose a system in which
bit producers will give the content away for free, but will pay with special currency that experiences
rapid demurrage. In this way, all the other participants that forward these WAT tickets will share the bit
producer’sdebt, allowingthemtoparticipateintheeconomyevenwhileobtainingnodirectremuneration
from their efforts. By compensating the demurrage rates of the peers in each category, a equilibrium state
can be reached in which all peers experience high welfare levels. This is further generalised in [275] as
the basis for local production and consumption architectures for peer-to-peer networks.
2.6 Incentives and Resource Allocation - Direct Reciprocity
We deﬁne a protocol as based on direct reciprocity if the interaction between two peers is only inﬂuenced
by the interactions between them in the past, and not the interaction between them and other third parties.
Thus, direct-reciprocity schemes are appropriate for long-lived relationships where there is ample
opportunity for each of the peers to reciprocate appropriately to the behaviour of other peers. However,
it has been shown that direct reciprocity schemes for peer-to-peer networks can converge too slowly to
be of practical use [198] (see Appendix A.4).
In [219], Marti and Garcia-Molina use a ﬁle sharing peer-to-peer system (very similar to Gnutella)
to demonstrate a direct-reputation system in which no secondhand information is used by the peers in
creating their reputation tables. Peers use self-signed certiﬁcates to identify themselves, and the pur-
pose of the reputation system is to prevent the distribution of non-authentic content in response to valid
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a reputation system vastly increases the robustness of a peer-to-peer system against malicious users. In
this case, the reputation system is acting a sanctioning device to enforce a social rule in which peers that
feed bogus content are shunned from further interaction.
The most widely deployed system using direct reciprocity as an incentives and resource allocation
mechanism is BitTorrent [84, 20, 21], and it has been repeatedly analysed by the research community.
We now discuss a representative sample of this research.
2.6.1 Incentives in BitTorrent
In [84], Cohen describes BitTorrent as a system seeking to achieve Pareto efﬁciency10 by allowing peers
to ﬁnd and realise Pareto improving interactions through a Tit-for-Tat strategy. Several aspects of the pro-
tocol are detailed, including peer bootstrapping, fragment and sub-fragment management and pipelining,
fragment dissemination techniques (including the rarest ﬁrst policy) and choking algorithms (including
the optimistic unchoking and anti-snubbing techniques).
One of the best-known elements of the BitTorrent protocol is its support for Tit-for-Tat, which has
been studied from many viewpoints, particularly its tendency to assign loads to peers in an unfair fashion
[298, 49, 254]). For instance, in [254] Piatek et al. argue that the incentive structure of BitTorrent is not
robust to selﬁsh clients and that “high capacity peers provide low capacity peers with an unfair share of
aggregate swarm resources”. In general, Piatek et al. argue that all BitTorrent peers make a large number
of altruistic contributions: low bandwidth peers almost never upload enough to others to compete with
other peers, and consequently almost never attain reciprocation, while high-bandwidth peers upload
much faster than the strict minimum required to attain reciprocation11. This can be purposefully avoided
by strategic peers to minimise their costs and increase their utility.
In addition, even though low-bandwidth peers almost universally fail to attain Tit-for-Tat reciproca-
tion in BitTorrent, they still experience downloads that are signiﬁcantly faster than their uploads. This is
because they receive the beneﬁt of arbitrary optimistic unchoking slots, both from seeders and leechers.
Figure 2.1: Expected percentage of upload capacity not resulting in direct reciprocation (ﬁgure taken
from [254]).
Thus, as seen in Figure 2.1, high-bandwidth peers tend to give most of their upload capacity “for
free”. As a proof-of-concept for these ideas, Piatek et al. propose BitTyrant, a BitTorrent implementation
where each peer ranks all its neighbours by their upload/download ratios and preferentially unchokes
10An allocation of a given set of resources to a given set of economic agents is Pareto Optimal or efﬁcient if it is impossible to
ﬁnd an alternative allocation that makes at least one agent better off without making any other agent worse off.
11Piatek et al. ﬁnd that after a given level of upload (in the region of 10 to 100 kBps), reciprocation is virtually assured. All
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those peers with high ratios, thus rewarding back cooperation in a reciprocative fashion. Additionally,
BitTyrant dynamically increases its upload speed to selectively provide an incentive to other peers to
maximise their upload throughput (it is usually not necessary to upload at full speed to get full speed
downloads from other peers). Under these conditions and an experimental setup including many seeder
peers, substantial gains are reported. Other relevant engineering objectives behind BitTyrant include:
• Maximising reciprocation bandwidth per connection. BitTorrent leechers (non-altruistic peers)
reciprocate equally among all the peers they are uploading to. It follows that the upload capacity of
a mainline BitTorrent peer is equally partitioned among its reciprocating peers. BitTyrant attempts
to ﬁnd reciprocating peers for which the total download bandwidth obtained through reciprocation
is the largest.
• Maximising the number of reciprocating peers. Providing an incentive to reciprocate to any
given peer entails a cost in BitTorrent, in the form of lost upload bandwidth. Therefore, instead of
just having a hard-coded number of peers to interact with, BitTyrant peers attempt to increase the
number of reciprocating peers in their “active set” until the marginal beneﬁt of having one extra
peer balances out the extra bandwidth cost imposed by eliciting reciprocation.
• Deviating from the “equal split” policy. The beneﬁt that a BitTyrant peer obtains on a per-
connection basis is maximised by reducing its upload to the minimum value required to elicit
reciprocation from each of its current peers. Thus, the per-connection investment is minimised,
the number of connections is maximised and, as each connection is usually with a non-strategic
peer (an altruistic implementation, such as Azureus[3], BitComet[4] or µTorrent[14]), the total
amount of download bandwidth is maximised.
Piatek et al. provide evidence that BitTyrant performs well in an environment dominated by altru-
istic implementations, not only increasing performance but making it more predictable and robust. In an
environment built on PlanetLab consisting only of BitTyrant peers, altruism and performance both in-
creased. This is due to the fact that, following [149] and others, BitTyrant does not withhold bandwidth
that would otherwise be idle. This means that, in this case, strategic peers allocate swarm resources
better, but without becoming a hindrance by refusing altruistic service if it incurs close to zero marginal
cost.
However, Piatek et al. discuss the following problems with BitTyrant:
• BitTyrant attempts to contribute as little as possible to elicit reciprocation, but will not withhold
unused, available upload bandwidth if it requested. Thus, if the minimum upload to attain the max-
imum download that an strategic peer can extract from a given swarm does not exhaust its upload
bandwidth, the peer will donate the rest of it altruistically - unless it can devote it to get higher
download speeds on another torrent. This means that, if high-capacity peers seek to maximise
the number of torrents they participate in, their upload capacity will be diffused across every one
of them, and the average performance for each individual swarm (and the majority of peers) will
degrade. This is specially true for low-bandwidth peers that are unable to participate in more than
one swarm successfully, and must then settle for the bare minimum performance available. There-
fore, even though the total performance of the system across all swarms increases, the individual
performance of each swarm degrades.
• New users experience a lengthy bootstrapping period where their download capability is severely
degraded. This is because, when a peer joins a swarm, it is initially severely constrained in the
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it will be unable to amass enough fragments to maintain high upload speeds long enough to elicit
reciprocation.
• BitTyrant will constantly reduce its upload rates, in an attempt to ﬁnd the minimum upload band-
width necessary for reciprocation. Thus, even if there are many high-capacity peers, BitTyrant
peers will end up with large numbers of low-bandwidth peers, which might impact performance
due to deleterious TCP interaction effects [230].
Another example of work regarding the strategic exploitation of BitTorrent is [207], where Liogkas
et al. analyse three additional techniques that selﬁsh peers can use to obtain increased performance from
BitTorrent:
• Downloading Only From Seeds. A downloader repeatedly contacts the tracker in an effort to
obtain the IP addresses of all seeds, to contact them all and download from all of them simul-
taneously. If there are enough seeds, the strategic peer can sustain high download rates only by
leveraging the unchoke windows of a constantly varying subset of seeds12.
• Not honouring optimistic unchoking, where the strategic peer infers the download capacity of
other peers by monitoring their “new fragment available messages”, and from it their upload ca-
pacity. Then, the peer interacts only with the fastest uploaders using Tit-for-Tat.
• Advertising false pieces, where the strategic peer advertises that it has a fragment that it really
does not have, so that when another node requests it it can obtain a number of fragments or sub-
fragments and reciprocate with random data.
Liogkas et al. report limited improvements when downloading only from seeds, but their results
are inconclusive, as their experimental setup included only one seed. As expected from our discussions
in transaction costs (see Appendix A.2.1), they ﬁnd that not honouring optimistic unchoking is coun-
terproductive because it is very hard to actually ﬁnd the best peers without it. What this tells us is that
optimistic unchoking, even with its exploitation risks, remains critical in assessing peer QoS and ﬁnding
better peers. The indirect estimation algorithm that appeared to have a limited success in PlanetLab [16]
fails in the wide area Internet, and Liogkas et al. indirectly provide evidence to suggest that information
gathering (network sensing; QoS estimation/mapping) is a good incentive to share upload bandwidth
through optimistic unchoking. Finally, advertising false pieces has limited effect as well, as the clients
themselves (as opposed to the BitTorrent protocol) implement a direct reciprocity system where, if a
given peer has sent invalid fragments, it is shunned from further interaction (banned). Thus, even though
they state that the endogenous mechanisms of BitTorrent are robust against strategic agents, their ex-
periments were made in a very speciﬁc circumstances and their results might not be applicable to other
environments.
Another example of an analysis of the strategic scope for BitTorrent clients is [209], where Locher
et al. discuss a technique to download entire torrents without any kind of reciprocation. Locher et al.
provide a software implementation: BitThief, that speciﬁcally exploits optimistic unchokes - the main
peer performance exploration tool of BitTorrent. A BitThief client does not upload at any time, and thus
does not perform any chokes or unchokes for remote peers. Additionally, it never announces availability
of any pieces: all other peers can only assume that the BitThief client is a new peer that recently joined
the swarm. In order to sustain a good download rate, BitThief relies heavily on optimistic unchokes
by the peers to which it connects. As the BitThief client will not reciprocate, the download bandwidth
12This has been explored repeatedly, in particular as part of [209] and [286], where the technique of connecting to a much larger
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obtained per peer in this manner is severely limited. To obtain a high download speed, then, BitThief
needs to connect to a very large set of peers. As optimistic unchoking slots are effectively uncorrelated
between agents, download bandwidth for BitThief clients is linearly dependent on the number of peers
in their active uploading set. Therefore, instead of limiting themselves to 80 connections (as the “ofﬁcial
mainline” client and others do), BitThief clients repeatedly contact the tracker to obtain as many leecher
and seeder IP addresses as possible, and connect to all of them (Locher et al. state that for some torrents
the number of active TCP connections per BitThief client grew to more than 50013). Additionally, the
BitThief protocol refuses to follow the rarest ﬁrst fragment download policy. Instead, BitThief clients
maximise their download speed by downloading whatever fragments they need that are available in high-
throughputpeers, puttingtheirowndownloadspeedbeforesystem-wideconcernslikeadequatefragment
diffusion14. In general, Locher et al. ﬁnd that for swarms with many peers (in particular seeders), and
torrents for small ﬁles, BitThief outperforms the “ofﬁcial mainline” BitTorrent client.
BitThief can exploit BitTorrent communities that enforce upload/download ratios by purposefully
lying to the tracker, reporting arbitrarily high amounts of upload trafﬁc in order to maintain a proper
ratio while freeloading. This attack can be compounded with a sybil attack, reporting the existence of
arbitrarily many peers.
Other exploits that Locher et al. tried which were more successfully countered by BitTorrent are
detailed below:
1. Announcing false pieces. In [207], Liogkas et al. propose that BitTorrent can be exploited by
strategic peers if they advertise fragments that it they do not have yet, alongside with fragments
that they actually have. When answering a request, the strategic peer uploads either random data
(if it has not got the appropriate fragment) or the fragment itself. Doing this for complete frag-
ments is harmful for the strategic peer, as many BitTorrent client implementations (in particular,
the “ofﬁcial” client and Azureus) will ban peers for fragment hash checks that fail. Thus BitThief
will answer all fragment requests with random data, but will avoid uploading a complete bogus
fragment - it will purposely fail to upload the its last sub-piece. When this sub-piece is eventu-
ally downloaded from a different peer, its CRC will fail and this peer will share the blame for the
bogus piece, as the affected peer will be unable to ascertain which of the two sent the offending
sub-piece or sub-pieces, and will be unable to retaliate effectively15. Though the “ofﬁcial main-
line” client can be exploited this way, Azureus is resistant: it will request the whole fragment
again, but will download it only from the peer that uploaded the most pieces when the hash check
failed. If the peer fails to re-deliver the fragment or refuses to upload and the connection stalls,
the peer is banned. In general, the authors ﬁnd that, due to adequate protection measures in client
implementations, uploading random data is not helpful in any way to improve download speed.
2. Sybil attacks against given peers. BitThief beneﬁts from the optimistic unchoke slots of other
peers, and therefore it would be advantageous for BitThief clients to be counted several times in
each client. This, however, would entail setting up parallel TCP connections to the same peer,
and most BitTorrent implementations guard against this by immediately shutting down any TCP
connection attempts from any IP address with which there is an active connection. Of course,
multihomed peers (or peers with access to a series of anonimising proxies, such as Tor [102])
would be able to execute this attack successfully.
13The authors state that, in their experience, there is no performance penalty with the simultaneous opening of multiple TCP
connections as reported in [230].
14It may be said that the rarest ﬁrst policy is also rational for selﬁsh peers, as it maximises the probability of successful Tit-for-Tat
transactions later on for the downloading peer. However, as BitThief does not reciprocate at all, this does not apply to it.
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2.6.2 BitTorrent Communities and Multi-Torrent Collaboration
It is well known that animal communities can facilitate cooperative behaviour by providing and regulat-
ing social capital (See Appendix A). This same approach is valid in the context of peer-to-peer protocols;
one example is [33], where Andrade et al. analyse the effect of BitTorrent communities on users’ co-
operative behaviour. One of the interesting results in [33] is that in torrents with many leechers and
few seeders, BitTorrent is successful in penalising freeloading, as shown by freeloaders experiencing
increased download times for a given ﬁle. However, for torrents with large numbers of seeders (high
seeding ratios), freeloaders may achieve download speeds comparable (or higher) to those of contribut-
ing peers. The authors posit that it is the competition between the uploads and the download TCP
acknowledgements that impacts the peer download performance.
Andrade et al. further analyse the seeding behaviour of peers in a particular community site (etree
[8]), ﬁnding that the seeding ratio16 tends to be higher for torrents of smaller size and for younger
torrents. They ﬁnd that torrents with a high sharing ratio17 tend to have high seeding ratios and large
numbers of participating peers, and that those community sites that imposed sharing-ratio enforcement
tend to have higher levels of seeding. In this case, seeding is not altruistically motivated: it stems from an
external incentives structure built around the community site and the easy access to content that it offers.
In essence, the community site gives peers the beneﬁts usually associated with social capital: information
diffusion, access to privileged knowledge, and increased trust in transaction outcomes. Sites impose
their own set of “social rules”, and noncompliance is punished with denial of access to social capital
(community resources). Andrade et al. show that this risk of losing social capital is enough to change
the incentive structure of BitTorrent users, which then change their behaviour to a more “reciprocally
altruistic” one.
In [152], Guo et al. focus on multi-torrent collaboration. According to their research, even though
most BitTorrent studies have focused on single torrents, around 85% of all peers participate in multiple
torrents. The paper starts analysing single-torrent statistics, with the following conclusions:
• Peer arrival rate to a given swarm decreases exponentially. Thus, given that seeds remain in
the system a relatively small time, fragment availability in BitTorrent degrades very quickly, so
that completing a full torrent download is only feasible in a small time window after its publishing.
This is only a reﬂection of the consumption patterns of BitTorrent users: ﬁle availability in Bit-
Torrent is heavily dependent on a large number of leechers being present (what has usually been
called swarm health), and this is in turn dependent on torrent popularity and the usage dynamics
of torrent distribution sites.
• BitTorrent swarm performance varies widely from swarm to swarm. Peers in swarms with
large populations have higher (and much more stable) download speeds when compared with
those in small swarms. For these, download speed is much lower, has much greater variance, and
is easily affected by the individual behaviour of seeds.
• Current BitTorrent implementations are unfair to high-capacity peers. Guo et al. ﬁnd that up-
load/download ratio decreases with increasing downloading speed. Thus, as peers extract higher
download bandwidths from the system, they have to invest less of their own upload bandwidth.
One possible explanation for this, presented in [152], is that faster peers ﬁnish downloading the
torrent content faster, and then immediately leave the system. This counters the common no-
tion that peers remain active for approximately the same amount of time in a given torrent (say,
16The seeding ratio is deﬁned as nu
nu+nd , where nu is the number of uploaders and nd is the number of downloaders.
17Andrade et al. deﬁne the sharing ratio of a peer as the quotient between the total amount of data the peer has uploaded and the
total amount it has downloaded. This can be extended to deﬁne the sharing ratio of an entire torrent to be the total amount of data
uploaded by all its active peers divided by the total amount of data downloaded by all its active peers.2.6. INCENTIVES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION - DIRECT RECIPROCITY 35
overnight), but peers with better download speed ﬁnish more quickly and thus spend more time as
seeders.
Guo et al. then move on to propose a model for inter-torrent collaboration for BitTorrent. The
model that they propose is essentially analytic, although some aspects of protocol design are addressed.
In particular, Guo et al. suggest forming an overlay network among BitTorrent trackers (the tracker site
overlay). Thus, when a peer wishes to join a swarm, it informs the tracker of this swarm of its available
ﬁles. The tracker then contacts the trackers responsible for swarms that include peers with whom the
original peer can trade, and peers are then introduced with each other. Through the use of the tracker
site overlay, it becomes possible for peers to contribute bandwidth in a given torrent while downloading
from another, which enables indirect reciprocity.
In [256], Pouwelse et al. present a measurement study on BitTorrent and and associated search
website (in this case, suprnova.org). Pouwelse et al. ﬁnd that system availability for BitTorrent networks
is very sensitive to the availability of their centralised components, such as trackers and search websites.
With respect to the actual peers, Pouwelse et al. ﬁnd that only 17% of the peers remain seeding longer
than an hour after their download ﬁnished. This reduces to 3.1% for 10 hours and 0.34% for 100 hours,
underscoring the fact that long-lived peers on which central system functions can be delegated can be
difﬁculttoﬁnd18. Thisbehaviour, howeverseemstobedependentonthecontent. In[290], Stutzbachand
Rejaie analyse the churn behaviour of peers in Linux distribution torrents, ﬁnding that their results are
heavily inﬂuenced by a large number of stable infrastructure seeders (this is in addition to the increased
altruism reported in [172] for Linux Red Hat 9). In the words of the authors:
At any point of time, a majority of participating peers in the system are long-lived peers.
However, the remaining small portion of short-lived peers join and leave the system at such
a high rate that they constitute a relatively large portion of sessions.
(quote from [290])
It follows that, although sufﬁciently high levels of peer availability might be attainable in a pure
peer-to-peer architecture, resilient designs for stream distribution and peer search should adequately
replicate functionality among long-lived peers, and should also provide an adequate incentives structure
that helps increase the average peer uptime. Pouwelse et al. correctly point out that BitTorrent does not
provide an incentive for seeding behaviour, as it requires altruism on the part of the user, and posit that
allowing seeders more expressive control over their altruistically donated bandwidth utilisation might be
beneﬁcial in this regard.
2.6.3 BitTorrent Locality Awareness
Most studies focusing in BitTorrent assume that, when peers select neighbours to barter with, they do
so in a random fashion19. This leads each peer to generate a large volume of potentially long-distance,
inter-AS TCP trafﬁc. The reduction of this inter-AS trafﬁc has generated increasing interest in the
research community, with the objective of developing peer selection procedures that could maintain or
increase the performance of BitTorrent while, at the same time, generating topologies engineered to be of
higher performance than a random graph graph with regards to to speciﬁc metrics. One such attempt is
[50], where Bindal et al. examine a peer selection technique for BitTorrent (biased neighbour selection)
18It may be argued that if the peer lifetime distribution is heavy-tailed, there will always be a non-negligible probability of
ﬁnding a peer with arbitrarily long lifetime. This, however, does not mean that this peer would be able to cope with the load of
reliably managing an overlay network of Internet scale. Additionally, even though the probabilities are non-negligible, they are
certainly extremely below the availability requirements of any Internet application.
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in which each peer attempts to select the majority of its neighbouring peers from those within the same
ISP.
Using simulations, Bindal et al. show that the performance of BitTorrent can be maintained while
reducing signiﬁcantly the inter-ISP trafﬁc. However, this requires that the original seeder has high upload
bandwidth (in the order of four times the current average bandwidth per peer). More generally, Bindal
et al. state that any admissible peer selection algorithm aiming to optimise any topological or trafﬁc
engineering objective can give good results, provided that the seed has large bandwidth and that a small
amount of randomness is maintained during peer selection.
When using locality optimising algorithms such as the one proposed in [50], the variance of the ﬁle
download time distribution decreases. This is because the real availability of different ﬁle fragments is
better estimated in this case than in normal BitTorrent; as the resulting topologies will be much more
clustered within ISPs, different peers will have much more similar fragment availability estimates, and
will therefore replicate pieces in a more locally optimum way.
The most important reason that BitTorrent maintains its performance when supplemented with
locality-aware trackers is its rarest-ﬁrst fragment replication policy. Peers within the same cluster have a
very clear view of which fragments are inside it. Furthermore, once a new fragment has been “imported”
into the cluster, it can very quickly reach many internal peers, thus reducing the probability of a single
fragment being “imported” several times into the cluster. As a result, most of the fragments that traverse
cluster boundaries tend to do so a only a very small number of times, increasing the efﬁciency of the
system.
2.6.4 Analytic Models of BitTorrent
Although analytic approaches might have limited applicability to practical scenarios, they are of great
importance because of the insight that they yield into the essential issues of the problem under study.
In [221], Massouli´ e and Vojnovi´ c propose an analytic model for fragment-based, swarming peer-to-
peer systems. This model, although requiring some basic assumptions for closed-form solubility, is
general enough to encompass many kinds of swarm-based distribution systems. Massouli´ e and Vojnovi´ c
model fragment diffusion using a density dependent Markov process, proposing a system of differential
equations to explore their dynamical properties, such as equilibria and convergence basins.
In [258], Qiu and Srikant propose a ﬂuid ﬂow model of BitTorrent and compare its performance
with measurement traces. This model is based on a number of simple assumptions, such as exponentially
distributed leecher and seeder departures. Special attention is given to the analysis of the equilibrium
points of the resulting dynamical system. By considering in turn the equilibrium points of the system
when dominated by its upload or its download bandwidth, they derive a closed form solution for the
equilibrium point and examine it under different parameter values, showing that the analytic model
yields sensible results that conﬁrm the intuitions that one might get from the protocol itself.
The stability of the equilibrium point is then analysed by linearisation, and found to be stable. Qiu
and Srikant further generalise the model to encompass Wiener processes, and propose expressions for
the expected variances of the number of seeders and leechers. A game-theoretic model of BitTorrent is
then proposed, and then used to explore the existence of Nash equilibria as a function of peer physical
bandwidth. In the case of identical bandwidths with rational, omniscient peers, they prove that no Nash
equilibrium exists. In a similar case, but where peers form groups whose members have identical up-
load bandwidths, they prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium where each peer chooses to saturate its
physical upload bandwidth. Additionally, they explore optimistic unchoking and, show that a freeloader
will be able to obtain, on average and with no optimisations (as compared to BitTyrant [254] or Bit-
Thief [209]), around 20% of the maximum possible downloading rate. They compare their model with
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Finally, Qiu and Srikant create a BitTorrent swarm and measure its number of seeders and leechers,
and compare this with the results from their model. The variations from the ﬂuid ﬂow model, once it
reaches steady state, are consistent with the 95% conﬁdence intervals to be expected from the variance
of the stochastic process.
2.6.5 BitTorrent Measurement Studies
The characterisation and measurement of the characteristics of BitTorrent-based systems under load
has received attention from the research community. In [172], Izal et al. follow the Linux RedHat 9
torrent, both from the tracker and the peer perspectives. They report that, on average, peers remain
for 6.5 hours as seeders after ﬁnishing the torrent download20. Additionally, Izal et al. report that
seeders had a very important effect in the distribution of this torrent: seeders contributed more than
twice the amount of upload bandwidth that leechers contributed, while the seeder/leecher proportion
was consistently higher than 20%21. The average download rate in [172] is consistently high, above 500
kbps. However, peer bandwidth exhibits high variability, spanning more than three orders of magnitude
(∼ 10kBps to ∼ 10000kBps).
An important characteristic of BitTorrent is that it scales well with ﬂashcrowds: when new peers
arrive at a high rate, the download bandwidth of the system is not evenly divided between all peers
(which could lead to stalling, and no peers ﬁnishing their downloads to become altruistic seeders that
increase overall bandwidth availability). Instead, download bandwidth is preferentially allocated to older
peers, because they have a wider selection of fragments to upload and therefore can more easily trade
for the fragments that they still need. Thus, the probability of having an idle download due to lack of
fragments to reciprocate with is much greater for newcomers, and the probability of some peers ﬁnishing
the download to become seeds increases. However, this same effect works against new peers attempting
to bootstrap their participation in the swarm. In this case, however, the rarest fragment ﬁrst policy facili-
tates the inclusion of new peers, as these will attempt to download (initially through optimistic unchokes)
those fragments that will be most interesting to the swarm, increasing their own upload capability. In
this case, a peer-level selﬁsh incentive (maximise the trade capability of the fragments downloaded) be-
comes instrumental in generating a system-wide architectural design: maximise the probability that all
fragments can be easily and quickly downloaded from any peer the swarm. This simpliﬁes protocol de-
sign, as it decouples fragment search from topology awareness, increasing system scalability and swarm
health.
In [205], Lien analyses some problems with the BitTorrent protocol on low-bandwidth, asymmetric
wireless links. In particular, Lien very brieﬂy explores different topologies for fragment distribution trees
in an attempt to balance the upload bandwidth for each peer and the delay that the fragments experience
from their source. Lien proposes solving the problem as a distributed Minimum Spanning Tree with a
restriction on the maximum number of adjacent nodes.
An important issue that is garnering attention in the research community is the study of the rela-
tionship between overlay networks and their underlying Internet. In [170], Iosup et al. study the relation
between the IP substrate and the application layer BitTorrent overlay, correlating some of its measured
characteristics with those of its underlying Internet. To do so, Iosup et al. inserted monitoring probes in
the top 2000 BitTorrent swarms advertised on thepiratebay.org [15]. One of their results is that Europe
is the dominant continent for BitTorrent, both in the number of users it has, and the amount of data
20This might seem overly high in the light of the results in [256], but it is easily explainable in terms of differing user incentives.
In the case of [256], the content corresponds to a software product that could be being distributed in violation of piracy laws,
imposing a liability risk on users. Red Hat 9, on the other hand, was a perfectly legal download that entailed no added risk.
21Again, thesedataseemoverlyhighforatypicaltorrent. Userincentivesmightplayaroleinproposingananswertothisaswell:
In general, linux distribution enthusiasts derive psychological utility from widely distributing their favourite distributions, thus
helping them acquire more users. Moreover, it might be argued that Red Hat 9 users, as part of the open-source user community,
have a more altruistic ethos (or a higher “warm-glow” utility) than an average Internet user.2.7. INCENTIVES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION - INDIRECT RECIPROCITY 38
transferred per user: 59.4% of BitTorrent users are located in Europe, and they account for 58.8% of all
transferred trafﬁc. North America follows, with 22.3% of the users. The USA accounts for 14.4% of all
recorded BitTorrent users (compare with 7.7% for the UK)22. Some results presented by Iosup et al. are
reproduced here in table form:
Connection Direct Strong Good Average Loose Very Loose
Number of IP Path Hops 0-1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20+
Percentage of all Paths 5.9 20.4 40.2 25.3 6.4 1.1
Table 2.1: Distribution of IP path hops for PlanetLab BitTorrent probes and the peers which contacted
them. Table reproduced from [170].
Connection Direct Strong Good Average Loose Very Loose
Number of AS Traversals 0-1 2 3 4-5 6-9 10+
Percentage of all Paths 12.5 44.7 32.0 10.2 0.5 0.1
Table 2.2: Distribution of AS traversal hops between PlanetLab BitTorrent probes and the peers which
contacted them. The authors found a number of traversal loops: AS traversals in which the same traver-
sal occurs more than once. They report that at least .01% of all the analysed traceroutes exhibit this
peculiarity, leading to as many as 56 AS traversals in a single IP path. Table reproduced from [170].
Connection Direct Strong Good Average Loose Very Loose
Hops within each AS 1 2 3 4-5 6-9 10+
Percentage of all Paths 58.1 12.9 8.0 12.2 7.6 1.2
Table 2.3: Distribution of IP path hops within single ASs between PlanetLab BitTorrent probes and the
peers which contacted them. The authors found a number of intra-AS routing loops: IP paths on which
the same IP address occurs more than once. They report that at least .001% of all the analysed traceroutes
exhibit this peculiarity. Table reproduced from [170].
Local LAN Campus Metropolitan Inter-City Longer
Min. RTT (ms) 0 15 50 100 200 300 400 500 750 1000
Max. RTT (ms) 15 50 100 200 300 400 500 750 1000 +
% of all Paths 0.6 2.9 5.8 13.3 13.7 13.8 8.6 12.8 7.5 20.7
Total 0.6 2.9 5.8 49.4 20.3 20.7
Table 2.4: Distribution of IP traceroute-measured Round-Trip times between PlanetLab BitTorrent
probes and the peers which contacted them. The authors only report results for successful traceroutes.
Additionally, as the measurements were taken from points with high bandwidth connections (PlanetLab
sites), there might be a systemic bias towards smaller RTTs (the RTTs for arbitrary Internet connection
points may be larger). Table reproduced from [170]
2.7 Incentives and Resource Allocation - Indirect Reciprocity
We deﬁne a protocol as based on indirect reciprocity if the interaction between two peers is inﬂuenced
not only by the interactions between them in the past, but also by the interaction between them and all
other peers. Although the majority of studies relating to indirect reciprocity have focused on reputation
systems, we start the analysis of these kind of systems by exploring the ways in which BitTorrent can be
extended to go beyond Tit-for-Tat.
22This, however, might be a reﬂection of the general trend of Europe to become the largest presence in the Internet, as indicated
by the number of Internet users[5].2.7. INCENTIVES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION - INDIRECT RECIPROCITY 39
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individuals experience a gain. The payoff structure yields an instance
of the familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma game
21. If both players cooperate,
each receives b 2 c, which is better than what they would obtain by
both defecting, namely 0. But a unilateral defector would earn b,
which is the highest payoff, and the exploited cooperator would pay
the cost c without receiving any beneﬁt. The payoff-maximizing
move is defecting.
This changes if the game is repeated for several rounds. For
simplicity we shall assume that in each round both players decide
simultaneously. We could also assume that they alternate, which
leads to a slightly different game
22–24. The so-called folk theorem on
repeated games implies that if the probability for future rounds is
sufﬁciently high, cooperation can be sustained by so-called trigger
strategies, which switch to relentless defection as soon as the co-
player defects once
25,26,87. A rational player must weigh the beneﬁt of
exploiting the co-player in one round against the cost of forfeiting
collaboration in all future rounds, and would therefore abstain from
defection.
In thecontextofindirectreciprocity,any twoplayersare supposed
to interact at most once with each other. Each player can experience
many rounds, but never with the same partner twice. Thus it is not
possible that a cheat is held to account by the victim. (In a variant of
this model, two players could interact on several occasions, one
always as the donor, the other as recipient, so that a return is again
excluded.) Clearly, trigger strategies can still ensure a cooperative
Nash equilibrium, such that if all players use them, no player would
have an incentive to deviate. In strategic thinking, only the payoffs
matter, not by whom they are provided. In this sense, the step from
direct to indirect reciprocity corresponds simply to the step from
personal enforcement to community enforcement
27–30. However, a
trigger strategy prescribing each person to cooperate until the ﬁrst
defection is personally experienced, and thenceforth to defect, hurts
the original wrong-doer only after many rounds. A strategy triggered
by the ﬁrst defection in the population leaves cooperation at the
mercy of the ﬁrst wrong move. In both cases many innocents would
be punished, and errors would cause havoc. Obviously, retaliation
should be directed towards the cheat rather than towards the whole
community. This requires more detailed information. Game theory
shows that even if information is transmitted only locally and errors
occur occasionally, cooperation can be sustained: there exist strat-
egies such that no rational player has an interest in deviating
unilaterally
28.
In evolutionary game theory it is not assumed that players are
rational but only that successful strategies spread—by being inher-
ited, for instance, or copied through imitation or learning
31. For
direct reciprocity, game theoretical analysis and individual-based
simulations have shown that a population of defectors can be
invaded by a small cluster of retaliators
32 or even by a single
retaliator
33. Typically, one considers a well-mixed population in
which individuals meet randomly and play a series of Prisoner’s
Dilemma games with each other. What counts is the total payoff.
Retaliatorscompensatefor thelossofbeingexploitedbyadefectorin
the ﬁrst round with long sequences of altruistic exchange with other
retaliators. Once cooperation is established, a complex evolution
takesplace,which depends onthe sizeof the population, the cost-to-
beneﬁt ratio, the average number of rounds and the probability of
errors
32,34,35.
Asimilarmodelofindirectreciprocityassumesthat,withinawell-
mixed population, individuals meet randomly, one in the role of the
potential donor and the other as a potential recipient (Fig. 2). Each
individual experiences several rounds of this interaction in both
roles, but never with the same partner twice. Again, all that counts is
the total payoff. A playercan follow either an unconditional strategy,
such as always to cooperate or always to defect, or else a conditional
strategy, which discriminates between the potential recipients on the
basis of past interactions. In a simple example, a discriminating
playercanhelptheco-playerifthatco-player’sscoreexceedsacertain
threshold.Aplayer’sscoreis0atbirth,increaseswheneverthatplayer
helps and decreases whenever the player withholds help. Individual-
based simulations show that if the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio is sufﬁciently
low, and the amount of information about the co-player’s past
sufﬁciently high, cooperation based on discrimination can emerge.
Figure 1| Direct and indirectreciprocity. a, Direct reciprocity means that A
helps B and B helps A. b, Indirect reciprocity comes in two ﬂavours.
‘Upstream reciprocity’ (left) is based on a recent positive experience. A
personwhohasbeenatthereceivingendofadonationmayfeelmotivatedto
donate in turn. Individual B, who has just received help from A, goes on to
helpC.‘Downstreamreciprocity’(right)isbuiltonreputation.Individual A
has helped B and therefore receives help from C. Mathematical
investigations of indirect reciprocity have shown that natural selection can
favour strategies that help others based on their reputation. Upstream
reciprocity is harder to understand
2,56,77,78 but is observed in economic
experiments. In both cases, the decision to help can be interpreted as a
misdirected act of gratitude. In one case recipients are thanked for what
another did; in the other case they are thanked by someone who did not
proﬁt by what they did.
Figure2|Buildingareputation. Inanaturalextensionofthebasicmodelof
indirect reciprocity, an action between donor A and recipient B is observed
by a subset of the population
36. The observers, the donor and the recipient
can inform others. People could pass on what has happened (the action) or
their assessment of the action. There are many possibilities of error: the
action or the intention of the donor can be interpreted differently by
differentpeople;someindividualsmayreceiveconﬂicting informationfrom
different sources; some individuals may not receive any information at all;
peoplecan have differentassessmentmodules. The reputation ofa person is
therefore not simply a label that is visible to all others, but instead each
personhasaprivatelistofthereputationofothers.Althoughlanguagecould
help to synchronize these lists
42, ultimately reputation is in the eyes of the
beholder.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison between Direct and Indirect Reciprocity (ﬁgure taken from [244]).
2.7.1 Systems based on Social Enforcement
In [255], Pouwelse et al. propose Tribler, a set of BitTorrent extensions that use social relationships be-
tween peer-to-peer users to simplify trust management, and clustering using similarity in tastes to aid in
content search, discovery and distribution. Their approach involves disallowing anonymous participation
on the peer-to-peer network, by binding the BitTorrent client to a personal identity, that is itself embed-
ded in a social network. Downloading performance is improved by allowing trusted peers (those bound
to users with strong social ties between them) to use each other as part of a cooperative download [130]
swarm where a central collector peer delegates download operations to other peers, that later forward the
obtained fragments for free (without Tit-for-Tat or payments). Thus, each peer virtualises itself, at the
application layer, into a peer alliance set that is, for all non-member peers, a peer with very large upload
and download capabilities. The bootstrapping problem is also alleviated, as the peer-to-peer network
superimposes itself on the social networks of the users23. If no trusted users are directly available at
start-up (the system allows communities to form naturally out of tastes or geographic location), a set of
superpeers are contacted to provide the starting peer with a set of peers (this is based on the tracker pro-
tocol of BitTorrent). Tribler separates data transfer from peer and content discovery; this latter functions
are implemented using a special overlay swarm. The social relations, altruism levels, peer uptimes, taste
similarity communities and other context information are stored in every peer in megacaches, which are
later exchanged in form of Bloom ﬁlters[52] using gossip-based protocols. Additionally, Pouwelse et al.
propose a buddycast algorithm, that allows each peer to update information with its socially close peers
and attempts to discover new peers with the same tastes. These new relationships can be cultivated, and
the peers could eventually become socially close.
In [130], Garbacki et al. detail 2Fast, a collaborative downloading strategy that could be considered
the precursor of the Tribler function of the same name. As a rationale for the work, Garbacki et al. iden-
tify a basic weakness in the Tit-for-Tat strategy of BitTorrent: it is unable to preserve information about
peer contributions between different torrents. Thus, in the case of leecher-dominated torrents, peers can
only beneﬁt from the system inasmuch as they can instantaneously contribute to it, and, for asymmet-
ric Internet connections, this means that download rate will be capped at a level that correlates roughly
with the upload capacity of the downloading peer (this does not happen in seeder-dominated torrents,
due to their high levels of altruism). To address this problem, 2Fast proposes the formation of trusted
peer groups whose total upload capacity is greater than or equal to the download capacity of any given
member peer. Thus, when one of the member peers wants to download a given torrent, it becomes a
collector and the rest of the peers in the group become its helpers. Each of the helpers contributes its up-
load bandwidth to the collector, and uses its download bandwidth to fetch appropriate fragments for the
collector. From the standpoint of an external peer, the trusted group looks as a single, multihomed peer
23Originally, Tribler required its own social network, but there is no reason by which it could not use already existing ones such
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with large upload capacity. Intra-group contribution balancing is achieved by collector peers performing
as helpers to other peers in turn, when needed. Thus, 2Fast is based on reciprocal altruism: Collectors
recruit helpers by promising that the bandwidth they invest in increasing the collectors upload capac-
ity (and thus boosting its download capacity) will be returned in the future, when the helper-collector
relationship is reversed.
Other authors have focused on the game-theoretical aspects of indirect reciprocity. One example is
[198], where Lai et al. extend the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to model the asymmetric nature of peer-
to-peer interactions, and implement an evolutionary strategy to reﬁne peer strategies. In particular, a
simulation model is developed in which every peer takes the role of either client or server for each round
of the game. Clients choose the servers they wish to interact with, and whether they want to cooperate
or defect in this interaction. A round consists of two games for each player: one as a client and one as a
server. After a generation of r rounds, each strategy is assigned to a proportion of peers in accordance to
the average gain that it gave to its users. Thus, high performance strategies tend to proliferate, and low
performing strategies tend to die out. Each peer implements a decision function that takes a history of
a player’s actions, either in direct interaction (private history) or obtained through gossip or centralised
reputation systems (shared history), and decides whether to cooperate or defect with that player. The
authors propose the reciprocative decision function, that instructs peers to cooperate with the probability
P(any peer cooperates with peer j) = min

number of times j gave
number of times j received
,1

.
Additionally, Lai et al. compare between objective reputation systems, where every peer agrees
on the reputation rating for every peer, and subjective reputation systems where each peer weighs the
reputations reported by other peers with their relative trust ratings. Through simulation, Lai et al. show
that imperfect information on the past actions of peers (private history) can lead to inefﬁciency, and
this issue aggravates with system size. Only very small peer-to-peer systems (smaller than 200 peers in
their simulations) were able to function at appreciable levels of cooperation using only private history.
Lai et al. ﬁnally analyse the issue of whitewashing, where peers use disposable identities to exploit
generosity towards newcomers. However, the solution that Lai et al. propose hinges on newcomers
arriving in batches of “good” and “bad” newcomers, which is by no means a given in practice.
2.7.2 Systems based on Reputation Systems
The study of reputations, their value and the way that they can affect the decision-making process of
strategic agents has been a favourite topic of study in economics and mathematical sociology (see [216]
and Appendix A). Recently, software platforms have been developed that allow peers to collect, dis-
tribute, and aggregate service quality information about the past behaviour of other peers [263]. These
have been called reputation systems.
One of the classic examples of a reputation system for peer-to-peer networks is EigenTrust [186,
185], which works as a participation metric that can be used to reward peers which contribute to the
overlay while still allowing less active peers to participate in it. Kamvar et al. very brieﬂy show that
the use of EigenTrust correlates positively with a set of participation indicators on Gnutella (number
of authentic uploads, popularity of ﬁles shared, uptime, number of shared ﬁles, etc.), and propose to
use larger bandwidth shares and bigger overlay-level search query Time-to-Live (TTL) as rewards for
participatory peers.
There have been, however, many other reputation system proposals. One of them is NICE [281],
in which trust values for a reputation mechanism are calculated in a decentralised manner by inferring
multiple trust paths using probabilistic search with attenuated Bloom ﬁlters [265]. Peers store cookies
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a service from peer nj, peer ni recursively searches for cookies issued by nj starting with its trust
neighbours (peers that have issued cookies to ni). This search is directed by using Bloom ﬁlters, and
eventually converges to a set of transitive-trust paths between ni and nj. In the words of Sherwood et al.
[281]:
Nodes that request resources present their credentials to the resource owner. Each
credential is a signed set of certiﬁcates which originate at the resource owner. Depending
on the set of credentials, the resource owner may choose to conduct a reference search. The
trust ultimately computed is a function of both the credentials, and of the references.
(quote from [281])
The trust paths calculated as a result of the reference search are used to compute a trust value that
nj places on ni, and further, to modify the terms of the transaction.
The use of probability distributions to compactly encode peer preferences in a pseudo-anonymous
way has been researched a number of times. For instance, in [60], Buchegger and LeBoudec propose a
Bayesian approach for belief representation and learning, so that second-hand information can be used in
a slander-resistant fashion to build reputation tables. Peers in this case integrate (merge) the information
from other peers using either a linear opinion pool (an average of the opinions of other peers, where
the information reported by each peer is weighted by its own reputation) or a independent opinion pool
(the product of the opinions of other peers, as if they were independent random variables). Resistance to
slander is obtained by ignoring those reports that signiﬁcantly deviate from the peer’s direct experience
at the moment of information merging.
Another example is [99], where Despotovic and Aberer estimate the reputations and trustworthiness
ratings between any peer pair without having to explore all trust paths by using a Maximum Likelihood
Estimationapproach. Thus, second-handinformationisintegratedweightedwithaprobabilityofitbeing
true - an independent credibility rating that is calculated by comparing reports with individual experience
(like in [60]).
Given that the basic commodity to be exchanged in peer-to-peer streaming systems is bandwidth,
it is advantageous to focus on reputation systems for bandwidth trading. One of these mechanisms,
Havelaar [147], relies in multiple aggregation levels for reputation information, and reporting to a stable
(non-changing) set of peers (in a similar note to KARMA [307]). Each peer maintains a vector that has
as many components as there are peers in the peer-to-peer network. Each peer populates this vector with
its own observations, and sends it to a ﬁxed set of successor peers. Each of these successors adds the
measurement vectors from all its predecessors, and creates a new vector that is combined with its own
observations by means of a simple exponential moving average. This averaged vector is propagated to
its successors. By exploiting sparseness in the aggregation vectors, communication overheads can be
signiﬁcantly reduced, favourably comparing to a DHT of equivalent size. Slander is prevented through
statistical averaging: given that the opinions of a single given node are very quickly dispersed and mixed
with the opinions of many others, only large colluding groups can have important network-wide effects
in the reputation system. Havelaar allows for indirect reciprocity and deferred usage of contributions,
but it is vulnerable to whitewashing and sybil attacks.
There has been great interest in the study of selﬁsh routing (see, for instance [128, 242, 259, 269]
and the references therein), and some of this work can be applied to peer-to-peer networks. A very
simple but representative example is [51], where Blanc et al. investigate incentives to discourage free-
loading in a routing game. This game is a variation of the random matching game in [187], adapted
to overlay routing over Chord [231]24. Time is divided into discrete rounds during which peers are
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randomly matched and each pair plays a Prisoner’s Dilemma, with the following stateful strategies:
1. If both peers are innocent, they both cooperate.
2. If both peers are guilty, they both defect.
3. Ifonepeerisinnocent andtheotheroneisguilty, thentheguiltyplayercooperatesandtheinnocent
player defects.
A peer starts the game with the innocent label. Deviation from this strategy is policed by the peers
themselves, as it triggers a punishment lasting for τ rounds where the offending peer is branded guilty,
and then punished by all other players (all will instantaneously defect in its presence). After τ rounds,
the peer becomes innocent once again, provided that it has followed the strategy during the punishment
period - cooperating even though it knows every other peer will defect (if the peer deviates in its be-
haviour during the punishment period, the punishment is restarted). This implies that before a peer can
be forgiven, it must suffer τ rounds of the sucker’s payoff 25 of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a punishment
for deviation from the social norm.
It has been proved [187] that following these social rules is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. How-
ever, the routing game of [51] differs from [187] because it is asymmetric: if peer ni requests peer nj to
route a fragment or request, it is not ni who can ascertain adherence to the social norm, but rather, this is
only possible for any peer nk downstream from nj in the overlay routing path. Thus, Blanc et al. assume
the existence of an omniscient, trusted central authority that is able to perfectly observe and judge the
actions of each peer and modify its reputation value accordingly (this is later relaxed to consider a central
authority that only detects misbehaving peers with a given probability).
Blanc et al. identify the following issues with their work:
1. The reputation system does not take into account the fact that different peers impose different
loads in other peers. Under large peer heterogeneity, the incentive mechanism can fail.
2. The incentive mechanism is not strong enough to make the social norm strategy dominant. Thus,
a peer might choose not to follow the social norm if other peers are failing to observe it, and
this behaviour can become self-sustaining. Colluding or misbehaving peers can thus derail the
socially-enforced equilibrium.
3. In a decentralised peer-to-peer system, reputations cannot be centrally managed, and reputation-
bearing messages can be modiﬁed, dropped, incorrectly routed or created out of false information.
Even if peers cannot tamper with their own reputation scores directly, collusion among peers and
sybil attacks can be used to artiﬁcially modify reputation ratings.
As evidenced by the inclusion of [187], indirect reciprocity can be motivated by social structure.
In [153] Gupta and Somani propose the creation of a reputation management system that allows peers
to form trusted communities. These trusted communities form and dissolve dynamically, and from the
point of view of external observers they are indistinguishable from single high-performance peers. All
peers in a trust group are constantly assessing each other, and may opt to evict under-performing peers
if enough votes are presented.
The study of reputation systems has developed greatly in the last 10 years, and space constraints
mean that many other possible solutions that have been explored by the research community (such as
CONFIDANT [59], Free Haven [101], the image scoring model [243] and many others) will not be
directly addressed.
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2.7.3 Systems based on Contracts (Hidden Action)
Most of the work focusing in the strategic elements of QoS on overlay networks assume that clients are
able to equate server effort with the experienced QoS. Thus, although the strategic character of QoS is
widely recognised, the fact that it might be impossible to measure it directly has not received nearly as
much attention. In this context, the Principal-Agent model (see Sections 3.4.1 and Appendix A.4) has
been useful in the study of sharing risks and externalities between peers communicating over best-effort
networks, and that can thus only imperfectly assess their respective behaviours.
There have been several attempts to model contracts in the context of peer-to-peer systems. In
[135], Ghosal et al. propose a system where peers agree to a contract when joining the network. This
contract speciﬁes the amount of resources that they will be required to contribute to the system in order to
gain access to its services. Ghosal et al. cast the optimal contract calculation as a dynamic programming
problem that seeks to assign to incoming peers a set of obligatory resource donations that is mutually
beneﬁcial for the peer and the network (both their utilities increase). As a particular example of this, in
[191] Khorshadi et al. consider a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing system where each download must be offset
by uploading it up to N times within a maximum time interval T.
With respect to the modelling of hidden action in networking scenarios, there have been several
attempts to use the principal-agent model in routing and peer-to-peer systems. In [120, 118], Feldman
et al. propose a system in which routing is analysed using a principal-agent model. The endpoints of the
ﬂow (the sender and the receiver) are modelled as the principal, and the forwarding routers as agents.
Feldman et al. derive expressions for optimal contracts that can be used to elicit high effort on the part
of the agents, while minimising investment by the principal. Furthermore, Feldman et al. ﬁnd that the
usefulness of information regarding outcomes at intermediate stages in the routing process is contingent
on the network topology, and that contracts can be implemented both directly (between the principal and
each agent) or recursively (between every node and its downstream partner).
In [229], Moore analyses hidden action from the standpoints of market theory and communitar-
ian resource allocation. Based on qualitative arguments, Moore proposes to constrain overlay network
topologies to consist of fully connected cliques interconnected through a smaller number of stable, long
lived channels. Thus, Moore posits, peers would be forced to have longer lived interactions with a
smaller number of peers, making reciprocative strategies more effective.
Implementingamodelinspiredbythenotionofsocialcapital[126, 86], [330]Zhaoetal. proposeto
counter hidden action by careful construction of the overlay topology. They assume that only some peers
manifest strategic behaviour, and they are randomly placed in a simulated topology following a power-
law distribution in the node degrees. Their proposal can be described, essentially, as supplementing the
topology with additional links in order to increase the probability of ﬁnding paths consisting only of
non-strategic peers. Obviously, as the number of strategic peers in each end to end path decreases, the
effect of hidden action decreases as well.
2.7.4 Other Indirect Reciprocity Systems
Some reputation systems follow models that were originally developed for the analysis of reputation
formation in humans. For instance, in [243], Nowak and Sigmund propose a model for the emergence
of cooperative behaviour among strangers. Agents only meet each other once, and thus there is no scope
for reciprocal altruism. Instead, agents label other agents with an image score that allows other agents to
discover the type of agent they face, thus enabling indirect reciprocity.
Another avenue that has been explored draws inspiration from cultural evolution models. In [156],
Hales and Arteconi proposes an evolutionary scheme where cooperation can emerge if both strategies
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operation without requiring shared histories, and thus is proposed as an alternative to indirect reciprocity.
In [178], Jian and MacKie-Mason analyse sharing in peer-to-peer networks using two distinct mod-
els: direct private incentives for the private provision of public goods, and generalised reciprocity as a
strategy in a repeated game. They model generalised reciprocity instances as contribution cycles on a
directed graph (in a manner identical to [145]), and formulate a stage game where strategies correspond
to sharing vectors. They propose some initial conditions that predict the existence of Nash equilibria
with sharing and free riding, even if no direct private incentives are present. These owe their existence to
generalised reciprocity and the application of a local Grim Trigger strategy. When the model in [145] has
been used in experimental studies of indirect reciprocity in humans, it has been found to yield coopera-
tion and increased social beneﬁts in small networks or networks with a high degree of trust between their
members. Another similar system is [32], for which Anagnostakis and Greenwald propose an indirect
reciprocity scheme based on n-way cyclical exchanges. They propose an algorithm in which a request
tree is formed, and when requests that connect disjoint branches of the tree, a cycle is identiﬁed through
the common ancestor of both branches. Anagnostakis and Greenwald show that the scheme provides
superior performance to direct reciprocity.
2.8 Peer-to-Peer Streaming Incentives
The incentive mechanisms that have been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter were not ex-
plicitly designed for real time streaming systems. When considering incentive mechanisms for stream-
ing, the real-time nature of the interaction must be necessarily considered, as the incentive mechanism
is usually heavily connected to the resource allocation techniques that the system uses - which are very
different in streaming overlays from those used in other kinds of overlays.
As a ﬁrst example, in [296] Tan and Jarvis consider a system in which each stream is divided into
substreams, which are then distributed using application-level multicast trees. These trees are built by
using an iterated, sealed-bid, ﬁrst-price auction procedure, where peers participating in substream dis-
tribution pick the highest bids and notify the losing bidders of the identities of the winners, so that they
can contact them and bid for the substreams again. Tan and Jarvis propose a Balanced Tree-Shortest
Path strategy that attempts to balance peer resource contribution and overlay network delay minimisa-
tion. Further, Tan and Jarvis analyse the differing incentives of stream consuming peers (delay and loss
minimisation) and non-consuming, stream-participating peers (currency accumulation maximisation). In
this case, the QoS provided by peers becomes a commodity, priced through the auction process. The sys-
tem does allow deferred consumption of contributions, but is vulnerable to both sybil and whitewashing
attacks.
In [155], Habib and Chuang propose the use of rank-order tournaments26 as a basis for an incen-
tive mechanism scheme to provide service quality differentiation through peer selection in peer-to-peer
streaming. The relative contribution of a peer is used as a signal that affects the strategic QoS decisions
of the others. Habib and Chuang base their study on PROMISE [163], and use PlanetLab [16] to conduct
experiments over the wide-area Internet. They conﬁrm experimentally that peers have a strong disincen-
tive to share their upload capacity while they are downloading (Habib and Chuang do not explain this
through a theoretical model, but some possible explanations can be found in [115]). Additionally, they
conﬁrm that random peer selection is tantamount to provisioning random QoS, and thus makes it impos-
sible to give any kind of playback guarantees to the destination peer’s codec. Habib and Chuang propose
a score-based reputation management mechanism to foster cooperation through indirect reciprocity by
image scoring [243], propose utility functions for the peers, and then formulate the best response dy-
26There is a established research current in economics of using rank-order tournaments as incentive devices to elicit agent effort
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namics of the system in such a way that they correspond to the best response dynamics of rank-order
tournaments. The rationale of the incentive mechanism is that a given peer will refuse to give service to
any peer that has a smaller cooperation score than itself - peers only cooperate with those peers that have
cooperated at least as much as themselves. Thus, predictably good peers (those that have largest scores)
have much greater ﬂexibility in choosing their peers, and thus are capable of obtaining better QoS. Fi-
nally, Habib and Chuang compare the effectiveness of their proposed mechanism to the effectiveness of
FEC (Forward Error Correction) for codec-level packet loss, and ﬁnd that up to 35% of FEC overhead
is required to have the same loss performance as the incentive mechanism. The system allows deferred
beneﬁt from contributions and is resistant to whitewashing attacks, but is vulnerable to sybil attacks.
Some incentive mechanisms for streaming involve the driving of a preference queueing system
using incentives information. One instance of this is [248], where Pai and Mohr present an incentive
mechanism for peer-to-peer streaming based on the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma that gives better QoS
to those peers who contribute more to the system. The system only requires direct reputation and reci-
procity. Pai and Mohr propose a “Token Stealing Algorithm” in which each peer ni has a system of
token buckets linked to trade accounts (this is similar to GNUNet [149, 47]), and the uploads that other
peers have made to ni are used to drive their own private token buckets, essentially converting upload
bandwidth into reserved capacity. This amounts to the implementation of a currency-based market using
pairwise currency accounts, and linking past contributions with expedited queueing. From another point
of view, this system is essentially a way to implement a currency-based market system using pairwise
currency accounts, and linking fragment value to their treatment in a QoS-aware queue. In the words of
the authors:
The Token Stealing algorithm is a simple extension of the token bucket algorithm. In
this algorithm, every peer maintains a standard token bucket that we refer to as the shared
bucket into which tokens are added periodically. In addition, the peer maintains a separate
bucket for each of its neighbours. We refer to these as private buckets. Whenever a peer
receives a packet from one of its neighbours, it removes tokens from the shared bucket and
transfers them to that neighbour’s private bucket. This has the effect of reserving a portion
of the peer’s upload bandwidth to repay the neighbour for the packets it has uploaded. To
prevent neighbours from reserving large amounts of bandwidth that they never utilise (for
example, because they are connected to other peers with large upload capacities), there is a
limit on the size of the private buckets. Tokens that overﬂow the private buckets are returned
to the shared bucket.
(quote from [248]; emphasis added)
Thus, in a resource-rich system, all peers receive comparable quality of service, whereas in a
resource-starved system peers that have contributed (uploaded) to a given peer receive preferential treat-
ment. The system, as it stands, does not accommodate indirect reputation and reciprocity. Furthermore,
it only supports direct reciprocity, allowing time deferred consumption only in a very limited fashion.
Oneofthemainproblemsassociatedwithcurrentpeer-to-peerstreamingsystemsisthatpeeruptime
can be short [316, 256, 33]. Thus, making the distribution overlay resilient to peer transience is a key
challenge. In [247], Padmanabhan et al. propose CoopNet, a peer-to-peer video streaming system where
stream reliability is increased by introducing spatial network diffusion redundancy, as well as MDC27.
27Multiple Description Coding[142] is a coding technique where a single media stream is separated into n > 1 independent
substreams (descriptions). Each description is then divided into packets and routed over uncorrelated, mutually disjoint end-to-
end paths. Although any combination of descriptions can be received and decoded, the quality of the reconstructed signal is
proportional to the number of recovered descriptions: the more descriptions recovered, the lower the distortion of the original
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CoopNet supports self-interested peers, as their participation in the distribution of media streams is only
required when they are actually consuming the stream, and even then, only uploading as much as they
download. However, Padmanabhan et al. do not address the issue of freeloading, as they do not propose
any kind of enforcement or retaliatory behaviour for the peers. CoopNet is not based on swarming,
but on Application Level Multicast (ALM). However, it tries to overcome the main resiliency problem
of ALM (the fragility of the distribution tree to failures, peer disconnections or QoS problems at peers
close to the root) by using, instead of a single multicast tree, a set of n uncorrelated multicast trees, each
carrying an independent substream (MDC description).
The proposed algorithm proceeds as follows. First, the original video stream is encoded as n > 1
separate substreams (descriptions), after ﬁrst dividing the stream into frame groups. Sections of these
frame groups are further classiﬁed according to their importance for stream reconstruction, and given
commensurate priority and FEC protection. This is done using network loss feedback, in the form of a
probability distribution p(m) of successfully receiving m out of the original n substreams. After the n
substreams have been generated, they are distributed over the network by using a set of n independent,
application layer multicast trees. The creation and maintenance of these multicast trees is one on the
main results of [247]. In particular, the following design criteria were used:
• Short (Bushy) Trees: The number of application layer hops between the source and the leaves
should be minimal. In addition to minimising stream delay, this would minimise the probability
of experiencing network problems along the application layer path between the source and the
leaves.
• Tree Diversity: Each peer should have a different set of ancestors on each of the distribution
trees for each description. Thus, any single node failure or disconnection will only impair the
transmission of a single description.
• Tree Efﬁciency: All the trees, while maintaining diversity, should be as close to the actual network
topology as possible, to minimise propagation delay and unnecessary exposure to network layer
congestion and loss.
• Fast Bootstrapping: The processing of new peers joining the overlay should be quick, so that the
peer starts receiving streaming content as soon as possible.
• Short Peer Lifetimes: The reconﬁguration of application level multicast trees should be as brief
as possible after a given peer has left the overlay or become unresponsive.
• Scalability: The tree management algorithm should be able to cope with very large and dynamic
trees, in the region of 1000 node arrivals and/or departures per second. Padmanabhan et al. did
not elaborate on the memory requirements of their technique.
• Balance: The tree should be as balanced as possible.
To manage tree changes as quickly as possible, Padmanabhan et al. considered a centralised tree
management algorithm in which all decisions regarding tree constructions were made by the stream
source. Furthermore, Padmanabhan et al. concede that this constitutes a performance and reliability
single point of failure, but argue that if the source peer fails, a failure on the tree management functions
is a moot point: the stream cannot continue anyway.
Thus, when a new peer wishes to join the overlay, it contacts the stream source, which directs it
to a designated parent node on each subtree (Padmanabhan et al. do not approach the problem of peer
all descriptions simultaneously. Instead, the reconstructed signal will exhibit transitory episodes of reduced quality. Roughly, the
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disobedience or strategic lies). These peers are elected in a deterministic fashion, following the idea
(originally proposed for SplitStream [65]) that the outgoing bandwidth constraints for every peer can be
honoured by making each peer an interior node in only one of the MDC trees, and a leaf on the rest. This
also contributes to increase tree diversity (hence reliability) and is the basis for an algorithm proposed
by Padmanabhan et al. to build bushy trees.
To make the trees efﬁcient, Padmanabhan et al. propose that, when a number of peers are equally
suitable parents for a new one, it should be assigned to the one that is close in terms of QoS or network
distance.
In [76], Chu et al. propose a scheme in which resource rich peers contribute excess resources to the
system, and subsidise resource-starved peers in order to enable improved social welfare. The protocol
is enforced by the media publisher. The media stream is divided into sub-streams, each one with its
own multicast tree. Since peers join as many trees as their contributed upload entitles them to, they can
strategically decide the best way to use their upload capacity. The system does not support deferred
consumption, nor resilience against whitewashing or sybil attacks.
2.8.1 Streaming Resource Depletion and Direct Reciprocity
Streaming systems that use direct reciprocity as an incentive mechanism can suffer from counterpro-
ductive chunk diffusion dynamics, because they present skewed fragment availability. We explore this
problem below, following the exposition of [248].
We imagine two peers ni and nj that have roughly the same delay from the source ns and are
trading fragments with one another. The precise amount each of them downloads from the other will
depend on many factors, including their past history of interaction, the current network conditions, and
the amount of overlap between the fragments that each one wants and the fragments that the other one
has. Now, say that for some reason nj has been downloading comparatively more fragments from ni
than from other equivalent peers, because ni has a greater number of fragments that nj needs.
If nj were to apply the Tit-for-Tat policy to ni, it would try to preferentially upload to it. However,
this would mean uploading to ni fragments that it does not yet have (ni is not interested in downloading
fragments that it already has), and doing so with small enough delay. Thus, nj will help ni to increase
its fragment diversity further, and thus the probability of some other peer nk of downloading preferen-
tially from it will increase. As this continues, more and more peers will aggressively compete for ni’s
resources, decreasing its average QoS and concentrating more and more fragments in ni rather than dis-
tributing them around the network. This self-reinforcing process will tend to concentrate a great number
of fragments in a single, very contested peer (ni). This positive feedback loop will tend to amplify small
differences between peers, so that peers with small delay or topology advantages will become increas-
ingly important, and other peers will invest large amounts of resources in trying to upload to them while
concentrating in them most of their downloads. Thus, general fragment availability will suffer, while the
distribution topology becomes more and more dependent on these hubs for connectivity.
In [248], Pai and Mohr tried the opposite solution: reducing the upload rate to those peers that
are preferentially downloading from a given peer. This worked in simulations, but had a huge negative
impact on system performance in practice. This happens because it propagates the bandwidth limitations
of “leaf” peers upstream, so that slow peers that are down the distribution tree tend to slow down peers
that are situated further upstream. The net result is that “it was not possible to accommodate the slowest
peers without dragging down the performance of the entire system” [248].
Thus, in order for direct reciprocity to be useful for near real time media streaming, contributions
must be made in the processes of ﬁnding and using chunks. A possibly fruitful direction of research in
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2.9 Incentive Mechanisms and Mechanism Design
The reader is referred to Section 3.3 for the deﬁnition of some of the technical terms following. Although
many of the works detailed before use either game theory or mechanism design as a tool for the formal
analysis of the presented incentive mechanisms, there are some works in the literature that have remained
closer in spirit to pure applications of game theory or mechanism design. We now present a sample of
these works.
2.9.1 Game Theory and Resource Allocation
As a ﬁrst example, in [31], Altman et al. survey different models and solution concepts for network
resource allocation problems in the context of game theory. Equilibrium concepts are analysed, in-
cluding both Nash-Pareto equilibria [237, 236] and Wardrop Equilibria [314]. Other applications of
game theory in communications networks involve the analysis of Braess’ Paradox [58], equilibrium
control through pricing or mechanism design, equilibrium convergence and Stackelberg frameworks for
customer-operator interactions. Practical applications of these models include the analysis of network
service provisioning, routing and static/dynamic ﬂow control.
In [140], Gollapudi et al. explore the routing and bandwidth allocation problem by considering
each end-to-end ﬂow as a game player attempting to maximise its utility on a routing game. Thus, by
considering selﬁsh, rational ﬂows, Nash equilibria are found that simultaneously optimise throughput
and fairness criteria. By maximising their own beneﬁts, network ﬂows achieve highly efﬁcient global
outcomes. The key technique to accomplish this, rewarding ﬂows in proportion to the beneﬁt they bring
to the global outcome, is almost identical to the incentive payment scheme proposed in VCG mecha-
nisms [306, 81, 150]. The issue of ﬁnding Nash equilibria is computationally very hard, with no known
polynomial-time algorithms [249, 242]. Thus, Gollapudi et al. propose a local search algorithm based
on agent best response dynamics, that is simple to implement but still converges to a good approximate
equilibrium in a short amount of time.
2.9.2 Mechanism Design and Computer Networks
There is growing interest in the use of mechanism design for the solution of networking problems. In
[241], Nisan and Ronen propose the use of mechanism design for the solution of optimisation problems
in computing and networking, and gives this technique the name of Algorithmic Mechanism Design
(AMD). By applying the VCG mechanism (see Chapter 3), Nisan and Ronen show that the shortest
path routing problem can be solved even when links are under the control of strategic entities, and then
proceeds to formulate and solve a task scheduling problem where k tasks are assigned to n agents in
such a way that the total process time is minimised.
The central objection that has been placed on mechanism design for the solution of network prob-
lems is the presence of the “centre” that takes agent messages and deﬁnes the mechanism outcome and
the payments that will be imposed on players. To address this, in [111], Feigenbaum and Shenker ar-
gue that a new approach to mechanism design is needed that takes into account not only its algorithmic
and complexity implications (like [241]), but the possibility of implementing its proposed solutions in a
distributed, scalable fashion. Thus, they posit that extending the notion of AMD to include elements of
distributed systems (thus proposing DAMD, Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design) can not only
be the starting point to formulate and solve fundamental open questions such as the notion of network
complexity, but also to set the foundations of distributed computing with strategic agents. Some applied
theoretical issues that Feigenbaum and Shenker propose include using approximation to produce socially
near-optimal, strategyproof, near budget-balanced equilibria or the use of cryptography to enable peer
accountability. Finally, Feigenbaum and Shenker propose a set of possible application problems, that
include web caching, peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing, application-layer overlay networks, and distributed task2.10. OVERLAY-ISP INTERACTION FOR MANAGED OVERLAYS 49
allocation. A similar, earlier paper is [240], where Nisan considers DAMD and its relationship with
conventional mechanism design, and several example problems in resource allocation, optimisation and
task scheduling are presented.
In [276], Sanghavi and Hajek study the production of a public resource, where economic actors
have an incentive to misrepresent their utilities from the public good in order to minimise their indi-
vidual contributions. Sanghavi and Hajek assume the existence of a central authority that controls the
production and allocation of the the shared resource, as well as the contributions of all peers. However,
they propose that the peers collapse their utility functions as a single scalar, as opposed to a whole real
valued function as required in the VCG mechanism. This alleviates the communication overheads of
the VCG implementation, while retaining good efﬁciency at its static Nash equilibrium. The system is
guaranteed to converge to the Nash equilibrium if the peers follow their best response dynamics (the
authors do not study arbitrary non-myopic strategies).
More recent works, such as [283], reinforce the general position of the research community with re-
spect to the usefulness of game-theoretical approaches, and propose a set of open research questions that
need to be addressed by AMD/DAMD. Since only strategic (rational or irrational) peers are susceptible
to incentives, the goal of DAMD is to set up an incentive scheme that allows irrational peers to become
rational, and rational peers to behave in a way that attains a good enough social welfare level.
2.10 Overlay-ISP Interaction for Managed Overlays
If one considers the edge-to-edge trafﬁc pattern most useful to a given peer-to-peer system or managed
overlay, it is clear that it will be a function of the preferences of the overlay peers regarding QoS,
resource availability and data caching and replication. On the other hand, if one considers the edge-to-
edge trafﬁc pattern most desirable to the ISP underlying it, it will be a function of its link and node costs,
the background trafﬁc that it carries and its trafﬁc engineering policies. Thus, a tension between the
preferences of the overlay and the ISP arises and can be analysed from a game-theoretical perspective
[31].
This tension has been very visible in the context of net neutrality [93], and it has been accompanied
by tools such as Switzerland [25], Glasnost [23] or bttest [104] that can be used to detect the bandwidth
throttling phenomenon that emerges as a rational strategy for ISPs [312]. Proposals to shift this equilib-
rium away from throttling and into more overlay-friendly states include bandwidth auctions [322] and
infrastructure caching, if the ISP can attract a sufﬁciently large number of subscribers [133].
Regarding the analysis of cooperative equilibrium outcomes between ISPs and managed overlays,
work has been done through the use of the Shapley value of coalitional games [211, 212], and there is a
long tradition of work regarding incentives issues in routing - see, for instance [139, 202, 43, 259, 113,
128, 63, 193]. Finally, it is important to note that there is currently a large interest in the standardisation
of interface to guide the equilibrium outcomes of these overlay-ISP interactions [252], and an increased
interest in the research community in exploring the issues behind the interaction of routing and content
distribution [103, 180, 184, 211, 28].
In Chapter 7, we present a model for the utility-maximising behaviour of managed overlays and the
proﬁt-maximising behaviour of ISPs.Part II
Theory and Contributions
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Underlying Theoretical Models
3.1 Graph Theory
Almost all contributions in this work refer to networks, and thus a basic set of graph-theoretical deﬁni-
tions is fundamental. We follow nomenclature similar to that of [148].
3.1.1 Nodes and Links
Deﬁnition 3.1. A directed graph G as a ﬁnite set of vertices, or nodes (N = {ni}) and a set of edges, or
links (L = {li}) deﬁned over the cartesian product N × N: each link li can thus be seen as a relationship
between two nodes. As the presence or absence of a link between two given nodes limits the ways in
which the network is traversable, it deﬁnes its topological structure.
The number of nodes in the network is |N|, the cardinality of N. The number of links in the network
is, equivalently, |L|.
Links correspond to ordered node pairs and have an intrinsic directionality: one of endpoints of the
link is designated as the start, and the other as the end. The link is thus directed from its start to its end.
We will use the notation start(li) and end(li) to denote, respectively, the start and end of link li.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A link lk is called outgoing from node ni, expressed as ni → lk, if it originates on ni
(start(lk) = ni). Equivalently, a link lk is called incoming to node nj, expressed as lk → nj, if it
terminates on nj (end(lk) = nj).
Deﬁnition 3.3. A link is incident on a node if it is either outgoing from or incoming to it.
Deﬁnition 3.4. Two nodes are adjacent if there is a link between them.
Deﬁnition 3.5. Two links are adjacent if they have an endpoint in common.
Deﬁnition 3.6. The incoming link neighbourhood Λ+(ni) of a node ni is a set consisting of all incom-
ing links terminating on the node. Thus, the indegree of ni, |Λ+(ni)| = deg+(ni), is the number of
incoming links incident on it.
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The incoming link neighbourhood Λ+(S) of a connected subgraph S in G is the set consisting of all
incoming links terminating on any node of S and originating on any node outside S.
Deﬁnition 3.7. The outgoing link neighbourhood Λ−(ni) of a node ni is a set consisting of all the
outgoing links originating on the node. Thus, the outdegree of ni, |Λ−(ni)| = deg−(ni), is the number
of outgoing links originating on it.
The outgoing link neighbourhood Λ−(S) of a connected subgraph S is the set consisting of all
outgoing links originating on any node of S and terminating on any node outside S.
Deﬁnition 3.8. The link neighbourhood Λ(ni) = Λ−(ni)
S
Λ+(ni) of a node ni consists of all links
incident on the node. Thus, the degree of ni, |Λ(ni)| = |Λ+(ni)|+|Λ−(ni)| = deg(ni) = deg+(ni)+
deg−(ni), is the number of both incoming and outgoing links incident on it.
The link neighbourhood Λ(S) of a connected subgraph S is the set consisting of all links with
exactly one endpoint in S.
Deﬁnition 3.9. The incoming node neighbourhood Π+(ni) of a node ni is the set of nodes adjacent to
ni through the links in Λ+(ni).
The incoming node neighbourhood Π+(S) of a connected subgraph S is the set consisting of all
nodes adjacent to any node in S through a link in Λ+(S).
Deﬁnition 3.10. The outgoing node neighbourhood Π−(ni) of a node ni is the set of nodes adjacent to
ni through the links in Λ−(ni).
The outgoing node neighbourhood Π−(S) of a connected subgraph S is the set consisting of all
nodes adjacent to any node in S through a link in Λ−(S).
Deﬁnition 3.11. The node neighbourhood Π(ni) of a node ni is the set of nodes adjacent to ni through
the links in Λ(ni).
The node neighbourhood Π(S) of a connected subgraph S is the set consisting of all nodes adjacent
to any node in S through a link in Λ(S).
3.1.2 Walks and Paths
Deﬁnition 3.12. A walk Wnm between two nodes nn and nm is an alternating sequence W =
n(0),l(1),n(1),l(2),...,n(k − 1),l(k),n(k) of nodes and links, such that l(i + 1) is incident on n(i)
and n(i + 1). Furthermore, n(0) = nn and n(k) = nm.
Deﬁnition 3.13. A trail Bnm is a walk Wnm with no repeated links, that is, where l(i) = l(j) if and
only if i = j. A directed trail is a trail where, for each link l(i), a direction is deﬁned such that if
n(i − 1) → l(i) → n(i) the direction is positive, and if n(i − 1) ← l(i) ← n(i), the direction is
negative. Intuitively, this means that if the direction of a link on a trail matches the direction implied
by its node sequence, the edge is positively directed, whereas if its direction is opposite to the direction
implied by its node sequence, the edge is negatively directed.
Deﬁnition 3.14. A path Pnm is a trail with no repeated nodes unless possibly the initial node nn and
the ﬁnal ﬁnal node nm. Thus, n(i) = n(j) if and only if i = j, except for the ﬁrst and last nodes, where
n(0) = n(k) is allowed (in this case, the path is a cycle and n = m). Again, a directed path is a cycle
where direction is deﬁned in the same way as in directed trails.
In Chapter 4 we will be interested in the analysis of all the possible paths between two nodes in a
directed graph. The following deﬁnitions will simplify the exposition.3.2. THE MATHEMATICS OF SYBIL ATTACKS 53
Deﬁnition 3.15. The graph power Gn of degree n ≥ 2 of a graph G1 = (N1,L1) is a graph with the
same N as G1, but a different link set Ln, so that there is a link between ni and nj in Ln only if there is
at least one path Pij in G1 of n hops or fewer between ni and nj.
Deﬁnition 3.16. The node diameter d(G,ni) of a graph G centred on a node ni is the minimum number
of hops h so that all nodes in G can be reached from ni in at most h hops.
Deﬁnition 3.17. The graph diameter d(G) of a graph G is the maximum node diameter of its constituent
nodes. Formally, d(G) = maxni∈N d(G,ni).
Deﬁnition 3.18. The maximum graph power Gd(G) of a graph G is the n-th power of the graph for
n = d(G). Thus, there is a link between ni and nj in Gd(G) if there is at least one path in Pij in G
between ni and nj.
3.1.3 Cycles
Deﬁnition 3.19. An oriented cycle is a cycle that is a directed path as well. Thus, orientation on a
cycle deﬁnes a “sense of rotation” along the cycle, and each of the links in the cycle can be positively or
negatively directed.
Deﬁnition 3.20. A link li within a cycle ck is positively directed, denoted as li 	 ck, if the direction of
li matches the “sense of rotation” along ck.
Deﬁnition 3.21. A link li within a cycle ck is negatively directed, denoted as li  ck, if the direction of
li opposes the “sense of rotation” along ck.
Deﬁnition 3.22. Two cycles are adjacent if they share at least one link.
3.2 The Mathematics of Sybil Attacks
In the following we provide a theoretical basis for the analysis of the sybil attack.
3.2.1 Whitewashing and Sybil Attacks
An underlying assumption of any reputation system is that a peer can be reliably identiﬁed over time.
Thus, reputation systems are usually susceptible to identity-based attacks. The main three attacks that
have been addressed in the literature are slander, whitewashing [117] and sybil attacks [106].
In most reputation systems, peers receive reports from other peers regarding the behaviour and
contributions of other peers in the trust network. Thus, peers can create reports with false information
regarding other peers, send reports pretending to be other peers, or arbitrarily modify reputation system
messages as they traverse the network - and this might be difﬁcult to detect. One particular way in which
peers can lie or modify passing messages is to artiﬁcially diminish the contributions or reputation of a
victim. This attack, known as slander, depends on the ability of peers to distinguish true information
with respect to a given peer from lies planted by other peers. This problem has been approached from
two main angles: using anomaly detection [183] and relying on statistical averaging to dilute the effect
of attackers [147].
Another related attack is whitewashing, that occurs when a peer can dump an identity that has been
targeted as untrustworthy by the reputation system and just use a new one. The whitewashing nodes are
then indistinguishable from legitimate newcomers, and can exploit any kind of allowances given to new
nodes to help them bootstrap into the system. Thus, whitewashing leverages the extremely low marginal
costthatcreatingnewidentitieshasincurrentpeer-to-peersystemstodestroythesanctioningcapabilities
of reputation systems, and complicates the insertion of new peers into the peer-to-peer substrate in the
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A third attack is the sybil attack. A Sybil attack occurs when a user creates a large (potentially
unbounded) number of identities that then collude towards the user’s aims. Not only can these identities
be created at almost no cost, any sort of past contribution history can be simulated as well.
Conventionally, reputation systems operate by assuming a correspondence between peer names and
their identities, and thus they are usually susceptible to sybil attacks [105]. Although these problems
are still open, numerous countermeasures have been proposed (see [203] for a general survey, and [323]
for recent work in leveraging social network structure for the prevention of sybil attacks). Even though
eliminating the scope for sybil attacks may be very difﬁcult within the current paradigms of reputation
systems [106], even imperfect identity management can decrease freeloading to a manageable level.
For instance, Marti and Garcia-Molina show that having a basic reputation system based on self-signed
certiﬁcates can provide large performance improvements (4 to 20-fold, as reported in [219]) on a ﬁle-
sharing peer-to-peer network against node selﬁsh behaviour, when compared with no reputation system
at all.
3.2.2 Deﬁnition of Sybilproofness
InthisSectionwewillbeconcernedwiththetrustnetwork ofapeer-to-peeroverlay: aweighted, directed
graph G (for nomenclature see Section 3.1) where the link weights wij ≥ 0 associated with the links
lij correspond in some way with the trust that peer ni has in peer nj. The manner in which these link
trust values are obtained is not of concern for the material presented. In Chapter 4, which is the main
driver for this Section, G is identiﬁed with past contributions between peers, and wij is just a record of
unreciprocated contributions backed by reciprocative policies.
Sybilproofness was presented in [71] (which then became Chapter 27 of [242]) in the context of
reputation systems. We respect the original nomenclature by Cheng and Friedman in [71].
Deﬁnition 3.23. A reputation function f(G) is a function f : N 7→ R, where N is the node set of a graph
G. The value that f assigns to node ni will be denoted as f(G,ni).
A sybil strategy is the analytical representation of a sybil attack. Since a peer can create not only
arbitrary identities, but also any relationships between them, a sybil strategy is comprised of an arbitrary
number of nodes and trust links, forming an arbitrary topology. Formally, we have that:
Deﬁnition 3.24. A sybil strategy for a malicious peer nm is a graph Sm = (Nm,Lm) along with a set
Λ(Sm) of attack links. Of course, Nm and Lm can be arbitrarily large, and they can form an arbitrary
topology. This (Nm,Lm) topology connects to G−m, the rest of the trust network, through the set of
attack links Λ(Sm) which could be potentially very large. Each link in Lm is annotated in an arbitrary
way, describing any claimed past history or trust between the sybil nodes. Links in Λ(Sm) are annotated
using normal trust building procedures with their correspondent peers.
We explore the concept of sybil strategy further. Let G = (N,L) represent the true state of a trust
network, and nm ∈ N a malicious node mounting a sybil attack from within G. Let G0 = (N0,L0) be
the trust network that results if we include the sybil strategy Sm of nm in G, so that Sm is the connected
subgraph of G0 that constitutes the sybil attack by nm. Since the links between sybils and real nodes must
be created following true trust building processes, we have that Π(Nm) ∈ N0 is identical to Π(nm) ∈ N
and, if we collapse Gm to its only real node nm, G0 is transformed into G. Of course, we have that
N0 = N ∪ Nm and L0 = (L \ Λ(nm)) ∪ Lm ∪ Λ(Sm), since the attack substitutes the links between nm
and its adjacent nodes with the attack links.
Deﬁnition 3.25. As before, let G = (N,L) represent an arbitrary trust network, and G0 = (N0,L0) be the
trust network including the sybil strategy Gm = (Nm,Lm). A reputation function f is value sybilproof if,3.2. THE MATHEMATICS OF SYBIL ATTACKS 55
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Figure 3.1: A malicious node nm and its sybil strategy Sm. The links between nm (or Sm) and the rest
of the network, G−m, are the attack links.
for every G and peer nm ∈ N, there is no sybil strategy Gm = (Nm,Lm) such that f(G0,ns) > f(G,nm)
for any sybil node ns ∈ Nm.
Early reputation systems like EigenTrust [185] relied on symmetric reputation functions, which
depend only in the topology of the trust network and are therefore invariant when symmetry transforma-
tions are applied to the trust network. It is easy to prove that these systems can not be sybilproof, but we
must deﬁne some concepts ﬁrst that will allow us to discuss network symmetries more easily.
Deﬁnition 3.26. A graph isomorphism from a graph G = (NG,LG) to a graph H = (NH,LH) is a
function χ : NG −→ NH that assigns a node in H to each one of the nodes of G while maintaining
adjacency. Thus, if ni and nj are adjacent in G, χ(ni) and χ(nj) must be adjacent in H.
In practice, we say that two graphs G and H are isomorphic if it is possible to re-label the nodes of
one to yield the other. A symmetric reputation function can now be deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 3.27. Let G = (NG,LG) represent a trust network, and χ an isomorphism of G such that
NH = χ(NG), and H = (NH,LH) is any graph isomorphic to G. A reputation function f is symmetric
if we have that f(G,nm) = f(H,χ(nm)).
Thus, a symmetric reputation function assigns values on the nodes only taking into account the
trust topology: their position in the trust network G and the weights of its links. Although attractive
mathematically, thispropertyisofverylimitedvalueinatrustnetworkinwhichsybilscanbeintroduced:
all peers can use sybils to implement any topology with any link weights.
A basic conclusion of [71] is that symmetric reputation functions are never sybilproof. The proof
of this result is simple, and relies on the fact that an automorphism is an isomorphism.
Deﬁnition 3.28. A graph automorphism of a graph G = (N,L) is a graph isomorphism to itself. Thus, if
ˆ χ is an automorphism of G, it re-labels nodes in N in such a way that the adjacencies of G are preserved.
Thus, any automorphism ˆ χ of G is a permutation on N that maintains the adjacency structure of G - if
two nodes are joined by an edge in N, so are their images under the permutation ˆ χ(N).
Of course, every network has at least one automorphism: the identity automorphism χI, that maps
every node to itself. We call this a trivial automorphism, and explicitly remove it from our analysis. We
shall restrict our attention to nontrivial automorphisms that reﬂect true network symmetries.
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Proof. Letˆ f be a reputation function such that not all of N is mapped to the same value (ˆ f is nontrivial).
Consider a sybil strategy Sm that consists of duplicating the entire G by creating a sybil node for each
node in G, also replicating any trust links between them (Sm is isomorphic to G). Then, G0 will consist
of two identical copies of G joined at the attacking node nm: one of the copies consists of true peers; the
other one consists of sybils (the sybil nm corresponds to itself). Obviously, G0 has an automorphism χ
such that every peer is mapped to its corresponding sybil, and by Deﬁnition 3.27, nm will always have
at its disposal a sybil that achieves the maximum reputation value in the network (indeed, any value in
the network).
3.2.3 Conditions for Sybilproofness
The solution that [71] presents for this problem is anchoring reputation values to some peer in the
network. After a trust anchor na has been set, reputation will propagate along outgoing paths from na.
In the analysis that follows, we present the exposition in [71] and, like [71], we extensively use the notion
of a capacity-edge-disjoint path. In this formulation, if there is an edge e = (ni,nj) with trust value
wij, it is possible to split it into many links e1 = (ni,nj), e2 = (ni,nj), ...with weights w1
ij, w2
ij, ...,
as long as the trust value of the link is split additively. This would imply that w1
ij + w2
ij + ... = wij ,
so that no trust is lost in the process. The basis of this is that a peer mounting a sybil attack will choose
to assign its contributions or trust values to any of its sybils in the most advantageous manner, but all of
them will ultimately bounded by the total trust between the nodes in the border of the sybil strategy and
the rest of the trust network. Figure 3.2 shows an example of this, where a true trust link between peers
nj and ni (Figure 3.2a) can be expanded into either a set of trust links from nj to the sybils of ni (Figure
3.2b), a set of trust links from the sybils of nj to ni (Figure 3.2c) or a set of trust links from the sybils
of nj to the sybils of ni (Figure 3.2d). Although the real trust value wij could be partitioned in various
ways, the total outgoing trust from nj (and its sybils) to ni (and its sybils) will be equal to wij. This
is because ni and nj are not sybils of a single node, and thus trust between them cannot be arbitrarily
created - it must be earned in some way1.
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Figure 3.2: Sybil strategies and disjoint paths. Ni is a sybil strategy for ni and Nj is a sybil strategy for
nj.
Deﬁnition 3.29. Let G = (N,L) represent a trust network, and na the anchor node. Further, let Pai be
the set of all capacity-edge-disjoint paths between na and the node whose reputation is being calculated,
ni. In addition, we deﬁne Pai as P(Pai) - the power set of Pai (the set of all subsets of Pai), so that
Pai is the set of all possible sets of capacity-edge-disjoint paths between the root node na and peer ni.
Finally, g(Pai) : Pai 7→ R is a reputation ﬂow function that takes the weights of the links in Pai and
1We assume that nj and ni are not colluding. If they are, they are treated as part of the same sybil strategy and will only be
able to interact with the rest of the peers through capacity-edge-disjoint paths.3.3. GAME THEORY 57
yields the amount of reputation that can ﬂow from na to ni via Pai. Then, an anchor-ﬂow reputation
function is deﬁned as
fa(G,ni) = max
Pai∈Pai
 
M
Pai∈Pai
g(Pai)
!
. (3.1)
It is instructive to decompose the operations that the various components of (3.1) are performing
on the fundamental link trust values. Pai is the set of capacity-edge-disjoint paths that maximises the
expression in parenthesis in (3.1), Pai iterates over each one of the paths in Pai, and the function g is
applied to obtain the reputation value that na provides to ni through Pai. These values are aggregated
over the set Pai using ⊕ to yield the reputation value fa(G,ni). Thus, g aggregates link weights over
paths and ⊕ aggregates paths over path sets. The ﬁnal max operation aggregates the entire Pai to one of
its elements Pai. Thus, (3.1) is essentially a hierarchical aggregation scheme applying the operators g,
⊕ and max.
Having deﬁned fa(G,ni), it is now possible to state the requirements that an anchor-ﬂow reputation
function must have in order to be sybilproof:
1. Diminishing returns. For all paths Pai, if path Pij is concatenated to Pai to obtain Paj then
g(Pai) ≥ g(Paj). Thus, if we denote path concatenation with ∪, we have that g(Pai) ≥
g(Pai ∪ Paj). As the length of a path for reputation propagation increases, its reputation ﬂow
either decreases or remains unchanged. This counters the capacity of creating arbitrarily long
chains of sybils with arbitrarily high trust links in them.
2. Monotonicity. ForallpathsetsPai, ifanotherpathPai isaddedtoPai toobtainP0
ai = Pai∪Pai
then
L
Pai ≤
L
P0
ai. This means that ⊕ is nondecreasing: as the number of reputation-
carrying, capacity-edge-disjoint paths from na to ni increases, the total reputation ﬂow from na
to ni either increases or remains unchanged. This property gives fa(G,ni) its reputation function
properties, allowing a higher trust value to be achieved if the reputation ﬂow over Pai increases.
Informally, this can be understood as the trust ﬂow between na and ni increasing with the number
of independent transitive trust paths between na and ni (we assume that ni and na are not both
sybils of the same peer, as this case is of no interest).
Furthermore, the diminished returns property is extended with the requirement that g is nonde-
creasing with respect to edge values. This means that if the trust value of any link which forms
part of path Pai increases, g(Pai) must not decrease. Again, this property allows fa to behave as
a reputation function: if the trust value of a link in a path increases, the trust transitivity over that
path is in some sense “stronger”, and the end-to-end trust should not decrease.
3. No splitting. Given a single path Pai, if we split it into two edge-disjoint paths P1
ai and P2
ai by
decomposing each of its constituent links into two parallel links , then P1
ai ⊗ P2
ai ≤ g(Pai). This
countersthecapacityofcreatingarbitrarilymanysybilswitharbitrarilymanylinkstopeersoutside
the sybil strategy set.
We use these properties to justify the sybilproofness of a novel contribution/currency distributed
accounting mechanism in Chapter 4.
3.3 Game Theory
Game theory [238, 236] is the mathematical modelling of the interactions between strategic agents.
Typically, game theory assumes that players in a game are rational: not only do they always make the
decision that beneﬁts them the most based on the information available (as deﬁned by the game), but
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might be incurred. Branches of game theory include cooperative game theory, in which players coali-
tions negotiate and enforce bargains, and non-cooperative game theory, in which the only meaningful
agreements are those which are “self-enforcing”: those for which the game provides the players with an
incentive to respect. We now deﬁne some of the concepts that we will use in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. For a
more detailed introduction to game theory, see [245, 137].
A game is a model of the interaction of autonomous agents called players. At any given point
of the game, each player has a set of actions available to it. However, the beneﬁt that a player can
eventually obtain from any given action is dependent on the actions of the other players at that point (and
all subsequent points) of the game. The game eventually ends with an outcome that is a result of the
decisions of the players, which can then rank, according to their preferences, all the possible outcomes
that can result form all possible combinations combinations of player actions. We now formalise these
concepts.
Deﬁnition 3.30. We deﬁne a game G as consisting of:
1. A set P = {pj} of players. In our case, there will usually be a peer ni that “hosts” the game, but
will not play itself. Thus, we have that P = N \ ni.
2. A type ζj ∈ Zj for each player, where Zj the set of all possible types for pj. The set of all possible
types in the game, Z = Z1 × Z2 × ... × Z|P| will be called the type space of the game.
The type of a player parametrises the utility that it obtains for any given game outcome (see utility
below), and it is usually private information: only pj knows ζj - in particular, ni does not know
ζj. We call ζ = (ζ1,ζ2,...,ζn) ∈ Z the type proﬁle of the game.
3. A set of possible actions Aj for each player pj. At each decision point in the game, any player
pj chooses an action aj ∈ Aj. The sequence of actions that any given player pj takes over the
duration of a game is called a strategy sj ∈ Sj. We call Sj the strategy space of player pj. We
deﬁne S = S1 × S2 × ... × Sn as the strategy space of the game, and each element s of S as a
strategy proﬁle.
4. A game outcome o ∈ O, where O is the outcome space of the game. Informally, the outcome is
the state of the game when no pj has any actions remaining and the game ends. We abuse notation
by deﬁning a function o : S 7→ O that maps the chosen strategies of all peers to the game outcome.
Thus, the game outcome depends on the combinations of actions that the players choose, and any
outcome os can be expressed as a function of any given strategy proﬁle: os = o(s1,s2,...,sn) =
o(s) for any strategy proﬁle s.
5. For each player pj, there is a preference relation that models the way that pj ranks the outcomes
in terms of their desirability. This preference relation will be modelled using a utility function
Uj, so that any given player pj prefers an outcome os over another outcome ot if Uj(ζj,os) >
Uj(ζj,ot). Further, we are assume that all pj ∈ P have quasilinear preferences, in the sense
that if any agent receives a payment of hj units as part of the game outcome, its utility will be
Uj(ζj,os) = f(ζj,os) + hj for some concave f.
The strategic elements of a game outcome are deﬁned by selecting a solution concept that identiﬁes
the equilibria conditions of the game. The most common solution concept is the Nash equilibrium: a
strategy proﬁle where every player selects the strategy that maximises its utility, taking the strategies of
all other players as given. We deﬁne the Nash equilibrium in terms of the player best response functions:3.4. ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER INCENTIVES 59
Deﬁnition 3.31. Let s−j = (s1,s2,...,sj−1,sj+1,...,s|N|) = s\sj be the strategy proﬁle of all peers
with the exception of pj. A strategy s
+
j is a best response for peer pj against the strategy proﬁle s−j of
all other players if it enforces an outcome o that maximises Uj. Thus, we have that
Uj
 
ζj,o(s
+
j ,s−j)

≥ Uj (ζj,o(sj,s−j)) ∀sj 6= s
+
j .
A best response function for player pj is a function ϑj such that s
+
j = ϑj(ζ−j,s−j).
In essence, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle where no player can increase its utility by
unilaterally changing its strategy. Thus, the strategy followed by each of the players is a best response to
the strategies being used by all the other players. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3.32. A strategy proﬁle s? is a Nash equilibrium of a game G if the strategy s?
j that a given
player pj follows is a best response to the strategy proﬁle s?
−j. Thus, it follows that
s?
j = ϑj(ζj,s?
−j) for every player pj.
In a Nash equilibrium, thus, every player chooses its strategy s?
j to maximise its utility Uj, given its
type ζj and the Nash equilibrium strategies s?
−j of every other player. Although the Nash equilibrium
is a natural solution concept for a strategic game, it has the drawback of requiring each player to know
all the possible strategies that the other players can use, and the resulting outcome as a function of its
own strategies. This makes Nash equilibria difﬁcult to compute (see [242] Chapter 2). We will seek to
enforce a stronger class of equilibrium that is easier to compute.
A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle where no player has an incentive to change its
strategy, independently of the strategies being followed by all other agents. Thus, the strategy that each
of the players follows is a best response to all the the strategy proﬁles that all the other players could
play. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3.33. A strategy proﬁle s∗ is a dominant strategy equilibrium of a game G if the strategy
that a given player pj follows is a best response to every possible strategy proﬁle s−j ∈ S−j, where
S−j = S1 × S2 × ... × Sj−1 × Sj+1 × ... × S|N|. Thus, the speciﬁc strategy proﬁle that other agents
might be using is irrelevant for pj when deﬁning which strategy to use. Formally, we have that
s∗
j = ϑj(ζj) for every player pj.
3.4 Economics of Peer-to-Peer Incentives
3.4.1 Incentives and Unobservability: Hidden Action
The term hidden action is used when, in a two party transaction, the actions of one of the parties (usually
regarding contract compliance or lack thereof) are hidden from the other. One model for these cases
is the principal-agent model, where an economic actor (the principal) trusts another one (the agent) to
perform a task. However, the actions that the agent takes (or fails to take) in the context of the task are
not completely veriﬁable by the principal. Thus, the agent has the power to impose, through its actions,
an externality on the principal. To transfer some of this risk back to the agent, the principal will usually
require a contract by which the value that the the agent obtains from the transaction will depend on the
observable consequences of its actions. This contract is designed to transfer at least part of the externality
back to the agent. Additionally, this contract creates an “audit point” where the principal is able to assess
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φ Level of effort by the agent
Us Utility function for the agent
Uc Utility function for the principal
q Project outcome: income for the principal
ψ Payment given by the principal to the agent
p Probability of the agent achieving given outcome, as a
function of its effort.
Ur Reservation utility for the agent
Table 3.1: Principal-Agent model notation
3.4.1.1 The Principal-Agent Model
The most natural explanation of the principal-agent model arises in the modelling of project and ﬁrm
management. Suppose that the owner of a project (the principal) hires a manager (the agent) to run
it. Since the principal will not supply labour to the project, he will only be interested in its pecuniary
outcome.
Let φ be the level of effort that the agent puts into the project, and ψ the payment that he will receive
from the principal after the project is completed. We assume that the agent will have a quasi-linear utility
Us = fs(ψ) − φ with f nondecreasing and concave2. Since we assume that the agent participates in
a labour market, there is a minimum reservation utility Ur for the agent: the minimum beneﬁt that he
must obtain from the pay-effort combination offered by the project with the principal so that it is rational
to participate in the project rather than taking any other employment opportunity. More formally, Ur is
the expected utility for the agent in the current labour market. We denote the expected utility that the
principal gets from the project as Uc. Again, Uc will be a quasi-linear utility Uc = fc(q) − ψ where q
represents the income that the principal obtains from the project (referred to as the project outcome).
The critical feature of the principal-agent model is that it assumes that the principal is unable to
measure the effort level φ directly. Thus, φ is always private information to the agent. Moreover, the
principal is unable to unambiguously infer φ from the project outcome - a number of possible values of φ
canyieldthesameprojectoutcomeq. Theoutcomeoftheproject, however, doesdependprobabilistically
upon the level of effort φ of the agent. To address the simplest case, let there be two possible project
outcomes q+ and q− with q+ > q− and two possible levels of effort by the agent, φ+ and φ− with
φ+ > φ−. Then, we deﬁne p+ and p− so that we have
P[q = q+|φ = φ+] = p+ (3.2)
P[q = q−|φ = φ+] = 1 − p+
P[q = q+|φ = φ−] = p−
P[q = q−|φ = φ−] = 1 − p−.
Since the principal is unable to observe and enforce φ, it will instead provide an incentive to the
agent in the form of a differentiated payment - a function of the project outcome. In this case, since there
are only two possible outcomes q+ and q−, there will be two payments ψ+ and ψ− with ψ+ > ψ−.
Thus, the principal will pay the agent ψ+ if the outcome is q+, and a smaller amount ψ− if the outcome
is q−.
This situation can be modelled as a game:
1. Players: the agent ps and the principal pc.
2A nondecreasing, concave utility function captures elementary intuitions regarding the relative value of money. In particular,
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2. Types: ps will have a reservation utility Ur ∈ R≥0.
3. Actions and Strategies: The agent can select its level of effort, and As = {φ+,φ−}. The
principal can select the payment it gives to the agent, and Ac = {ψ+,ψ−}. In this case, the
strategy for both the principal and the agent is just choosing an element in their action sets.
4. Outcome: There are only two possible outcomes, and O = {q+,q−}. In this case, the outcome
function is implicitly deﬁned by (3.2).
5. Utility Function: Us and Uc as deﬁned before.
Let U+
c be the expected utility for the principal if φ = φ+, and U−
c the expected utility for the
principal if φ = φ−. Then, we have that
U+
c = p+Uc(q+,ψ+) + (1 − p+)Uc(q−,ψ−)
U−
c = p−Uc(q+,ψ+) + (1 − p−)Uc(q−,ψ−).
In the same way, the expected utilities for the agent as a function of its effort and payment are
U+
s = p+Us(ψ+,φ+) + (1 − p+)Us(ψ−,φ+)
U−
s = p−Us(ψ+,φ−) + (1 − p−)Us(ψ−,φ−).
The incentives problem for the principal is to calculate ψ+ and ψ− to maximise its expected utility
U+
c , while at the same time making φ = φ+ a dominant strategy for the agent3. In other words, we
seek to ensure that the agent obtains a higher utility by exerting φ+ than by exerting φ− (we call this
the incentive compatibility constraint), and that the agent utility is high enough to compete with the
labour market (the rationality constraint). The principal-agent problem is thus formulated in terms of the
following optimisation problem.
Maximise: U+
c (3.3)
Subject to: U+
s ≥ Ur (rationality)
And: U+
s ≥ U−
s (incentive compatibility).
We solve this problem using standard Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst order conditions derived from the La-
grangian
LA(ψ+,ψ−) = p+(fc(q+) − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(fc(q−) − ψ−)
+ λ(p+fsψ+ + (1 − p+)fsψ− − φ+ − Ur)
+ µ((p+ − p−)(fsψ+ − fsψ−) − φ+ + φ−). (3.4)
3We shall not consider optimising U−
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The critical point condition ∇L = 0 yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
(λp+ + µ(p+ − p−))
∂fs
∂ψ


 
ψ+
= p+
((1 − λp+) − µ(p+ − p−))
∂fs
∂ψ
 


ψ−
= (1 − p+)
p+fs(ψ)|ψ+ + (1 − p+)fs(ψ)|ψ− = φ+ + Ur
fs(ψ)|ψ+ − fs(ψ)|ψ− =
φ+ − φ−
p+ − p−
.
These equations can then be solved for ψ− and ψ+, the expression for which will of course be dependent
on fs.
We present a particular kind of principal-agent model and its novel application to overlay services
provided over the best-effort Internet in Chapter 6.
3.4.2 Auctions and Mechanism Design
Consider a situation where a peer ni (the auctioneer) offers a single item for sale among a set P = {pj}
of strategic agents (the other peers). Each pj has a value vj ∈ R≥0 that represents how much it values
the item being auctioned - how much it is willing to pay to obtain it. Therefore, if pj wins the item and
it is required to pay a price ν for it, the net utility that it will experience is Uj = vj − ν; if some other
agent wins the item, Uj = 0.
The simplest way in which that the auctioneer could resolve the auction would be to allocate the
item to that agent who values it the most: nw such that w = argmaxj vj. The problem is that ni cannot
know the true values vj, since they are private to each pj. Since the bidders can report any value that
they choose, the challenge is to provide them with an incentive to truthfully reveal their vj. We now
show that this is achievable simply by correctly choosing the price ν that the winning peer will pay for
the item.
The Vickrey auction provides a mechanism in which it is a dominant strategy equilibrium for bidders
to report their valuations truthfully, and that succeeds in assigning the auctioned items to those peers that
value them the most (it is efﬁcient). We now analyse it in the single-item case.
3.4.2.1 The Single-Item Vickrey Auction
The single-item, sealed-bid, second-price auction is deﬁned as the following game:
• Players: We assume that an auctioneer peer ni will auction a single item to the rest of the peers.
Thus, we have that P = N \ ni. Of course, |P| = (|N| − 1) and we assume that |P| ≥ 2.
• Types: Each bidding peer nj : j 6= i will be a player pj of the game, with a private value vj for
the item that is being auctioned. Therefore, in this case, ζj = vj, Zi = R≥0 and Z = R
|P|
≥0.
• Actions and Strategies: Since the only action available to a peer corresponds to sending a bid,
its only strategy is choosing the amount to bid. Accordingly, the strategy space of each peer is
Si = R≥0, and the strategy space of the game is S = S1 × S2 × ... × S|P| = R
|P|
≥0. The strategy
si will be equal to the amount that a peer bids, and the strategy proﬁle of a game is just a vector
s ∈ R
|P|
≥0.
• Outcome: The outcome of the game consists of the identity of the peer that wins the item, pw ∈ P,
and the amount ν paid for the item. The outcome function is deﬁned to be o(s) = (ow(s),oν(s))
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highest bid wins the item, and pays the highest non-winning bid. If we denote the second highest
bid as ˆ ν, we have that ν = ˆ ν.
• Utility Function: The winning bidder pw has a utility of Uj = vj − ˆ ν, all the other peers have a
utility of 0.
The Vickrey auction has the property that any given peer can never increase its utility by bidding
any value different from its true valuation vj. This means that truthfully revealing their private values is
a dominant strategy for all peers. Formally,
Theorem 3.2. Let pj be any given bidder and sj its bid value. Let U∗
j = Uj|sj=vj be the utility that
the bidder obtains if it truthfully reveals its value, and Us
j = Us
j |sj6=vj the utility that it obtains if it
strategically reports sj 6= vj. Then, U∗
j ≥ Us
j .
Proof. There are two outcomes for the auction as far as pj is concerned: it can either win the auction or
lose it. We analyse each one in turn.
• Assume that pj would win the auction by reporting sj = vj, and that the price to be paid in that
case is ν = ˆ ν. In this case, U∗
j = vj − ˆ ν ≥ 0, because ˆ ν is the second highest bid after sj = vj.
Now, we consider the two possibilities regarding an strategically deﬁned sj:
– Case 1 (sj ≤ ˆ ν): In this case, pj would lose the auction. Since in this case Us
j = 0, we have
that U∗
j > Us
j . Of course, we assume that if sj = ˆ ν there will be some arbitrary tie-breaking
procedure. In this case, we assume that this process goes against pj and it loses the auction.
The speciﬁcs of this are irrelevant for the proof.
– Case 2 (sj > ˆ ν): In this case, pj would still win the auction and pay the same price, since ˆ ν
is unaffected. In this case, we have that U∗
j = Us
j .
• Assume that pj would lose the auction by reporting sj = vj. In this case, U∗
j = 0, and some other
peer wins with bid ˆ ν. Again, we consider the two possibilities regarding sj:
– Case 3 (sj ≤ ˆ ν): In this case, pj would lose the auction anyway, and Us
j = 0. So, we have
that U∗
j = Us
j .
– Case 4 (sj > ˆ ν): In this case, pj would win the auction and pay ˆ ν as price. However, this
price is too high for pj, because vj < ˆ ν - that is the reason pj would have lost the auction
had it bid truthfully. Thus Us
j = vj − ˆ ν ≤ 0, and U∗
j > Us
j .
It follows from the previous discussion that U∗
j ≥ Us
j irrespective of vj and ˆ ν.
The Vickrey auction is a very elegant solution to a seemingly very difﬁcult problem: it can reliably
compute a function (argmax) over a set of numbers, each of which is being held by a strategic agent that
has no a-priori reason to reveal it truthfully. The Vickrey auction is able to solve a welfare-maximisation
problem even if the inputs for the problem are private to each strategic agent, which in turn acts only on
the basis of maximising its own utility.
3.4.2.2 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
The easiest way to generalise the single-item Vickrey auction to multiple items is through mechanism
design. Mechanism Design allows a designer to specify the rules of a game in order to achieve, as an
equilibrium result, a speciﬁc social outcome, even if the many agents which will participate in the game
are self-interested and act in a strategic manner. This is achieved by deﬁning a set of incentives for the
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These agent incentives usually include monetary payments that are functions of the behaviour of the
agents. Although there are ways of obviating the need for money in mechanism design ([160, 232] and
[242] Chapter 10), there is no need for such techniques in this case. We will use the contribution transfer
protocol primitives explained in Chapter 4 to achieve payments. Instead of exploring the generic issues
surrounding mechanism design (see [241, 174, 169, 220], [227] Chapter 6 or [242] Chapter 9) we focus
on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its relationship to multi-item Vickrey auctions.
The VCG mechanism, when deﬁned as a game, has the following characteristics (see Table 3.2 for
variable deﬁnitions):
• Players: We assume that a peer ni is distinguished as a mechanism designer that wishes to imple-
ment an optimal social outcome among a set of players P (as before, P = N \ ni).
• Types: Each peer nj : j 6= i will be a player pj of the game, with a private type ζj that deﬁnes
how much value a particular social outcome k ∈ K holds for the peer. This is done through
valuation function vj(k). Thus, different players value social outcomes differently, according to
their type and their associated valuation function. Since vj(k) is private, it can be used to model
not only endogenous peer characteristics, but information about the social environment which is
only known to that player.
• Actions and Strategies: We deal only with the most basic kind of VCG mechanism, where each
peer pj sends to the designer a message that states its preferences regarding the social outcome,
and then designer the announces the social outcome and payments to be applied to each player
based on the messages it receives. Formally, this means that each peer will either supply its true
valuation function vj(k) or an strategically deﬁned one sj(k).
• Outcome: When the designer receives a vector s(k) = (s1,s2,...,sP) of player messages (each
one a function of k), it applies an outcome function o(s(k)) = (ok(s(k)),oh(s(k))) to select what
social outcome k∗ = ok(s(k)), will be selected, and what payments h∗ = oh(s(k)) will be applied
to the players.
• Optimal Social Choice Implementation: The mechanism chooses the social outcome k ∈ K
that maximises the aggregate reported player value ˆ s(k) =
P
pj sj(k) as an objective function.
Therefore, k∗ = argmaxk∈K ˆ s(k), and the mechanism designer maximises the total aggregate
value, according to the valuation functions sj(k) supplied by the peers.
• Manipulation-resistant payments: The VCG payments hj that each peer receives can be ex-
pressed as
hj(s(k)) = cj(s−j) −
X
k6=j
sk(k), (3.5)
where the cj are arbitrary functions of s−j only. Thus, since k 6= j in the summation above,
hj : S−j 7→ R≥0 and the payment that an agent pj receives is never a function of its own strategy
sj. Hence, a player can not increase its payment by selecting an advantageous sj. With the
aforementioned payments, the utility of each peer becomes
Uj(k) = vj(k) +
X
k6=j
sk(k) − cj(s−j). (3.6)
• Utility Functions: Each pj has a utility of Uj(k) = vj(k)−hj(k), where hj are the payments that
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k Social outcome in of an economic mechanism
K Set of all possible social outcomes
vj(k) Valuation of a social outcome k by agent pj
sj(k) Valuation of a social outcome k that agent pj reports to
the mechanism designer
ˆ s(k) Aggregate valuation of a social outcome k to all agents,
according to their reported valuation functions
hj Payment to agent pj
Uj(k) Utility of agent pj for social outcome k
cj(s−j) Cost that can be applied to agent pj as a function of the
strategies of all peers except itself
Table 3.2: Mechanism design notation
• Incentive Compatibility: The VCG mechanism is incentive compatible: truthfully revealing its
valuation function vj(k) is a dominant strategy for all players - there is no incentive for any pj
to unilaterally deviate from revealing its true valuation. To see why, consider a given pj with
valuation vj(k), reported valuation sj(k) and a ﬁxed but arbitrary strategy proﬁle s−j for the rest
of the peers. Let k∗ = ok({vj,s−j}) and U∗
j = Uj|sj=vj be the social choice and the utility of
pj if it truthfully reports its value, and ks = ok(sj,s−j) and Us
j = Uj|sj6=vj those obtained if it
strategically reports a different valuation function sj(k). We see that, by (3.6),
U∗
j + cj(s−j) = vj(k∗) +
X
k6=j
sk(k∗) := ˆ s(k∗)
Us
j + cj(s−j) = vj(ks) +
X
k6=j
sk(ks) := ˆ s(ks).
However, we know that k∗ was calculated by the mechanism designer so that k∗ =
argmaxk∈K ˆ s(k), whichmeansthat ˆ s(k∗) ≥ ˆ s(ks). ThismeansthatU∗
j +cj(s−j) ≥ Us
j +cj(s−j),
which in turn implies that U∗
j ≥ Us
j .
• Incentives to players: If we assume that the pj truthfully reveal their valuations vj(k), their
utilities become Uj(k) =
P
k vk(k) − cj(s−j). This means that, in the process of maximising its
own utility, each agent will choose the outcome k∗ that maximises the social utility (the sum of all
peer values).
Until now, the cj(s−j) have been essentially arbitrary, with the only requirement of not depending
on sj. However, by an appropriate choice of cj(s−j), the VCG mechanism can gain additional beneﬁts.
One possible selection that makes the VCG mechanism individually rational and positive transfer free
is the Clarke Pivot Rule, by which
cj(s−j) = max
k∈K
X
k6=j
sk(k).
Informally, the Clarke pivot rule assigns to cj(s−j) the aggregate reported value had pj not participated
in the mechanism at all. In this case, if we assume truthful reporting of values, we have that, for the
player payments,
hj(k∗) = max
k∈K
X
k6=j
vk(k) −
X
k6=j
vk(k∗).
Thus, each player pays an amount equal to the value degradation that it causes to the rest of the players:
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the total value that the rest of the system achieves if it does participate. From this, we see that the utility
that a given player obtains from the mechanism (assuming each player truthfully reveals its valuation
and optimises its own utility) is
Uj = max
k∈K
X
k
vk(k) − max
k∈K
X
k6=j
vj(k), (3.7)
which means that the total utility that a player obtains is just the extra utility that it brings into the game
with its participation - the difference between the total utility of the system with and without its presence.
The VCG mechanism with Clarke pivoting (VCG-C) has the following two additional important
properties:
• Individual rationality: The players in a VCG-C mechanism will always get non-negative utility.
Theorem 3.3. If vj(k∗) ≥ 0 for every pj and k∗, Uj ≥ 0.
Proof. Let k∗ ∈ K be the optimal social choice if pj participates in the mechanism, and k∗
−j ∈ K
the optimal social choice if it does not. In addition, let V(k) =
P
k vj(k) be the total value of the
mechanism if pj participates. Then, we have that
Uj = V(k∗) − V(k∗
−j) + vj(k∗
−j).
However, since vj(k∗
−j) ≥ 0, and because k∗ maximises V(k), we have that
Uj ≥ V(k∗) − V(k∗
−j) ≥ 0,
and it follows that Uj ≥ 0.
• No positive transfers: The players never receive money from the designer.
Theorem 3.4. If there is truthful reporting, hj(k) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let V−j(k) =
P
k6=j vj(k) be the total value of the mechanism if pj does not participate,
and k∗
−j ∈ K the optimal social choice in this same case. Again, let k∗ ∈ K be the optimal social
choice if pj participates in the mechanism. We can see that
hj(k∗) = V−j(k∗
−j) − V−j(k∗) ≥ 0,
because k∗
−j was chosen to optimise V−j(k).
3.4.2.3 The Multi-Item Vickrey Auction
By using the VCG-C formalism, the properties of the multiple-item Vickrey auction can be easily ex-
plored. Although analysing the general case where there is a distinct valuation for each item (and indeed
for each combination of items) is simple once the VCG-C mechanism has been presented, we focus on
the case where the items offered are identical, so that the utility that a player gets from participating in
the auction is only a function of the number of items it wins.
A seller peer ni wishes to sell m identical items to the other peers, so that P = N\ni and the social
outcome k is the allocation of items to bidders. Formally, k is a vector with one component for each
pj ∈ P, where kj indicates how many items were assigned to pj. Each bidder provides the auctioneer
with a valuation function vj(ki) indicating its beneﬁt in obtaining ki items, for 0 ≤ ki ≤ bj, where bj3.4. ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER INCENTIVES 67
is the maximum number of items that pj is interested in. The auctioneer then then calculates the value-
maximising allocation k∗ = argmaxk
P
pj vj(kj) subject to the feasibility constraint
P
j kj ≤ m. The
prices that each bidder will pay are calculated are as indicated by (3.5), and the utilities as indicated by
(3.7). We analyse this particular kind of multi-item Vickrey auction in much greater depth in Chapter 5,
in the context of a novel auction-based swarming protocol for QoS overlays.4
A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism
Although direct reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) contribution systems have been successful in reducing freeload-
ing in peer-to-peer overlays, it has been shown that, unless the contribution network is dense, they tend
to be slow or fail [198]. On the other hand, current indirect reciprocity mechanisms based on reputation
systems tend to be susceptible to sybil attacks, peer slander and whitewashing (See Section 3.2.1).
In this chapter, we present PledgeRoute, an accounting mechanism for peer contributions that is
based on social capital (see Appendix A.3 and [56, 127, 86] for the social sciences deﬁnitions of this
term). This mechanism allows peers to contribute resources to one set of peers and use these contri-
butions to obtain services from a different set of peers, at a different time. PledgeRoute is completely
decentralised, can be implemented in both structured and unstructured peer-to-peer systems, and is re-
sistant to the three kinds of attacks mentioned above. Our focus on the expression of social capital as
a set of transitive obligation chains stems from the analysis of complementary currencies, where it has
been used as a medium of exchange to support economic transactions [273, 206, 36, 287].
To achieve this, we model contribution transitivity as a routing problem in the contribution network
of the peer-to-peer overlay, and we present arguments for the routing behaviour and the sybilproofness of
our contribution transfer procedures on this basis. Additionally, we present mechanisms for the seeding
of the contribution network, and a combination of incentive mechanisms and reciprocation policies that
motivate peers to adhere to the protocol and maximise their service contributions to the overlay. We
elaborate on these contributions in the following sections.
4.1 Freeloading, Reciprocity and Contribution Accounting
Peer-to-peer overlays coordinate the contributions of large numbers of independent peers to form scal-
able, decentralised, self-organising content delivery systems. However, as explored in Section 2.1, they
aresusceptibletothefree-ridingproblem([27, 254]): itisindividuallyrationalforeachpeertocontribute
as little as possible, while at the same time consuming the contributions of other peers.
If resource contribution is framed as an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the expectation for reciprocity
in future interactions (including retaliation) can be a strong incentive for cooperation [39]. Reciprocity
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then emerges as a viable technique for the control of freeloading. We follow the standard nomenclature
for direct and indirect reciprocity (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A.4).
Many resource allocation techniques based on direct reciprocity have been proposed (see, for in-
stance, [84, 185, 97]). These, although easily implementable on the peers, can be limited by the high
churn rates typical of peer-to-peer overlays. Any given peer may be interacting essentially with strangers,
and thus, direct reciprocity mechanisms will tend to have slow convergence, if they converge at all [198].
In practice, these mechanisms are only robust for systems with long-lived relationships where the oppor-
tunity for mutual reciprocation is high.
Direct reciprocation is further complicated if the subset of peers that provide the services that a
peer seeks is not the same one that is interested on the services that it provides. This supply-demand
mismatch can also happen in time, since peers are usually only interested in particular services at par-
ticular times - which means peers can ﬁnd that their past contributions could be useless when it comes
to obtaining services in the present. Given that peers that do not consume a stream but still act as band-
width multipliers (a recent example of this would be [319, 318]) can potentially play an important role
in increasing the total system capacity in streaming QoS overlays, we propose a scheme that will allow
them to take advantage of their past contributions from the peer and use them for stream consumption
when needed, even if the set of peers that received past contributions and the set of peers from which
service is requested are disjoint.
In these circumstances, a reciprocity system that allows contributions given to a peer to be “repaid”
by other peers at different times in the future may be the only way to foster cooperation between strategic
peers seeking private utility maximisation.
Most indirect reciprocity schemes proposed in the literature (see, for instance [185, 153, 97] and
Chapter 2.7) are based on reputation systems, and differ mainly in the way the reputation scores are
calculated and propagated. In general, however, they assign ratings to peers according to their past
behaviour, andcommunicatethemthroughtheoverlayitself. Thismakesthemvulnerabletoexploitation,
due to the near-zero cost of creating new identities. Peers might create arbitrary contributions between
ﬁctitious peers (the sybil attack [106]), lie regarding their contributions or the contributions of other
peers (the slander attack), or discard identities that have been labelled as malicious and penalised (the
whitewashing attack).
Other indirect reciprocity schemes rely on implementing a currency-based economy that is resistant
to forgery and double-spending (see, for instance, [328] and [132], and Section 2.5). A common problem
of these schemes is the minting of currency and the trust anchoring that it implies, usually necessitating
either a public key infrastructure, a web of trust, or threshold cryptography techniques. Furthermore,
these systems usually make use of auctions (See Section 2.5.5), which usually place on the peer the
nontrivial burden of estimating the value of the services that other peers offer.
4.1.1 PledgeRoute
In this chapter we propose PledgeRoute, a contribution accounting system that provides indirect reci-
procity by allowing peers to contribute to a set of peers and transfer these contributions for use with
other peers in a direct reciprocity basis. Thus, we enable indirect reciprocity by decomposing it in two
stages: contribution transfer and direct reciprocation.
Contribution transfer operates by decomposing an end-to-end transfer operation into a sequence of
pairwise contribution transfers between peers that have interacted in the past. Any peer ni can perform
contributions towards any other given peer nj, which will be converted to an abstract measure of con-
tribution. Then, this ni can then request to have its contribution transferred from nj to a different peer
nk, from which it can now request any service. Instead of relying on centralised markets, we propose
an accounting system that not only keeps track of peer contributions, but also allows them to be trans-4.2. DEFINITIONS 70
ferred between peers following contribution chains. Peers can contribute to one set of peers and transfer
these contributions to another set of peers from which services are required, implementing a distributed
exchange economy.
By casting contribution transitivity as a routing problem, we can use distributed routing algorithms
to achieve our objective in a completely decentralised fashion. To achieve this, we propose a Dijkstra-
inspired generalised routing algorithm to route contributions through the network by means of wealth-
preserving transactions. In order to make the system sybilproof [71], our algorithm for contribution
transfer relies on ﬁnding the end-to-end transfer paths that have maximum bottleneck contributions,
which have sybilproofness properties similar to those of maximum ﬂow. Peers use self-certifying iden-
tiﬁers [223] that their neighbours can verify with public keys that are exchanged when the peers initially
come into contact (all communication between peers is digitally signed). Thus, since contributions are
always bound to an identity, peers gain nothing from having multiple identities: their contributions will
be simply split among them. To complement our routing algorithm, we present simple cryptographic
techniques and protocol operations that provide resistance to slander and whitewashing attacks.
To avoid the execution of costly routing computations over the entire peer-to-peer overlay topology,
we propose a probabilistic topology sampling algorithm based on a truncated, self-avoiding random walk
that samples preferentially those paths capable of yielding high-valued contribution transfers. Using
information recovered from messages forwarded along these random walks, each peer constructs a local
contribution network model of the peers that have unreciprocated contributions to one another and that
can be used to ﬁnd paths with high contribution transfer potential. Contribution transfer is achieved
using a soft-state reservation protocol.
Since the contribution transfer operation only preserves the net contributions of each peer, and not
its absolute contributions and obligations, there is a danger of draining the contribution network of social
capital (we discuss this problem in Section 4.5). This means that, although no peer ends up “worse off”,
the capacity of the system to transfer contributions from one peer to another will be reduced. To counter
this, we propose a technique to seed the contribution network based on the creation of a credit tree rooted
on each peer, and its use for the creation of balanced contribution cycles.
To achieve stable cooperation in the reciprocation phase in the presence of strategic peers, we
propose an incentive mechanism based on the modiﬁcation of the contribution values of each peer.
4.2 Deﬁnitions
In this chapter we will be mainly concerned with the contribution network: the graph-theoretic repre-
sentation of the contributions that have been given and received in the peer-to-peer overlay. We will
model the contribution network as link-weighted, directed graph G using the nomenclature of Section
3.1, where the link weights wij ≥ 0 associated with the links lij correspond to the magnitude of the
contributions from ni to nj. In practice, wij is just an account associated with ni that is maintained in
nj. Again following Section 3.1, we denote a simple path in G from ni to nj as Pij (we discuss the
weighing of paths and links in the context of our routing algebra in Sections 4.4 and 4.7).
We shall denote w−(ni), the weighted outdegree of ni (the total unpaid contributions that ni has
given to its neighbours) as its social capital. Conversely, we shall denote its weighted indegree w+(ni)
(the total unpaid contributions that ni has received from its neighbours) as its pledged resources. We call
the net contribution of ni to the system its wealth, and we deﬁne it as W(ni) = w−(ni) − w+(ni).
We shall be interested in modifying the topology of G (usually by creating new links) while main-
taining the net contributions of each peer invariant. To perform such wealth preserving transformations,
we begin by deﬁning a closed cycle C ∈ G on the contribution network, and we assign an orientation to
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Having deﬁned C, we traverse its links following its orientation, adding an amount τ to the contri-
butions associated with each link that is traversed in its designated direction, and subtracting an amount
τ from the contributions associated with each link that is traversed opposite to its designated direction
(transformations requiring negative link weights are considered invalid). Each peer in C adds the same
amount to its indegree and its outdegree, keeping its wealth invariant. After the transformation, links
with zero weight are removed from G.
Every peer ni sets υij, the maximum amount of unreciprocated contributions that it will give to a
neighbour nj in G. We will call υij the safe credit margin of nj as assessed by ni. In order to calculate
υij, each peer ni maintains ˆ wij, the amount of contributions that nj has given to ni as response to
reciprocative requests (see Section 4.3). As peers successfully reciprocate for a number of interactions
they can be more reliant on the continued trustworthiness of their neighbours, and υij will increase with
ˆ wij. Finally, each peer enforces ξi, the maximum credit it is willing to support. We defer to Section 4.5
the analysis of the relation between wij, ˆ wij and υij.
4.3 Basic System Concepts
In PledgeRoute, the contribution network G represents the set of previously rendered services, which
carries a reciprocity implication and is equivalent to the notion of social capital in the social sciences
[86]. Thus, we have a web of commitments, where social capital (unreciprocated past contributions) can
be freely converted into services (for instance, streaming trafﬁc).
To avoid single points of failure or the compulsory presence of trusted third parties, we require no
centralised identity management system. Instead, peers use self-certifying identiﬁers that are exchanged
when they initially come into contact. These can be used as public keys, to verify digital signatures on the
messages sent by their neighbours, as all communication between peers is digitally signed. An additional
beneﬁt of this decoupling of the incentives mechanism from the identity management system is that the
protocol can be easily used in cases where anonymous or pseudonymous participation is desired. This, of
course, does not mean that we require user anonymity or pseudonymity - the user can be authenticated in
any relevant way in order to enable access to content or functionality, without this affecting the operation
of the system in any way.
There are two distinct interaction policies in our system: altruistic and reciprocating (these will be
explained shortly). A peer chooses one of these two when requesting a service, and the behaviour of the
server peer depends on this choice.
When a peer requests a service using the altruistic policy, it does not offer any kind of “payment”
for it, relying instead on the altruism of the serving peer. The serving peer, however, will only grant
the service on a best-effort basis: its service quality will be reduced as required, giving priority to
reciprocation-based interactions.
However, altruistic services are not “free”: the serving peer nj will expect reciprocation at some
future time from the requesting peer ni (this is equivalent to the reciprocal altruism of [299]). This
expectation takes shape as an increase in wji, and models the reciprocative obligation that the recipient
has contracted towards the serving peer.
Although any request using the altruistic policy receives essentially random service quality, this
policy is of fundamental importance as it helps the system bootstrap: when new peers arrive in the
system, they have no previous contributions to other peers in the overlay, and they can only obtain
services through altruism (at least until they have had the opportunity to provide services themselves).
When a peer ni requests a service from a server peer nj using the reciprocating policy, it will offer a
payment τ to cover it that will be deducted from the account wij in nj (the previous contributions that ni
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to cover for the request, nj will give it prioritised service and subtract τ from wij. If τ is insufﬁcient
or wij < τ, the request will be interpreted as an altruistic interaction, and the request originator will be
informed of this fact. This should be uncommon, as the originator is aware of its contributions to the
server peer. We assume that the conversion between services and contribution units is the same for all
peers, and universally known1.
Clearly, there is an element of trust involved in this transaction: the value of the service that the
client peer receives might not be equivalent to the amount τ by which its account is decreased. This
problem is equivalent to the server nj arbitrarily decreasing the client’s account wij by an amount equal
to the difference between τ and the true value of its service2. The reaction of the client to this is detailed
in Section 4.6.
In summary, altruistic interactions increase the social capital in the network, while reciprocative
interactions decrease it. We now explore the use of these accounts for contribution transfer.
4.4 Distributed Contribution Accounting
We now describe the protocol elements of PledgeRoute, focusing in those properties relevant to the
issues detailed in Section 4.1. In particular, we shall not focus in the peculiarities of service pricing and
valuation, instead choosing to complement other works such as PeerMart [161] and [82].
4.4.1 Contribution Topology Discovery
The ﬁrst issue that we will address is the process that allows each peer to construct a local view of the
contribution network G that can be used for the computation of contribution transfers. This local view of
G from the standpoint of ni will be called Gi. The aim of our topology discovery algorithm is to allow
peers to attain high levels of contribution transfer capability while keeping as few links of G in Gi as
possible.
The contribution topology discovery process starts when a peer advertises the unpaid contributions
that it has to each of its neighbours in G using Pledge Announcement Messages (PAMs). Each PAM is
associated with a simple path in G: a series of links terminating on the sending peer where no peer or
link is repeated.
The path that the PAM follows is decided in a probabilistic fashion, with the probability of it being
forwardedfromapeerni toagiven neighbour peernj madeproportionaltowji, the unpaid contributions
that nj has made to ni (the pledged resources that ni has towards nj). Clearly, the PAM has greater
probability of traversing paths where peers have made large contributions.
We model this using a truncated, self-avoiding random walk deﬁned on the contribution network
G. Peers periodically generate PAMs which are sent in random walks following the links in G. These
random walks, however, are biased to preferentially traverse links that have high contribution values,
yielding biased topology samples that favour subgraphs with high contribution transfer potential.
We focus on the transition probability associated with a single instance of the random walk starting
in peer ns. If we deﬁne pt
j(s) as the probability of a PAM starting at peer ns visiting peer nj at time t,
the state transition probability for our random walk is given by
p
t+1
j (s) = ρstopδjs + (1 − ρstop)
X
i∈Π+(nj)
rt
ijpt
i(s) , (4.1)
where rt
ij denotes the probability of a transition from state i to state j (the forwarding of the PAM
from ni to nj) at time t, ρstop denotes the probability that the PAM walk is terminated, and δjs is the
1We drop this assumption in Chapters 5 and 6, where we generalise PledgeRoute to a decentralised currency platform.
2The problem of the client refusing to pay the server after it has granted a service does not exist, as the server locally maintains
the account with the contributions of the client.4.4. DISTRIBUTED CONTRIBUTION ACCOUNTING 73
Kronecker delta. It is apparent from (4.1) that the system will periodically regress to its initial state s,
corresponding to peer ns. This reﬂects the fact that the PAM will be removed from the network and
returned to its originator ns. Periodically, new PAMs will be generated by the originating peer ns, each
one of which which will start another topology discovery random walk.
In order to make (4.1) self-avoiding and biased towards high-contribution paths, we deﬁne for the
transition probabilities that
rt
ij =
( wji P
j∈U(ni,P) wji if U(ni,P) 6= ∅
δjs otherwise.
(4.2)
In (4.2), U(ni,P) is the unvisited neighbour set of ni for path P: U(ni,P) = Π−(ni)\P. Informally,
U(ni,P) is the set of peers that have unreciprocated contributions towards ni which have not forwarded
the PAM yet, and P is the path in G that the PAM has taken from its creation and until time t.
By design, rt
ij will favour transitions from ni to peers nj with large wji values, avoiding previously
visited peers, and terminating the walk if U(ni,P) = ∅. In practice, this random walk is implemented
by including the sequence of visited peers on each PAM. Every peer will extract the neighbours that
have not been visited by the PAM and then pick one randomly, the distribution being weighted by the
contributions that each eligible neighbour has given to ni (the value of the wji account). So, peers that
can support higher contribution transfers are preferentially selected.
After a given peer (say nj) is selected for forwarding, ni will insert in the PAM a timestamp, a
nonce, the self-certifying identiﬁer of nj, the maximum contribution value wji available for contribution
transfer, and will digitally sign of all these elements. When nj receives the PAM, it can check that it
was indeed originated by ni, that it is actually directed to itself, that the contribution value wji reported
by ni is correct, and that it is not a replayed message. This last check is done by ignoring all expired
PAMs (those with timestamps older than a given timeout value told), and keeping track of all the nonces
corresponding to messages that have not expired.
As the PAM propagates according to (4.1) and (4.2), each peer will include its own identiﬁer, the
contribution value that it has for the next peer in the chain and the rest of the elements detailed above.
Given that every peer can trivially conﬁrm or deny the value wji claimed by an upstream PAM peer,
every PAM message is audited at each step of the random walk and it can be considered truthful.
After processing the PAM, every peer on the random walk will be able to update its local contribu-
tion subgraph Gi with the wij values corresponding to the links that the PAM had previously traversed.
Since links are traversed in “inverse” order, each peer will update its local view of the contribution net-
work with a directed contribution path rooted on itself and terminating on the originator of the PAM.
When a given peer decides to terminate the PAM walk, it will forward it back to its originating peer (the
reason for this is explored in Section 4.6).
4.4.2 Contribution Transfer Protocol
Once a subgraph Gi of the unreciprocated contribution topology G has been discovered by incorporating
the information of a number of PAMs, the next step is to use it to perform contribution transfers. This is
outlined in Figure 4.1.
Contribution transfer events can be decomposed as consecutive pairwise transactions. Thus, past
contributions are only needed between adjacent peers in the contribution chain. However, since Gi may
not perfectly reﬂect G, we design the transfer protocol to be resistant to errors in Gi.
If ni requests to transfer up to ri contribution units to a “remote” peer nk, the next-hop peer nj
might be unable to immediately commit, as this is contingent on changing conditions in the downstream
contribution chain. Instead, nj can calculate a contribution value that itself is willing to reserve for the4.4. DISTRIBUTED CONTRIBUTION ACCOUNTING 74
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Figure 4.1: Contribution paths and transfers
transaction (rj in Figure 4.1) and forward this information on. If every peer in the contribution chain
does this, the ﬁnal peer in the chain (in this case nk, the peer that will actually provide the service) will
have a complete view of the amounts that each peer is willing to commit (including itself), and will be
able to compute an amount τ that complies with all these requirements (Fig. 4.1a)3.
After τ is found, it is deducted from the accounts wij in the contribution path, and added to the
account for the origin peer on the destination peer (wik in Figure 4.1b). Then, the ﬁnal result of a con-
tribution transfer of magnitude τ is to create a contribution link of τ from ni to nk through a wealth
preserving operation, subtracting τ from every hop in the contribution chain to compensate for the cre-
ation of the new link.
ns nt ni
(= Hs||Rs||Ps||Ss)
Ms
Mi
(= Hi||Ms||Si)
Mt
Mt
(= Ht||Mi||Tt||St)
Rs = Qs||Tt||St||Ss
Fi
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Figure 4.2: The contribution transfer operation
The basic operations that PledgeRoute uses to implement a contribution transfer event are shown
on Figure 4.2, and are similar to those in [273] and [309]. As a ﬁrst step, a peer ns issues a Contribution
Transfer Request Message (CTRM) Ms. These are structurally very similar to PAMs, including the
unreciprocated peer contributions wij and the self-certifying identiﬁers of all peers that they traverse, as
well as their nested digital signatures.
In greater detail, each CTRM includes a transaction header Hs detailing the transaction being re-
quested and a timestamp, and a request Rs containing the maximum and minimum amount of contri-
bution that ns wishes to transfer to nt, as well as the path that this will request take. As part of its
self-certifying identiﬁer, Ms will also include its public key Ps. The CTRM is then signed and sent.
Each peer on the transaction path (here represented by a single intermediary ni) will check the
nested signatures in the trust chain, and prepend a header Hi containing the maximum amount of con-
3Of course, τ ≤ min(wij,wjk) and the maximum τ feasible on the contribution network coincides with the maximum ﬂow
over the simple path along the unreciprocated contributions chain, which makes it sybilproof (see Section 4.7).4.5. TRUST AND CONTRIBUTION CYCLE SEEDING 75
tribution that it is willing to devote to the transaction. Again, it will sign the concatenation of Hi and
Ms before forwarding it on to the next peer in the path. If the minimum contribution transfer requested
by ns exceeds the maximum amount that a given intermediary is willing to reserve, a failure message Fi
is propagated back through the trust chain, in order to free the reserved trust amounts in previous peers.
As is common with soft-state reservation protocols, the reserved contributions on each one of the peers
in the contribution chain will be automatically released if the end-to-end transaction is not successfully
completed within a timeout interval tT. In case of protocol failure, a failure message propagates back
along the contribution chain, in order to free the reserved contribution amounts in previous peers without
having to wait for tT to elapse.
When the CTRM reaches its destination peer nt, it determines the amount of trust that can be shifted
through the path, inserts this information on a header Ht and concatenates it with the received request
Mi. Then, it appends a trust granting ticket Tt for the request Rs - this will allow ns to increase its
account wst on nt, and it includes its self-certifying identiﬁer. Before sending this new message to ni,
nt signs Ht||Mi and Tt (independently).
As Mt propagates back through the trust chain, every peer checks its own included signature, and
the signature of the peer it got the message from. Finally, when ns receives the ticket Tt, it appends it
to a service request Qs and signs both. When nt receives this message, it checks its own signature and
increases wst.
Once contribution has been transferred, it is indistinguishable from direct contributions, and peers
are able to decide, with complete ﬂexibility, where to “spend” the accumulated pledged resources that
other peers maintain for them.
4.4.3 Contribution Transfers as a Routing Problem
Byusingtheroutingalgebramodelof[146], wecananalysethecontributiontransferoperationsformally.
In particular, we see that the routing of CTRMs according to maximum transfer capacity paths can be
modelled with a routing algebra where min is applied over the edges of paths to calculate their capacity,
and max is used to compare the desirability of different paths, preferring paths with greater capacities.
Formally, our system can be modelled as the max-min semiring over the real numbers, (R,max,min),
which is normally used to model bandwidth-aware routing.
A useful property of this algebra is that it is monotonic: the addition of links to paths preserves
the ordering of paths in terms of their desirability. This means that if we have two paths Pij and Pik
starting from ni, and Pij is weakly preferred over Pik (denoted as Pij % Pik), then prepending a new
path Psi to both Pij and Pik to form two alternative paths Psj = Psi ∪ Pij and Psk = Psi ∪ Pik will
preserve the ordering (desirability) of their path transfer capacities, and we have that Psj % Psk. This,
in turn, allows ni to ﬁnd optimal contribution transfer paths incrementally, by advertising all incoming
links and their weights wjk to all its neighbours in G, and running a Dijkstra-like algorithm [266] to route
over the contribution network G. In our case, this “link ﬂooding” approach is avoided both for increased
scalability and to preserve the slander resistance properties of the system (see Section 4.7), but each peer
ni uses a Dijkstra-based algorithm locally over its sampled topology Gi to determine transfer paths.
4.5 Trust and Contribution Cycle Seeding
It is clear that the contribution transfer process detailed in Section 4.4.2 drains the contribution network
G, as it subtracts τ from all links in the CTRM path, while only producing a single new one of weight τ
between the transaction originator and the last peer in the chain. Although this is not harmful to peers,
because they still have the same wealth (their contributions are reduced in the same amount as their
pledges), it is deleterious to the capacity of the network to perform contribution transfers, as it depletes
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There are two processes that can be used to counter this effect, by injecting social capital into
G. The most fundamental one is true altruism: when peers give contributions without decreasing any
account in G, there is a net increase in social capital. The second process is mutual crediting, in which
an hypothetical contribution of value zero is “decomposed” into two nonzero contributions between two
peers, but with opposite directions. However, just as Tit-for-Tat can be generalised to cyclical multiparty
exchanges, mutual crediting can be extended to any closed cycle of consistently oriented links in G.
None of the peers involved would experience an increase in wealth, but a number of links with nonzero
weights would be added to G.
To accomplish this, we present a process by which peers can ﬁnd sets of other peers that can agree
to create new contribution cycles between them. This means that each one of the peers in the set will
pledge some resources to a successor peer and gain a pledge for the same amount from a predecessor
peer, in a ring of shared obligations. Since the wealth of every peer in one of these contribution credit
cycles remains unchanged, the only effect of this operation is to replenish link contributions and facilitate
contribution transfer.
Naturally, each peer must be conﬁdent that the next peer in the cycle will actually reciprocate these
virtual contributions in case it is requested to do so. Thus, every peer must estimate the amount of
contributions that it can be conﬁdent that each of its neighbours would eventually pay back with high
probability: the safe credit margin υij deﬁned on Section 4.2.
We calculate υij as a monotonically increasing, sub-linearly growing function of ˆ wij (recall from
Section 4.2 that the ˆ wij are the contributions that nj has reciprocated to ni). The reason for this is that,
in order to make the safe credit margin reliable, peers will demand an increasing amount of successfully
reciprocated contributions in order to increase υij. We present one such function, where the increase in
ˆ wij required to allow for an increase in υij levels grows linearly. To present the intuition behind this
function, let us consider two new peers ni and nj, such that wij = wji = 0 and ˆ wij = ˆ wji = 0. Since
ni is unable to ascertain the trustworthiness of nj (and vice-versa), they will only provide each other
with a basic amount of altruistic service: υij = υji = κ.
If peer ni now gives altruistic contributions to peer nj amounting to κ, then wij = uij = κ, and
no more contributions are possible from ni to nj until reciprocation takes place. When nj reciprocates
by providing a service worth κ to ni, nj will set wij = 0, and ni will set ˆ wij = κ and uij = 2κ.
Increasing uij from 2κ to 3κ, however, will require a further increase of ˆ wij of 2κ. In general, an
increase of uij from nκ to (n + 1)κ will require an increase of nκ in ˆ wij. Thus, uij = nκ will require
ˆ wij = κ + 2κ + 3κ + ··· + (n − 1)κ, and we have that the safe credit margin uij can be calculated as
uij = min

1
2

κ +
 
κ2 + 8κ ˆ wij
 1
2

,ξi

,
where the ﬁrst term inside the min is the positive root of ˆ wij =
(uij−κ)uij
2κ (by the summation above),
and ξi is the maximum credit allowed by ni, as deﬁned in Section 4.2.
Each peer then advertises their υij values to their neighbours in a manner analogous to the wij
values in PAMs. The messages used for this purpose are called Credit Announcement Messages (CAMs),
and they also include nested digital signatures of the peers that have received and forwarded them. This
time, however, the random walk probabilities of the CAM are weighted by the υij of the neighbours,
instead of their wij. Each peer ni that receives a CAM will use it to update its model of the credit
topology with an oriented path Psi of safe credit margins starting on the message originator ns and
ending on ni itself.
AstheinformationpresentinmanyCAMsisaccumulatedinni, itwillcreatealocalmodelG{υ}i of
the safe credit network G{υ}. Of course, since all paths obtained from CAMs terminate in ni, Π−(ni) =4.6. INCENTIVE MECHANISM 77
∅. Another consequence of this is that we can be sure that for every peer nj ∈ G{υ}i, there is at least one
directed path Pji. Thus, if ni can estimate its safe credit margin υij to nj and through this create a new
link lij with weight υij, it can create a cycle cij by concatenating Pji with lij (obviously, lij 	 cij and
lkl 	 cij for all lkl ∈ Pji). Of course, the maximum amount of credit that can be consistently applied
over the entire cycle is equal to the minimum credit that can be accepted on any one of its constituent
links, so that the maximum credit τc = min(υij,{υkl} : (nk,nl) ∈ Pji). Informally, if the peer can
estimate its safe credit margin to any of the peers present in its credit topology G{υ}, the new link that
this assessment creates will generate a correctly oriented cycle on the credit graph, and the minimum
credit on its constituent links will determine its value. Then, using a procedure analogous to the one
used for contribution transfer, the peers can perform the necessary additions to their accounts in order to
seed the contribution network G.
4.6 Incentive Mechanism
4.6.1 Account Maintenance Incentives
Since most of the protocol elements that we propose involve the consistent modiﬁcation of the account
values wij, protocol stability in the presence of strategic peers demands that peers have no incentive to
arbitrarily change the accounts relating to the contributions of other peers.
As detailed in Section 4.4.1, every time that a peer ni sends a PAM (either newly created or for-
warded) to another peer nj, nj can check if the value that ni reports of wji corresponds to the actual
contributions cji from nj to ni. The most straightforward way of dealing with this scenario would be
for nj to reduce wij by cji − wji if cji > wji, and to increase wij by wji − cji if wji > cji (as long
as this does not bring wij − wji over the safe credit margin υij). This policy directly mimics the reci-
procity properties of the Tit-for-Tat trigger strategy in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and as such it can
take advantage of the signiﬁcant literature available [190] on its convergence, evolutionary stability, and
how to deal with its vulnerability to observation noise (misjudged defections triggering mutual defection
runs).
4.6.2 Protocol Incentives
The protocols described in Section 4.4 presuppose the correct operation of the contribution accounting
system, which is itself vulnerable to freeloading. To see why, it sufﬁces to consider the beneﬁt that a
strategic peer might obtain from message forwarding. In the case of a PAM, a peer ni does not need
to forward the PAM to obtain a ﬂow contribution path rooted on itself. Thus, by receiving PAMs but
refusing to forward them, a peer can conserve its resources and still beneﬁt from contribution topology
discovery.
To provide a negative incentive to the termination of PAM walks, every peer decreases the account
of the next peer in the contribution chain by an amount χPAM before sending the PAM. Consider a PAM
traversing the path in Figure 4.1a. In this case, wji would be decremented by χPAM, giving ni a proﬁt
of χPAM and nj a deﬁcit for the same amount. However, when nj forwards the PAM to nk and wkj is
decremented, nj will regain its original level of contribution and it will be nk who has a deﬁcit. In this
way, the deﬁcit of χPAM is propagated through the contribution chain, until the PAM is returned to ni
(and its initial proﬁt cancelled). This means that, if the PAM fails to be forwarded (or returned to the
originator), the last peer that received it will automatically suffer a contribution ﬁne of χPAM.
For CTRMs, any peers not at the contribution chain endpoints have nothing to gain from the trans-
action, but still have to consume their own resources. Again, any peer could choose not to propagate
CTRMs from different peers, and it would save resources without impacting its own transfer capacity.
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the transaction timer tT. The expiration of tT triggers two events. First, the soft-state reservation for
the transaction is freed. Second, each peer automatically decrements the account of the next peer in the
contribution chain by an amount χCTRM. The account movements balance in the same way as in the
PAM case, but instead of equalising the contribution contributions, the peer that failed to complete the
transaction is ﬁned with χCTRM, and the transaction originator is given a compensation of χCTRM.
4.7 Attack Resistance Properties
4.7.1 Resistance to Sybil Attacks
First, we show that our proposed system is resistant to sybil attacks [106]. In our case, the sybil attack
takes the following form: a peer nm creates a large set of identities, and directly modiﬁes their account
values to create an arbitrary contribution network among them (a sybil strategy, as deﬁned in [71]). Then,
it tries to use this ﬁctitious contribution network to extract large amounts of resources from the network.
We argue that this attack will not be proﬁtable for the attacker. The reason for this is the equivalence
between contribution transfer and maximum ﬂow over simple paths in G. This implies that the capacity
of this “network of sybils” to extract resources from the peer-to-peer infrastructure remains bounded
by the contribution values of the links that connect it to the rest of the system (the set of attack links,
as deﬁned in [323]). As these will be, in turn, bounded by the contributions that the peers in the sybil
network make to normal peers, there is no incentive to create large numbers of identities: this will just
split the contribution values amongst all of them, and no single one of them will beneﬁt. Every one of
the sybils will experience worse service than a single identity with access to the same network resources.
To analyse the sybilproofness properties of contribution transfer, we use the theoretical framework
presented in [71] and in Section 3.2. We deﬁne the maximum contribution transfer capacity between a
peer ns and another peer ni as
W(s,i) =
M
Psi∈Psi


O
ljk=(nj,nk)∈Psi
wjk

, (4.3)
where Psi = {Psi} is the set of all paths from ns to ni, and each of the ljk is a contribution link in G.
Since in our particular routing algebra ⊗ = min and ⊕ = max (see Section 4.4.3), we deﬁne W(Pij)
simply by applying min to the wnm values of the lnm ∈ Pij.
It is clear that (4.3) is a special case of the anchor-ﬂow reputation function (3.1), where each peer
anchors its “reputation” ﬂow on itself. Thus, rather than having a global anchor node that every peer uses
to measure “reputation” from, each peer can rank each other peer in terms of how much contributions
can be transferred to it through G. More formally, we have that
g(Psi) =
O
ljk∈Psi
wjk = min({wjk : ljk ∈ Psi}),
where ⊕ = max is used in practically the same way as in (3.1), and the max operation over the power
set Pai is superﬂuous, since by monotonicity (see below) the set Psi of paths that maximises W(s,i) is
known - it includes every possible path between ns and ni.
From these deﬁnitions, it is easy to see that our system satisﬁes the conditions for both value and
rank sybilproofness (Theorems 4 and 5 of [71], and Section 3.2.3):
1. Diminishing returns. If we have a path Pij with capacity W(Pij) and we concatenate it with
another path Pjk with transfer capacity W(Pjk) to create a new path Pik, we have that W(Pik) =
W(Pij ∪ Pjk) = W(Pij) ⊗ W(Pjk) = min(W(Pij),W(Pjk)) ≤ W(Pij). It follows that4.8. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 79
⊗ = min is nonincreasing.
2. Monotonicity. If we have two paths P1
ij and P2
ij with capacities W(P1
ij) and W(P2
ij), and we
aggregate them with ⊕ = max, we have that W(P1
ij) ⊕ W(P2
ij) = max(W(P1
ij),W(P2
ij)) ≥
W(P1
ij). Then, we have that ⊕ = max is nondecreasing.
3. No splitting. We consider a path pin = {lij,ljk,...} that has a contribution transfer capacity of
W(Pin) =
N
l=(ni,nj)∈Pin wij = min(wij,wjk,...). We split this path into two parallel paths
P1
in and P2
in that span the same links as Pin, but which have link capacities w1
ij and w2
ij such that,
for every link lij, w1
ij+w2
ij = wij. Since we require w1
ij ≥ 0 and w2
ij ≥ 0, we have that wij ≥ w1
ij
and wij ≥ w2
ij for all lij. Then, we have that W(P1
in) ≤ W(Pin) and W(P2
in) ≤ W(Pin), and it
follows that W(P1
in) ⊕ W(P2
in) = max(W(P1
in),W(P2
in)) ≤ W(Pin).
Furthermore, since contribution is transferred through single routes and ⊕ = max, contribution
transfer is rank sybilproof.
4.7.2 Resistance to Peer Slander
Our system is also designed to mitigate peer slander. One case of this problem involves peers lying
about the contributions that they have received from other peers. As noted in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2,
the effectiveness of this attack is reduced because all information concerning the contribution of a peer
must be vetted by its neighbours before being passed on.
Another, related case involves peers lying about the contributions that they have given to other
peers. Again, this is of limited impact in our system, since it would entail forging a digital signature.
4.7.3 Resistance to Whitewashing
Finally, we show that our system is resistant to whitewashing attacks: the creation of disposable iden-
tities, so that any penalties that the system might have imposed on misbehaving peers are “forgotten”.
Since the only way to make whitewashing unproﬁtable is to make a newcomer and a heavily punished
node indistinguishable, this attack is difﬁcult to defend against: it exploits altruistic system characteris-
tics that are desirable for bootstrapping and incorporating new peers into the system.
In our system, all punishments are equivalent to the loss of previous contributions. In effect, both
newcomers and heavily punished peers have zero social capital. Since these peers are unable to engage
in reciprocative interactions, they will only receive best effort service (they will be easily preempted by
peers with higher contribution values) and will not be able to participate in the contribution transfer net-
work. To see why, it sufﬁces to recall that the PAM random walk is weighted by previous contributions:
a node with very small previous contributions has a very small probability of being forwarded a PAM.
As peers increase their contributions, they become more heavily embedded in the contribution network
and their capacity for contribution transfer increases. However, we note that while non-malicious peers
will only need to build up their contributions once, whitewashers will need to do so several times: once
for each one of their new identities. This provides peers with an incentive to maintain their identities and
behave correctly towards other peers.
4.8 Simulation Experiments
We analyse our system by performing extensive simulations. When we use a synthetic contribution
topology G to test our protocols, we use Erd˝ os-R´ enyi [53] graphs, and if weighting is required, we
assign link weights following a uniform distribution. We simulate each peer individually, in order to take
into account differences between the true contribution network G and its sampled model on each peer,
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4.8.1 Contribution Topology Discovery
In order to get a better understanding of the behaviour of our accounting mechanism, we track the
formation of the contribution network subgraph Gi for each of the peers as the PAMs propagate through
the contribution network. To evaluate this, we use a static G with 1000 peers, each with an average of 150
neighbours. We leave the analysis of the inﬂuence of dynamic changes to these parameters for further
work.
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Figure 4.3: Contribution transfer volume and reachability in Gi
As expected from our proposed PAM forwarding probability (4.1), the locally constructed sub-
graphs Gi tend to be much sparser than G and may fail to account for all possible paths through which
contribution transfers could be routed. To analyse this, we consider the normalised contribution transfer
capacity: the sum of all the potential contribution transfers that ni could perform over Gi using the rout-
ing algebra of Section 4.4.3, normalised by the same magnitude calculated over the entire contribution
network G. As we can see in Figure 4.3 (left), not many messages are needed to attain a high capability
for contribution transfer. With just 10 PAMs per peer and a ρstop of .1, the average contribution transfer
capacity of a peer is nearly at 55% of its theoretical maximum.
If we focus not on the capacity of the contribution transfers, but on the existence of a contribution
transitivity path on Gi, our results are even better. As shown in Figure 4.3 (right), the proportion of
peers reachable through contribution transfers grows quickly with the number of PAMs per peer (its
growth rate decreases, as expected, as the walk length approaches the graph diameter). The standard
deviation of the distribution of both the normalised contribution transfer capacity and the number of
peers reachable through the discovered contribution transfer paths decreases with increasing PAMs per
peer, as Gi approximates G. The range in the number of announcements per peer in Figure 4.3 was
selected to be small enough to be practical in conventional Internet deployments of PledgeRoute.
It is interesting to consider the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the capacities of all the
contribution transfers that peers can achieve using their locally constructed Gi. We compare it with the
CDF of all the contribution transfer capacities that could be achieved if every peer had perfect knowl-
edge of G, represented as a dashed line in Figure 4.4 (due to the construction of our simulated G, most
peers tend to achieve roughly the same contribution transfer capacity between them). As the number of
PAMs increases, Gi samples G more accurately and the CDF of locally discovered contribution transfer
capacities becomes much closer to the theoretical maximum.4.8. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 81
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Figure 4.4: Change in transfer capacity CDF with number of PAMs
4.8.2 Contribution Transfer and Indirect Reciprocity
To evaluate the properties of our system as an incentive mechanism,we use an interest digraph H to
model peer service preferences: an edge (ni,nj) in H implies that peer ni is interested in requesting
services from peer nj.
We deﬁne two types of peers: reciprocators, that follow the reciprocity rules described in Sections
4.4, and freeloaders that rely exclusively on altruism and refuse to honour any service requests. More-
over, we distinguish two kinds of reciprocators: enabled peers are able to transfer contributions and
perform contribution seeding as described in Sections 4.4 and 4.54, while non-enabled peers can only
perform direct reciprocity (strict Tit-for-Tat with peers with whom they have interacted in the past).
Direct Reciprocity Indirect Reciprocity
G   H G H
Contribution Graph Interest Graph
Gd(G)   H
Figure 4.5: Indirect reciprocity and the service capacity improvement it provides.
The signiﬁcant improvement that indirect reciprocity provides over direct reciprocity is evident
from Figure 4.5, where G and H are examples of contribution and interest graphs. The links in G ∩ H
are those services that could be achieved using direct reciprocity: those that imply the existence of both
interest and accumulated social capital between the two peers involved. If we recall Gd(G) (Deﬁnition
3.18), we see that the links in Gd(G) ∩ H are those service interest links in H that can be achieved by
routing contributions over G. Since obviously G ⊂ Gd(G), indirect reciprocity allows an improvement
of the service delivery capacity of a peer-to-peer system. Of course, the reachability that routing over
G provides will be a function of its structure and how well matches that of H. If one assumes that G
4When an enabled peer requests a service from a peer to whom it has not contributed, it will attempt to execute a contribution
transfer operation. When contacted by a peer to whom they owe past contributions, reciprocators will provide prioritised service
(all other requests will only get best-effort service). When a freeloader receives a request, it will ignore it.4.8. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 82
and H are engineered to be similar (as in [255]), it may be that a small number of hops in G are enough
for good coverage in H, which in turn could be useful in decreasing routing table size. We leave such
optimisations for further work.
In order to focus exclusively on the reciprocity properties of the system, we neglect peer capacity:
all peers will respond to all requests either with high quality service, best effort service, or refusal
due to freeloading behaviour. We are interested in exploring how the service quality experienced by
reciprocators and freeloaders varies as NH, the average peer outdegree in H, and R
F , the proportion of
reciprocators vs. freeloaders, change.
Algorithm 1 Execution of a simulation epoch for a single time t
for all ni ∈ G (in random order) do
for all service requests si of ni (10 in our simulation) do
Calculate Si, the set of peers in G known to ni that are of interest in H (Si ⊂ Gi, Si ∈ Π−(ni)
in H)
Rank all ns ∈ Si using s1, then tie-break ranking with s2, then tie-break with random
Send request si to the peer ns that had the best ranking
end for
end for
We start each simulation run with peers having no contributions between them, and then allow
the simulation to run until an equilibrium is reached where the average proportion of services that a
peer receives through reciprocation and altruism remains unchanged. On each one of the epochs of
a simulation run, the actions in Algorithm 1 are performed, where s1, s2 and random represent peer
selection strategies for each peer ni:
• s1: Prefer peers to whom ni has contributed, and are thus “indebted” towards it.
• s2: Prefer peers that have reciprocated towards ni in the past.
• random: Choose any peer randomly.
Finally, we run a simulation run for each possible combination of NH and R
F , and terminate the
simulation only after the average service quality for all peers in G has converged. The results are shown
in Figure 4.6.
In Figure 4.6, blue circles represent reciprocators and red triangles represent freeloaders. The
left column shows the results obtained when reciprocators are non-enabled, while the right column
shows those obtained when reciprocators are enabled. Finally, the top row shows the proportion of time
that peers obtain high priority service, while the bottom row shows the proportion of time that peers
obtain best effort service5. We plot the average service quality that a peer receives, as a function of
NH normalised by the number of peers in H. The error bars mark the maximum and minimum values
obtained by varying R
F between .5 and .9, for each value of NH.
We can see that both enabled and non-enabled reciprocators obtain a higher ratio of prioritised ser-
vice as NH increases, since this gives them a better chance of being able to ﬁnd a peer to whom they can
send a reciprocating request. However, enabled peers experience a much higher proportion of prioritised
service requests, and this proportion increases much more quickly than for non-enabled peers. This is
because contribution transfer allows enabled peers to perform reciprocative interactions almost exclu-
sively, being able to route their contributions in G to match the supply and demand constraints imposed
by H. Unable to do this, non-enabled peers are forced to maintain higher proportions of their service
requests as altruistic ones, thus suffering a service quality penalty. Additionally, we see that freeloaders
5Due to freeloaders, some requests will not be honoured and these two rows will fail to add up to one.4.9. USING PLEDGEROUTE AS A PAYMENT MECHANISM 83
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Figure 4.6: Average service quality as a function of NH
|H|
experience consistently worse service levels and much higher variability, validating the effectiveness of
reciprocity as an incentive mechanism.
4.9 Using PledgeRoute as a Payment Mechanism
Although the contribution transfer operation has been presented as a sybilproof protocol operation en-
abling indirect reciprocity, it has wider applicability in the context of the design of incentive mechanisms
for peer-to-peer networks. In particular, it can be used as a completely decentralised currency platform,
where peers use self-minted local currencies that are exchanged through the contribution transfer oper-
ation (called currency transfer in this case). Instead of being backed by a central bank, this currency
is individually backed by each peer, with the network G{ ˆ w} of reciprocated contributions ˆ wjk operat-
ing like a web of trust that can be used to set up bootstrapping credits through cycle seeding and direct
altruistic requests.
Two basic operations are deﬁned for the currency platform along with currency transfer: currency
deposit and withdrawal. A deposit is mapped to granting an altruistic service request, and in effect it
increases the wealth of the peer granting the service, while the peer to whom the service is being granted
increases its obligations (for this peer, we call this operation a buy). On the other hand, a withdrawal is
mapped to being granted a reciprocative request, and it decreases the wealth of the peer requesting the
service. The peer granting the reciprocative request decreases its obligations, and for this peer we call
this operation a sell. This is shown graphically in Figure 4.7 (for an example of how could this be used
in an auctions-based system, see Section 5.4).
Althoughthemappingbetweensocialcapitalandcurrencyseemstransparent, thereisafundamental
difference: isthereisnolongeraneedforaﬁxedexchangeratebetweencontributionsandcurrencyunits.
Thus, the use of a currency system enables peers to use a pricing mechanism to assign value to candidate
service options. This property of a currency system will be of great use in Chapters 5 and 6, where the4.10. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 84
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Figure 4.7: PledgeRoute as a payment system
valuation that peers give to services becomes of critical importance6.
One possible weakness of PledgeRoute when used as a currency platform is that each transaction
will be reﬂected in two different accounts, and there is a risk that these will not match if peers do not
agree in the correct value of a service. In this case, the oversight mechanisms detailed in Section 4.6.1
can be used to manage and resolve such discrepancies.
Although currency transfer is not enough, by itself, to implement an incentive mechanism, it is
a very useful component for more complex incentives systems. When supplemented with statistical
throughput models, it can be used to guard against hidden action in QoS overlays (see Chapter 6), and
when supplemented by an auction-driven resource allocation mechanism it can be used to streamline
peer-to-peer swarming and content distribution (see Chapter 5).
4.10 Discussion of Potential Improvements
In this model we presented PledgeRoute, a decentralised accounting system that, when used in conjunc-
tion with reciprocity policies and two classes of service (altruistic and reciprocative), operates as an
incentive mechanism.
Since PledgeRoute is based on reciprocity, it will be useful in more or less symmetric systems,
where contributions are sometimes given and sometimes received by all the peers. Thus, an obvious
improvement path would be to consider a PledgeRoute alternative for heavily asymmetric systems, such
as conventional Internet TV broadcasting, where instead of a peer-to-peer network where all peers are
equivalent and function as servers and clients in approximately the same ratio, we have a tree-like distri-
bution structure originating from a single, infrastructure location which does not download at any point.
Under such circumstances, reciprocity seems a poor ﬁt, and different incentive models are required.
6Since pricing and valuation systems can be complex and varied in their implementation details (see for instance [161, 73, 119]
and Chapter 5), we do not require any particular one for PledgeRoute when used as a payment system.5
An Incentive Mechanism for Service
Differentiation using Vickrey Auctions
One interesting aspect of using a completely decentralised, self-organising peer-to-peer overlay for real-
time streaming is that it provides essentially unlimited scalability without the need for infrastructure
support. This of course can entail signiﬁcant communication and coordination costs and pose difﬁcult
privacy issues, but its scalability and resistance to single points of failure can make it attractive even in
light of these challenges (see Section 2.3).
We deﬁne a swarming protocol as a set of rules that allow each peer to determine, in a completely
decentralised fashion, to which other peers will it send service requests, which service requests from
other peers will it accept, and the service quality that it will give to each one of these service requests
when they are served.
Protocols of this kind implement tradeoffs between system quality metrics while respecting peer
capacity constraints. This, however, is often complicated by factors such as service availability under
churn, complex content search issues, varying achievable QoS between different peers and incentives
issues. In our case, we restrict our attention to the design of a fully distributed resource allocation
protocol that will give increasingly better QoS as peers contribute an increasing amount of resources to
the overlay.
Due to the great complexity of the aforementioned tradeoffs, swarming protocols tend to either
make simplifying assumptions or address only subsets of the problem. We now explain where our
proposed protocol stands in these issues.
5.1 System Overview
We commence by recalling Property 1 in Chapter 1 (The Fundamental Property of Incentive Mecha-
nisms), and thus deﬁning an incentive mechanism as a resource allocation policy where the utility that
each participating strategic peer ni obtains is directly proportional to the utility that the other participat-
ing peers achieve because of the participation of ni in the overlay. At its most basic, it is a protocol in
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which peers allocate their resources preferentially to those peers that provide more of their own resources
for use in the peer-to-peer overlay. Of course, this means that different peers must have a way to affect
the utility that other peers get from the system, depending on the amount of resources they provide to
other peers.
To achieve this, we require that peers have a quality differentiation policy in place. This means
that they can allocate resources to peers in such a way that any particular ordering of peers in terms
of decreasing quality can be achieved with minimal wasted or unused resources. This will be heavily
dependent on QoS measurement and enforcement particulars, but obvious examples of tools to achieve
this include packet prioritisation, differentiated queueing, query service order sorting or differentiated
capacity assignment.
5.1.1 Assumptions
We commence by laying out the groundwork for the analytical contributions that we present in this
chapter by presenting our basic assumptions. As is usually the case, these will be motivated not only by
our desire to achieve an accurate model, but also by the necessity for mathematical tractability.
WeassumethattimeisslottedinintervalsT, witheachintervalbeingcalledaround. Wewillusethe
auctions nomenclature presented in Section 3.4.2. We consider the multiple-item Vickrey auction when
applied to a simpliﬁed peer-to-peer chunk swarming scenario. Each peer will behave, each round, as a
server (an auctioneer) and a client (a bidder). Peers will only open one auction per round as auctioneers,
but they will participate in all the auctions of their interest simultaneously.
Each peer ni, in its role as an auctioneer, will have Mi service units in auction, with this number
being contingent on its resource capacity. In addition, we assume that resource allocation for round k is
decided during round k−1: during round k−1 all auctioneers receive bids from all interested peers, and
all auctions are resolved at the end of that same round. Service unit delivery, as well as the next bidding
round, commences at the beginning of round k.
We assume that these service units are content independent, so that their quality is only a function
of the peers involved and not which speciﬁc content subset is being requested. This means that the value
of each service unit will be a function of the properties of the peers involved and the overlay link between
them. This is not due to an inherent limitation on Vickrey auctions - rather, it is a simplifying assumption
that helps in obtaining closed-form solutions for some magnitudes of interest.
We assume that peer quality information will be collected by each peer, distilled into statistics and
made available to other peers through a market system M, which may also include accounting and
payment components. In our case, we use PledgeRoute (see Sections 4.9 and 5.4) as an accounting and
payment mechanism.
The various components of the incentive mechanism are presented in Figure 5.1. The three basic
components are the bidder, auctioneer and accounting processes. The bidder process takes as input
information from network measurements (network layer latencies, end-to-end throughput, synthetic co-
ordinate information, etc.) and from the market system (bid value probability densities, average peer
load, peer resource capacity, etc.) in order to determine from which peers to request service. These re-
quests take the form of bids for resource auctions at other peers. When one or more of the bids of a peer
are selected for service (we say that these bids win), the accounting process records this, updates relevant
accounts accordingly, and informs the auctioneer process of the account balances for the peers whose
bids win auctions, so that they can be assigned to a proper QoS class. The auctioneer receives bids from
remote bidders, compiles bid probability densities and updates them in the market system along with
the total number of received bids and the total amount of resources that the peer makes available to the
overlay. Finally, the auctioneer process selects which bids will receive service, determines the quality
class for each won bid, and provides services to the remote peers accordingly.5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 87
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Figure 5.1: Auction-based swarming: system diagram
5.1.2 Peer Value Estimation
We assume that each peer pj will have a mechanism to obtain the value vij of receiving a service unit
from a given auctioneer ni. Relevant variables that might affect service unit value include end-to-end
throughput between ni and pj, network layer jitter, latency and loss between ni and pj, the total amount
of CPU or upload bandwidth that ni provides to the overlay, the transaction response time at ni, or any
other measure that might have an inﬂuence on the usefulness or desirability for pj of a service unit from
ni. We give an example of how might this be accomplished for a speciﬁc incentives model in Section
5.5.1.
We do not prescribe any particular value estimation function as part of this model, allowing each
peer to supply its own instead. This allows peers to freely express their preferences for services and
make appropriate quality tradeoffs between candidate auctioneers.
5.2 The Auctioneer Process
For our analysis, we assume that within each peer ni there is an auctioneer process auctioning Mi service
units to the rest of the peers, which we denote as P = {pj}. We will use a multi-item Vickrey auction,
and thus the outcome k∗ is determined in exactly the same way as in Section 3.4.2.3: each client peer
pj is assumed to have sent mji bids, each at a value vj(ζj) where ζj corresponds to the type of pj (we
describe ζj in more depth in Section 5.3.1). The bids are ranked in increasing order of value, and the
top Mi win a service unit. The calculation of the Clarke pivot value is trivial as well - it is just the sum
of the winning bid values had pj not participated. Therefore, the payment hj that will be applied to the
winning peers pj is just the sum of the top Xij losing bids, where Xij is the number of bids that pj won
in a given auction by ni. The utility Uj that pj has (after payments) is just the difference between the
sum of the values of its Xij winning bids and the sum of the top Xij losing bids.
We will make two simplifying assumptions. First, we follow the independent private values as-
sumption in the sale of Mi service units to Ni bidders. Thus, the value that each bidder gives to the
service units being auctioned is private, and uncorrelated with the values of the other bidders. Second,
we will assume that peers experience no synergy in acquiring increasing numbers of service units. This
means that for each pj, the utility in obtaining Xij service units from ni is just Xij times the utility in
obtaining a single service unit from ni. Therefore, there are no complementarity or substitution effects
between different service units, and all service units from a given auctioneer have the same value. For-
mally, this means that the model only requires a single per-item valuation vj(ζj) instead of a valuation5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 88
function vj(ζj,Xij). In this case the player type ζj is a vector that includes quality-related properties of
the peers and the overlay path between them and the auctioneer.
Throughout this chapter, we will be interested in estimations that peers make regarding the number
of competing bids that they will have to face when they bid at other peers. Instead of taking a peer-
independent point of view, we shall always consider bid load as relevant to the bid competition of a
particular peer (which we usually denote as pj). Thus, rather than the total number Ni of bids on ni, we
shall be interested in the number of bids in ni with which the bids of pj must compete - which usually
involves removing from Ni those bids sent by pj itself. We shall denote this number of bids as N
j
i , the
total competing load of pj at ni.
We now deﬁne two basic load-related states for the auctioneer. We call the situation in which
Mi > N
j
i as an overabundance state, and Mi < N
j
i as a scarcity state. In the scarcity case, even before
pj has sent a bid, there are more bidders than service units are in auction. In the overabundance state pj
can expect to have some of its bids accepted at zero cost. The reason for this is that following directly
from the Clarke pivot rule, nonzero prices will only be charged in the scarcity state1.
5.2.1 Calculating Expected Auction Outcomes
As detailed in Section 5.1.1, the main task for the auctioneer process will be selecting which received
requests to select for service, and the main task for the bidder process will be to select which peers to
select requests for which service units. Since it will be advantageous for the bidder to have a model of
a potential auctioneer, we shall be interested in calculating the expected auction outcomes that a bidder
will experience from a given auctioneer. We now turn our attention to this problem.
5.2.1.1 Estimating the Expectation of the Number of Successful Bids
It is interesting for a bidder pj to know, given its valuation vij, the expected number of bids it will win
with a particular auctioneer ni. Since by the incentive compatibility property of the VCG mechanism
we know that peers have no incentive to bid strategically, we assume that peers bid their true valuations.
Thus, every peer pj bids its true valuation vij for mji service units out of the total Mi being auctioned
by ni.
We simplify our protocol design by modelling the bid values as a random variable V i with a prob-
ability density fV
i
, and sharing only the densities between the peers, rather than the actual bid logs.
Then,
R vb
va fV
i
(v)dv gives the proportion of valuations between va and vb for all those bids that were
submitted to ni. Since players do not bid strategically, auctioneers can compile the true value probability
distributions for their set of bidders from the bids that peers submit to them.
Again focusing on the prospective competition for peer pj, in the model presented here we treat the
N
j
i competing bids that ni receives in a given interval T as a set of N
j
i realisations of the random variable
V i, which represents the valuations that all other peers have for service units provided by ni. We denote
this vector of variates drawn from fV
i
as V i = {V i
1,V i
2,...,V i
N
j
i −1,V i
N
j
i }. The auctioneer ni sorts
V i in ascending order, creating ¯ V i = {V i
(1),V i
(2),...,V i
(N
j
i −1),V i
(N
j
i )}, keeps the top Mi bids in
¯ V i and discards rest. We deﬁne the vector of these Mi bids as ¯ Bi = {Bi
(1),Bi
(2),...,Bi
(Mi−1),Bi
(Mi)},
the vector of ranked winning bids.
We are interested in the probabilities of the various possible outcomes of the auction (see Figure
5.2). We imagine a situation where a set of bidders p−j has already submitted all their bids to ni, so that
the N
j
i , Mi and mji are set (thus, N
j
i is the total number of bids that ni will receive in addition to the
mji that pj will send, and Ni = N
j
i + mji). If N
j
i > Mi, ni is in the scarcity state, and the bids from
pj will compete with the bids from other peers. In particular, we see that the lowest bid that pj will have
to surpass will be the (N
j
i − Mi + 1)-th highest bid received by ni. In this case, the number of service
1In this respect, this protocol is similar to the resource allocation policy of GNUNet [149].5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 89
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Figure 5.2: Calculating the expected number of won bids
Ni Total number of bids that auctioneer ni receives
N
j
i Total number of competing bids that auctioneer ni receives, as assessed
by pj
Mi Total number of service units that auctioneer ni offers
mji Total number of bids that bidder pj sends to auctioneer ni
Xij Number of winning bids on auctioneer ni that were sent by bidder pj
Table 5.1: Auction-based swarming model notation
units that pj can win will be bounded by the total number of units in auction Mi or the number of bids it
submits, mji.
If Mi > N
j
i , ni is in the overabundance state and pj will have access to X
ij
free = Mi − N
j
i
contention-free service units. Clearly, the ﬁrst Mi − N
j
i bids from pj will win without competition
and paying zero cost. Any bids following, though, will face the same bid competition situation detailed
above, with ˆ N
j
i = Mi − X
ij
free = N
j
i and ˆ mji = mji − X
ij
free = mji − Mi + N
j
i (Since by hypothesis
mji > X
ij
free, m0
ji > 0). Then, we focus on the analysis of the scarcity state, since the overabundance
state can be trivially reduced to it. We henceforth assume that N
j
i > Mi.
Again, we denote as Xij as the number of winning bids on ni sent by pj. We see in Figure 5.2 that
pj will win no bids with a probability P[vij < Bi
(1)], which is equivalent to P[vij < V i
(N
j
i −Mi+1)],
and it will win exactly one bid with probability P[Bi
(1) < vij < Bi
(2)], which is equivalent to
P[V i
(N
j
i −Mi+1) < vij < V i
(N
j
i −Mi+1)]. This pattern continues until either all the bids that were
submitted to the auctioneer have been considered (this is the situation shown in Figure 5.2) or all
the service units that ni has in auction have been considered. This bounds the maximum2 number
of bids that a bidder can win to Xij
max = min(mji,Mi), and this can happen with a probability of
P[vij > V i
(N
j
i −Mi+X
ij
max)] = 1 − P[vij < V i
(N
j
i −Mi+X
ij
max)].
Since we have that P[V i
(k) < vij < V i
(k+1)] = P[V i
(k) < vij] − P[V i
(k+1) < vij], we have that
2A rational peer should never send more bids than service units are available at the auctioneer, as it brings no beneﬁt. We do
not directly enforce this, however, as our protocol takes this into account automatically.5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 90
µij, the average number of successful bids that bidder pj will have per auction, can be found with
µij = E[Xij] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
k
 
P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij] − P[V i
(ϕ+k+1) < vij]

, (5.1)
where ϕ = N
j
i − Mi. Since (5.1) telescopes, it can be trivially simpliﬁed to yield
µij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij]. (5.2)
We ﬁnd P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij] by using the (ϕ + k)-th order statistics [95, 40] of the value distribution
fV
i
, which are formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let V i ≥ 0 denote a continuous random variable with probability density fV
i
(v), and
cumulative distribution FV
i
(v) =
R v
0 fV
i
(ω)dω. Let (V i
(1),V i
(2),...,V i
(N
j
i )) denote a random sample
of size N
j
i drawn on V i, and ordered so that V i
(1) < V i
(2) < ... < V i
(N
j
i ). Then, the V i
(1),V i
(2),...,V i
(N
j
i )
are collectively known as the order statistics derived from V i. The probability density for the k-th order
statistic will be denoted as fV
i
(k)(v), and can be calculated [40] as
fV
i
(k)(v) =
N
j
i !
(k − 1)!(N
j
i − k)!
FV
i
(v)k−1(1 − FV
i
(v))N
j
i −kfV
i
(v). (5.3)
As is customary, we will denote the CDF of the k-th order statistic of the random variable V i as
P[V i
(k) ≤ vij] = FV
i
(k)(vij) =
Z vij
0
fV
i
(k)(ω)dω. (5.4)
By performing the substitution y = FV
i
(ω) on (5.3), and assuming that FV
i
(0) = 0 we have that
P[V i
(k) ≤ vij] =
Z F
V i
(vij)
0
N
j
i !
(k − 1)!(N
j
i − k)!
yk−1(1 − y)N
j
i −kdy,
which can be expressed as
P[V i
(k) ≤ vij] =
1
B(k,N
j
i − k + 1)
B(FV
i
(vij); k,N
j
i − k + 1), (5.5)
where B(k,N
j
i −k+1) and B(x; k,N
j
i −k+1) are, respectively, the beta and incomplete beta functions
with parameters a = k and b = N
j
i − k + 1:
B(x; a,b) =
Z x
0
ya−1(1 − y)b−1dy [0 ≤ x ≤ 1]
B(a,b) = B(1; a,b) =
Z 1
0
ya−1(1 − y)b−1dy.
By substituting (5.5) in (5.1), we have that
µij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
I(FV
i
(vij); ϕ + k,N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1), (5.6)
where I(x; ϕ + k,N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1) is the regularised incomplete beta function of x with parameters5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 91
a = ϕ + k and b = N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1:
I(x; a,b) =
B(x; a,b)
B(a,b)
[0 ≤ x ≤ 1].
Since I(0;a,b) = 0 and I(1; a,b) = 1, we have that limvij→0 µij = 0 and limvij→∞ µij = Xij
max, as
expected: in the ﬁrst case no bids are won, while in the second one the maximum number of feasible
service units are won.
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Figure 5.3: Value probability density (PDF) and cumulative distribution (CDF) for service unit valu-
ations fV
i
(vij) and FV
i
(vij) used as input for (5.6), (5.7) and (5.8) in Figures 5.4,5.5 and 5.7. The
experimental PDF and CDF are shown in blue, the analytical ones in red.
5.2.1.2 Estimating the Variance of the Number of Successful Bids
We now turn to the calculation of the second moment of Xij, the number of bids that pj wins at ni. We
have that
E[(Xij)2] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
k2  
P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij] − P[V i
(ϕ+k+1) < vij]

,
which again trivially telescopes as
E[(Xij)2] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
 
k2 − (k − 1)2
P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
(2k − 1)P[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij].
This implies that
E[(Xij)2] = −µij + 2
X
ij
max X
k=1
kP[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij],
which in turn means that we have for σ2
ij, the variance of Xij, that
σ2
ij = −µ2
ij − µij + 2
X
ij
max X
k=1
kP[V i
(ϕ+k) < vij] (5.7)
= −µ2
ij − µij + 2
X
ij
max X
k=1
kI(FV
i
(vij); ϕ + k,N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1)
where, again, I(x; ϕ+k,N
j
i −(ϕ+k)+1) is the regularised incomplete beta function with parameters
a = ϕ + k and b = N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1. In this case, since we have that limvij→0 µij = 0 and
limvij→∞ µij = Xij
max we see that limvij→0 σ2
ij = 0 and limvij→∞ σ2
ij = 0. This is of course expected;
in the ﬁrst case pj always loses all its bids, and in the second case it always wins them. There is no risk
associated with either of these two cases.5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 92
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Figure 5.4: Expected number of won bids E[Xij]. Blue curves correspond to experimental simulation,
red curves to (5.6). Each curve corresponds to a different mji ∈ {1,5,10,15,20}. All curves are present
in all graphs, but overlap in the cases where mji > Mi since the number of won items is clamped at Mi
in that case.
5.2.1.3 Estimating the Expectation of the Utility for all Successful Bids
Finally, we calculate the expected utility of a peer. This utility, for a won bid, equals vij − hj where
hj is the price that pj needs to pay to ni, which is found by applying the Clarke pivot rule (see Section
3.4.2.2). Then, we have for the utility of pj that (see Figure 5.6):
Uij =

          
          
vij − V(ϕ+1) if V(ϕ+1) < vij < V(ϕ+2) (1 bid won)
2vij − V(ϕ+2) − V(ϕ+1) if V(ϕ+2) < vij < V(ϕ+3) (2 bids won)
3vij − V(ϕ+3) − V(ϕ+2) − V(ϕ+1) if V(ϕ+3) < vij < V(ϕ+4) (3 bids won)
4vij − V(ϕ+4) − V(ϕ+3) − V(ϕ+2) − V(ϕ+1) if V(ϕ+4) < vij < V(ϕ+5) (4 bids won)
. . .
Xij
maxvij −
PX
ij
max
n=1 V(ϕ+n) if V(ϕ+X
ij
max) < vij (All bids won)
By a reasoning identical to that shown in Figure 5.2, we can express this utility in terms of one sided5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 93
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Figure 5.5: Standard deviation of the number of won bids
 
E[(Xij)2] − E[Xij]2 1
2. Blue curves
correspond to experimental simulation, red curves to (5.7). Each curve corresponds to a different
mji ∈ {1,5,10,15,20}. All curves are present in all graphs, but overlap in the cases where mji > Mi
since the number of won items is clamped at Mi in that case.
intervals in the following way (again, this is evident in Figure 5.6):
Uij = [vij − V(ϕ+1)] if V(ϕ+1) < vij
+[vij − V(ϕ+2)] if V(ϕ+2) < vij
+[vij − V(ϕ+3)] if V(ϕ+3) < vij
+[vij − V(ϕ+4)] if V(ϕ+4) < vij
. . .
+[vij − Vϕ+X
ij
max] if V(ϕ+X
ij
max) < vij
and thus we have for the expected utility E[Uij] that
E[Uij] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
Z vij
0
(vij − ω)fV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω,5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 94
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Figure 5.6: The probability density functions for the order statistics relevant in the calculation of the
expected bidder utility. Each curve denotes the density function (PDF) of an order statistic (labelled in
the ﬁgure itself). The coloured areas correspond to the regions over which the peer experiences a given
utility, given in a box with the same background colour. The number inside each region denotes the
number of bids won.
where fV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω) is the density function (PDF) of the (ϕ + k)-th order statistic of V i, as given by (5.3).
If we assume that FV
i
(ϕ+k)(0) = 0, the integral within the summation can be partially performed to yield
Z vij
0
(vij − ω)fV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω = vijFV
i
(ϕ+k)(vij) −
Z vij
0
ωfV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω.
where FV
i
(ϕ+k)(vij) is just the CDF of the (ϕ + k)-th order statistic of V i, as given by (5.4). The last
integral in the expression above is readily solved using integration by parts, to yield
Z vij
0
ωfV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω = ωFV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)

 
vij
0
−
Z vij
0
FV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω
Hence, we have that
µU
ij = E[Uij] =
X
ij
max X
k=1
h
vijFV
i
(ϕ+k)(vij) − vijFV
i
(ϕ+k)(vij)
i
+
Z vij
0
FV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω,
and therefore
µU
ij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
Z vij
0
FV
i
(ϕ+k)(ω)dω (5.8)
=
X
ij
max X
k=1
Z vij
0
I(FV
i
(ω); ϕ + k,N
j
i − (ϕ + k) + 1)dω.
By exchanging summation and integration we see that
µU
ij =
Z vij
0
µij(ω)dω,
where we interpret µij as a function of the peer valuation vij, and we substitute it with the integration
variable ω.5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 95
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Figure 5.7: Expected utility for all won bids E[Uij]. Blue curves correspond to experimental simulation,
red curves to (5.8). Each curve corresponds to a different mji ∈ {1,5,10,15,20}. All curves are present
in all graphs, but overlap in the cases where mji > Mi since the number of won items is clamped at Mi
in that case.
5.2.2 Allocating Winning Bids to Service Classes
The auction procedure detailed in Section 5.2 was only used to decide whether a peer would receive
service or not. Once the set of peers that will receive service is known, each one is assigned a different
quality class, according to the currency reserves that the peer has with the auctioneer. We present two
possibilities, one of greater accuracy but much greater computational demands, and a simpler one that
nevertheless satisﬁes our requirements for an incentive mechanism.
For both procedures, we assume that each auctioneer can allocate its resources during the auction
time window T so that each one of the winning peers pj is assigned a service quality qj ∈ Q so that it
conforms to the structure of the wji as much as possible. We now present the ﬁrst of our proposed ways
of mapping contributions to quality, which achieves high accuracy at the cost of increased computational
complexity.
5.2.2.1 Exact Proportional Quality Mapping
In this ﬁrst approach to quality mapping, the auctioneer ni will deﬁne a resource space Ωi = Ωi
1×Ωi
2×
Ωi
3 × ... where each of the subspaces Ωi
k corresponds to a particular resource k under the control of ni
that can be partitioned and allocated differentially to bidders (transaction delay, upload bandwidth share,
etc). We assume that these allocations are exclusive, so that if the auctioneer allocates a bidder pj an
amount (ω∗
j)k of resources from Ωi
k, these will be unavailable for allocation to any other peer.5.2. THE AUCTIONEER PROCESS 96
In order to relate resource allocation with service quality, we assume that the auctioneer has a
quality estimation function Fi : Ωi 7→ Q that maps each resource allocation vector ω ∈ Ωi to a quality
level q ∈ Q.
We are interested in the level sets of Fi: the sets ˆ Ωi(qc) ⊂ Ωi such that Fi(ω) = qc for all
ω ∈ ˆ Ωi(qc). We thus deﬁne the correspondence F
−1
i : Q 7→ Ωi that gives, for each q ∈ Q, its level
set in Ωi under Fi(ω), and denote this as ˆ Ωi(qc) = F
−1
i (qc). We call F
−1
i the inverse quality mapping
correspondence. By deﬁnition, ˆ Ωi(qc) gives all the possible resource allocations in ni that will yield a
quality of qc. We denote ˆ Ωi(qc) as the qc-quality level set of peer ni.
If Ωi is inﬁnitely divisible and the auctioneer has a target aggregate quality qi
T that it wants to
achieve per time window T, one way of achieving differentiated resource allocation for each winning
bidder pj of the Mi that will be granted service is by selecting one vector ω∗
j with j ∈ {1,2,...,Mi}
out of each level set ˆ Ωi(qj), where qj is the quality that will be allocated to winning bidder pj. In this
case, we propose a proportional quality mapping such as
qj = qi
T
wji P
j wji
. (5.9)
Then, each winning bidder pj will be associated with a feasible quality subspace ˆ Ωi(qj), so that
ˆ Ωi(qj) = F
−1
i
 
qi
T
wji P
j wji
!
, (5.10)
and one allocation vector ω∗
j ∈ ˆ Ωi(qj) will be chosen for each winning bidder pj, subject to capacity
constraints which, by our exclusivity assumption, then take the form
X
pj∈P
(ω∗
j)k ≤ (¯ ωi)k, (5.11)
where ¯ ωi is the total resource vector that auctioneer ni has, and (¯ ωi)k is the k-th component of ¯ ωi (the
total capacity that the auctioneer ni has for resource k ∈ Ωk). A conceptual example of the process
just described, when applied to a resource space with only two subspaces Ωi
1 and Ωi
2, each one of them
mapped to an interval in R≥0 (which means that Ωi is a ﬁnite Euclidean plane), and two peers who are
to receive resource allocations is shown in Figure 5.8.
In the example in Figure 5.8, the quality levels to be associated with bidders p1 and p2 have been
calculated as q1 and q2, and their feasible quality subspaces ˆ Ωi(q1) and ˆ Ωi(q2) deﬁned on this basis
(this is shown in Figure 5.8(a)). The proportional quality assignment problem is, in this case, to choose
ω∗
1 ∈ ˆ Ωi(q1) and ω∗
2 ∈ ˆ Ωi(q2) such that their components lie in the shaded areas in Figure 5.8(b).
Apart from the analytic treatment (inspired by the system of distinct representatives technique in
[169]), the main contribution of this section is that, from (5.10), the total quality qi
T is allocated propor-
tionally to all winning bidders so that qj = qi
T
wji P
j wji. This approach as it stands is, however, unsat-
isfactory for many reasons. First, the experimental calculation of the feasible quality subspaces ˆ Ωi(qj)
is an involved problem in and of itself. In addition, and being critically dependent on the structure of
the ˆ Ωi(qj), the calculation of a set of allocation vectors ω∗
j ∈ ˆ Ωi(qj) that, in addition, satisfy resource
capacity constraints (5.11) can be a very difﬁcult combinatorial problem, potentially with unfeasible
computational demands. In summary, not only can the calculation of the ω∗
j be very computationally in-
tensive, depending on the structure of the resource space Ωi and the complexity of the level sets F
−1
i (qj)
and the capacity constraints (5.11), but it also requires the a-priori deﬁnition of the target quality qi
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Figure 5.8: Example of ﬁnding the allocation vectors ω∗
j using exact proportional quality mapping
such a way that the problem is feasible3.
5.2.2.2 Rank Quality Mapping
Even though the exact solution of 5.2.2.1 would be highly accurate, we are interested in exploring a
simplerapproachthatcanstillbeconsideredanincentivemechanism-thatis, thequalityq∗(pj)thateach
bidder obtains is monotonically increasing with its account balance wji, so that peers have an incentive
to continuously contribute to the peer-to-peer overlay, so that their contributions can be transferred to
whichever peers they require services from and the quality they receive increases.
We propose to apply a preference relation to the set of winning peers in order to rank them, and then
use their rank k to assign them to one of a set of QoS classes Qi(k) = {qi
1,qi
2,...,qi
Mi} that have been
precomputed by the auctioneer ni. If this preference relation orders peers according to their previous
contributions, peers with greater resource donations to the overlay (as indicated by large account values
wji) will obtain better quality levels.
Clearly, a very simple way of achieving this would be for the auctioneer ni to sort the Mi winning
service requests in increasing order of currency reserves, and then to assign a increasing quality service
class to each request following this ordering. If we follow the technique presented in Section 5.2.1.1,
we can treat these Mi account values as realisations of the random variable Wi representing the stored
credit (unreciprocated contributions) of all peers towards ni. Then, the expression equivalent to (5.1)
3For simple, 1-dimensional quality estimation functions this has been done in the past, one such example being [201]. The
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can be found by considering the expected service quality of pj,
µ
Q
ij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
Qi(k)
 
P[Wi
(k) ≤ wji] − P[Wi
(k+1) ≤ wji]

.
If we deﬁne Qi(k) so that Qi(0) = 0, we have that
µ
Q
ij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
(Qi(k) − Qi(k − 1))P[Wi
(k) ≤ wji],
and if we deﬁne ∆Qi(k) = Qi(k) − Qi(k − 1), the expression above can be simpliﬁed to yield
µ
Q
ij =
X
ij
max X
k=1
∆Qi(k)I(FW
i
(wji); k,Mi − k). (5.12)
We now prove that allocating service quality as presented above is indeed an incentive mechanism,
if Qi(k) is increasing with the bid rank k, that is, if qi
1 < qi
2 < ... < qi
Mi.
Theorem 5.1. Given Qi(k) = {qi
1,qi
2,...,qi
Mi} with qi
1 < qi
2 < ... < qi
Mi, the expected quality µ
Q
ij is
monotonically increasing with increasing wji.
Proof. First, we see that the I(FW
i
(wji); k,mji − k + 1) are increasing in wji from the deﬁnition of
B(x;a,b), since it is an integral where the integrand is positive over the entire interval of integration
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. This stems from the fact that FWi(ω) : R 7→ [0,1] is non-decreasing and non-negative on
its whole domain (−∞,∞). Of course, by deﬁnition, the ranking that a peer receives is monotonically
increasing with increasing wji. Since Q is increasing, we have that qi
k > qi
k−1 and ∆Qi(k) > 0, and
since µ
Q
ij is a linear combination with positive coefﬁcients of increasing functions of wji, it is itself
increasing with respect to the wji.
5.3 The Bidder Process
We present a heuristic utility-maximising algorithm. Essentially, the idea is to estimate the expected
utility and the number of service units that will be obtained from a given auctioneer as a function of the
planned number of bids submitted to it and their value. This expected utility can be used to select the
auctioneer that provides the largest expected utility for the current bid, and then submit a bid to it. The
detailed speciﬁcation of the peer selection heuristic for the bidder process is shown in Algorithm 2 (for
variable deﬁnitions see Table 5.2).
The algorithm iterates over the service units that each peer requires. Each bidder process will send
a bid for a service unit one or more times, until in expectation it receives each service unit αk times (the
obvious choice would be αk = 1, but αk < 1 could be used if the peer can cope with unavailable service
units). The candidate auctioneers to which a bid might be sent include all those peers which can provide
the service unit in question and to whose auctions the bidder has not submitted a bid yet. For each one
of these candidate peers, the bidder will calculate ∆Uij, the increase in its utility from sending each one
additional bid beyond those that are already scheduled for that peer (the µij(n∗
i) and Uij(vji,mji,N
j
i )
in Algorithm 2 are just (5.6) and (5.8) respectively).
The peer then compares, between all candidate auctioneers, the additional expected utility that it
will experience as a result of an additional bid, and the peer for which this magnitude is maximal is
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Algorithm 2 Expected utility maximisation heuristic for pj
mji = 0∀ni
for all service units sk do
{Initialise bidder process state}
R
j
k = ∅
N
j
k = 0
while N
j
k < αk do
{Obtain candidate auctioneer set}
A
j
k = Pk \ R
j
k
{Maximise the value of the next bid value the candidate auctioneers}
∆Uij = Uij(vji,mji + 1,N
j
i ) − Uij(vji,mji,N
j
i )
∆µij = µij(vji,mji + 1,N
j
i ) − µij(vji,mji,N
j
i )
n∗
i = argmaxni∈A
j
k ∆Uij
∆µ∗
ij = ∆µij(n∗
i)
Send a bid of value vij to peer n∗
{Update bidder process state}
R
j
k(pj) = R
j
k(pj) ∪ n∗
i
N
j
k = N
j
k + ∆µ∗
ij
mji(n∗
i) = mji(n∗
i) + 1;
end while
end for
mji Number of bids for ni that pj has scheduled
R
j
k List of peers to which pj has scheduled a bid for service unit sk
N
j
k Expected number of times that pj will receive service unit sk
αk Threshold value for the expected number of times that service unit sk will be received,
0 < αk ≤ 1.
A
j
k List of peers that can provide service unit sk to pj, and which have not been scheduled
to receive a bid yet
Pk List of all peers that can provide service unit sk
∆Uij(mji) Expected additional utility that pj would obtain by bidding mji + 1 times instead of
just mji times with auctioneer ni
∆µij(mji) Expected number of additional service units that pj would obtain by bidding mji + 1
times instead of just mji times with auctioneer ni
N
j
i Number bids per round that compete in ni with those sent by pj
Table 5.2: Peer selection algorithm notation
In order to execute Algorithm 2, the bidder will require, from the market system, some information
regarding all tentative auctioneers. In particular, pj will require FV
i
(vij), the CDF of valuations at the
auctioneer, Mi, the number of service units being auctioned in the current round, Ni, the total number
of bids that the auctioneer receives per round, and P(sk), the list of all peers that can provide service
unit sk for all units sk that pj requires. The only processing that pj will perform before performing
Algorithm 2 will be to obtain N
j
i by removing from Ni its own bids to ni; the rest of this information
will be used as given (the value vij is privately calculated by pj as detailed in Section 5.3.1). We shall
not address the strategic issues surrounding the truthful revelation of these values.
5.3.1 The Peer Valuating Function
We assume that each peer will have access to a vector ζi of network measurements and peer performance
indicators4, either directly measured or obtained through the market system M. Since we require these
measurements to be as reusable between peers as possible, we impose the requirement that they must be
4Although each peer might choose to keep interaction logs of its transactions with other peers to better estimate their value,
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deﬁned so that they explicitly exclude the effect of the quality allocation procedure detailed in Section
5.2.2.
The bidder has a value function vij = vj(ζij,µ
Q
ij) where the vector ζij captures not only the private
preferences of each peer and the reported quality indicators that each auctioneer might provide, but
also the possible effects that the network will have over the service, independently of the actions of the
auctioneer5.
The µ
Q
ij used as input for the value equation above is the expected quality that the server will assign
to the bidder, and it is calculated using (5.12). This means that the value vij that a peer pj assigns to
a given auctioneer ni is a function not only of the overlay network path properties ζij between them,
but also of the expected quality class to which it would be mapped in ni, which is in itself a function of
its past contributions. This gives us our incentives mechanism property: peers will ﬁnd that auctioneers
providehigherqualityserviceastheircontributionstothemincrease, whencomparedtothecontributions
of the other peers competing with them.
The calculation of vij proceeds as follows. First, pj estimates the expected quality µ
Q
ij that it will
receive from an auctioneer ni. This is achieved by querying the market system M for FW
i
(wji), the
CDF of the currency accounts in ni, and also for its quality mapping function Qi(k). Using these and
its own wji value on (5.12), the prospective bidder can estimate µ
Q
ij, and with that, vij = vj(ζij,µ
Q
ij).
Since pj requires vij for all its prospective auctioneers, this value calculation is performed once for each
one of them. Again, an analysis of the incentives for the truthful revelation of these values will be out of
scope for this thesis.
5.3.2 Alternative Peer Selection Functions
Even though we presented a particular optimisation heuristic for peer selection relying on (5.7), the
framework presented can be trivially adapted to use other functions. Direct examples would include the
minimisationofthestandarddeviationofthenumberofbidswon(5.7)withaminimumutilityconstraint,
or the maximisation of any increasing function of the expected bid set utility (5.8). In both of these cases
(or indeed any other), the idea would be to calculate the added beneﬁt or degradation that a new bid to a
given auctioneer brings to the bidder, and schedule a bid for the auctioneer that optimises, for that bid,
whatever the system designer has chosen the peer selection function to be.
5.4 The Accounting Process
In this case, the accounting process is reduced to PledgeRoute operating as a distributed currency plat-
form (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9). The objective of the accounting process is only to keep track of the
payments given and received, so that µij and µ
Q
ij can be estimated accurately, performing any currency
transfers necessary to pay for services and to ensure adequate service quality from other peers. In this
case, we shall distinguish two kinds of bids: buy requests and withdrawal orders. Bid requests are,
essentially, altruistic requests, and may be immediately discarded if the maximum credit for the peer
is insufﬁcient to cover for them. Withdrawal orders, on the other hand, being reciprocative in nature,
will always be considered for competition in auctions. In this case, though, since we are concerned
not only with incentives but also with overlay optimisation, there is no guarantee that having previous
contributions with the auctioneer is enough to be granted service.
5.5 Example: Chunk Swarming for Real-Time Streaming
As a motivating example, we apply the presented framework to a speciﬁc swarming protocol problem:
chunk swarming for real-time streaming using a mesh/pull protocol (see Section 2.2).
5We shall not make a distinction between these two kinds of information regarding incentives for the time being, though - the
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A peer (the peercaster, pp) takes a streaming source such as video and segments it to produce stream
data units (chunks) at a constant stream rate of R chunks per interval T. Peers query the market system
M to learn which chunks other peers have, and they select a subset of these peers from which to request
chunks.
The two most important performance objectives for a peer-to-peer streaming system of this kind are
lag and continuity:
• Stream lag: The delay between a chunk being generated by the peercaster np and the same chunk
being received by a given downstream consumer peer. Low stream lag means that the stream is
closer to real time, and thus peers capable of delivering lower lag chunks will have higher value.
• Stream continuity: The percentage of stream data units that arrived on time to be useful to a down-
streamconsumerpeer. Highstreamcontinuityenablesminimaldistortioninstreamreconstruction.
In our case, we leave peers free to set their continuity at whatever level they choose.
The basic assumptions for this model are then that service units are identiﬁed with chunks, that
peers know their valuation function vij, and that each peer ni will drive its resource allocation using
the Vickrey auction model presented in the previous sections. Every peer on its bidder role with send
mji bids to each auctioneer whose content it is interested in, where mji will be calculated using a
procedure like that described in Section 5.3: peers will estimate the expected value per bid that each one
the candidate auctioneers can provide, which will take into account the quality that they expect to receive
as a function of their past contributions.
In summary, during each time window of duration T, each chunk auctioneer ni receives Ni bids for
the Mi chunks which it will upload in the next time window. The top Mi bids will be served, and each
bidder pj that wins Xij > 0 bids will be charged an amount equal to the sum of the values of the top Xij
losing bids. Then, each of the winning bids will be assigned a service time inversely proportional to their
account balances wji, so that the bids of peers with higher account values will be serviced ﬁrst. Since
chunk values will be inversely proportional to delay, only peers that contribute their upload capacity to
the overlay will be able to gain access to the lowest lag chunks.
5.5.1 Chunk Swarming: The Peer Valuation Function
The basic engineering objective of the proposed incentive mechanism will be the minimisation of stream
lag. Therefore, we require a formal deﬁnition of stream lag that can be used to construct the valuation
function vij and the rank quality mapping Qi(k).
As discussed throughout Chapter 2, synthetic coordinates provide efﬁcient network locality infor-
mation while reducing complexity at the application layer. In this case, we rely on situating peers in an
abstract delay space, and then relating distance over this space to network layer delays through the use
of a metric d, so that the delay between ni and nj will be denoted as d(ni,nj). Thus, we associate a
coordinate to each peer so that the d-distance between their coordinates will be a good approximation to
the network latency between the peers. From now on we will refer as delay to this synthetic-coordinate
derived distance.
Since we are assuming no synergy effects, all chunks from a given auctioneer should have the
same value, and thus, the same lag. This will not be possible in the strict sense, since we will assume
that chunks are not sent concurrently, but one after another at the upload speed of the auctioneer. To
approximate the no-synergy condition as much as possible, however, auctioneers will upload all chunks
won by a given peer immediately after one another, so that the time difference between the transmission
of each chunk is minimised. The consideration of cases with synergy requires the use of a full-ﬂedged
combinatorial Vickrey auction [91], possibly along with the deﬁnition of a suitable bidding language.
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L(cn,nk) Chunk lag of cn at peer nk
tQ(nj,nk) Time from the start of the service interval T that will elapse before nj
ﬁnishes its chunk transfer to nk
d(nj,nk) Synthetic coordinate delay from nj to nk
Table 5.3: Components of Chunk Lag notation
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Continuous Chunk Lag). We deﬁne the chunk lag for a chunk cn at a given peer nj as
the amount of time that has passed since cn was produced at the peercaster np and the time in which
it is received by nj. This implies that the minimum chunk lag between two peers will be equal to the
delay between them. We calculate the chunk lag Lc at nk of a chunk cn downloaded from nj as the
chunk lag of cn at nj (assumed to be truthfully revealed by the sender - we defer the consideration of
truthful revelation of QoS parameters, such as chunk lag, to our discussion on the principal-agent model
in Chapter 6), plus the time tQ that elapses before nk ﬁnishes sending the chunk, plus the network delay
from nj to nk (see Table 5.3). This model is similar to the one we present in Figure 6.2, and can be
formalised as
Lc(cn,nk) =
(
0 if nk is the peercaster np
L(cn,nj) + tQ(nj,nk) + d(nj,nk) if nk downloads cn from nj.
(5.13)
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Continuous Peer Lag). We deﬁne the peer lag Lp(nj,k) of nj as the average chunk lag
of the last k contiguous chunks that it has received. Of course, Lp(nj,k) ≥ Lc(cn,nk) for all chunks
cn in nj.
Although each peer can potentially have its own valuation for each chunk, it is clear that, in general,
vij will be reduced for large values of Lc(cn,nk), since we assumed that peers attempt to minimise their
stream lag. Thus, the peer valuation function vij(Lp(nj,k)) is a decreasing function of the peer lag Lp.
5.5.2 Chunk Swarming: The Auctioneer Process
Another important decision in terms of mapping the abstract model presented in Section 5.2 to a speciﬁc
example (in addition to the consideration of vij as a decreasing function of Lk) is the determination of
the Mi rank quality classes in such a way that increasing QoS from the point of view of the auctioneer
translates into higher value from the point of view of the bidder. We will deﬁne the resource space Ωi
of the bidder as the time window of duration T during which it can upload chunks. We assume that T is
just enough to upload Mi chunks, so that T can then be partitioned into Mi disjoint upload chunk slots.
Once the set of winning peers has been decided by taking the top Mi received bids, the auctioneer
will decide the assignment of chunk slots (quality classes) to winning bids (chunks) by sorting the list
of winning bids according to the contribution account balances of their corresponding peers, and then
proceeding with chunk uploads by following this list. Thus, account balances decide the order on which
the bidders will be served, which itself deﬁnes the delay tQ(nj,nk) for chunk transmission completion.
Clearly, tQ(nj,nk) will be a monotonically decreasing function of the account balances wji, as the more
unreciprocated contributions a peer has, the sooner its chunks are sent. Clearly, in this case Qi(k) maps
increasing contribution account balance to reduced lag by scheduling bids to chunk slots through the
ranking technique presented in Section 5.2.2.
The previous discussion is predicated on the assumption that an upload slot can only be assigned
to a single peer, which is the case for network layer unicast. The consideration of multicast scenarios is
complicated by the fact that different members of a multicast group could have provided very different
contributions to the overlay, making reciprocation to the entire multicast tree an ill-deﬁned concept. We
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5.5.3 Chunk Swarming: The Quality-Resource Allocation Function
We now estimate the expected number of chunk slots that the bid of a peer pj will have to wait before
ﬁnishing transmission, as a function of its past contributions wji. We see that the chunk will ﬁnish
transmission after 1 slot with probability P[Wi
(Mi−1) < wji], if it is at the top of the contribution account
ranking (above the rest Mi − 1 bids). It will ﬁnish after 2 slots with probability P[Wi
(Mi−2) < wji <
Wi
(Mi−1)] = P[Wi
(Mi−2) < wji] − P[Wi
(Mi−1) < wji], after (Mi − 1) slots with probability P[Wi
(1) <
wji < Wi
(2)] = P[Wi
(1) < wji] − P[Wi
(2) < wji] and after Mi slots with probability P[wji < Wi
(1)] =
1 − P[Wi
(1) < wji]. Then, by following a procedure identical to that one in Section 5.2.1.1, we see that
the expected number of chunk slots Dij that a request will require for service is given by
Dij = Mi −
Mi−1 X
k=1
I(FW
i
(wji);k,Mi − k). (5.14)
Of course, we have that limwji→0 Dij = Mi and limwji→∞ Dij = 1, as expected. Since we have that
tQ(ni,nj) =
T
Mi
Dij,
we focus our analysis on Dij.
Theorem 5.2. The ranked chunk slot function Dij is monotonically decreasing with increasing wji.
Proof. Since FW
i
is a CDF, it is increasing with wji. Furthermore, since a sum of increasing functions
is increasing itself, we only need to prove that I(x;k,M − k − 1) is increasing to prove that Dij is
decreasing. This follows from the deﬁnition of B(x;a,b), since it is an integral where the integrand
is never negative in the domain 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, which is the range of FW
i
. It follows that Dij(wji) is
monotonically decreasing.
5.5.4 Chunk Swarming: The Bidder Process
We now describe the operation of the bidder process, which can be found in greater detail in Algorithm
3. In every bidding round of length T, the peercaster generates a new chunk. Peers will get the bidding
and account cumulative distributions (FV
i
and FW
i
) from their potential auctioneers ni (or the market
system M), as well as their peer lag Lp(ni,k), their upload capacity Mi in chunks per bidding interval
and their total bid load level Ni. By subtracting from Ni the load that they themselves impose on
their prospective auctioneers (the bids that they have sent to them in the recent past), each peer pj can
estimate N
j
i , the number of competing bids they will face in ni. Using wji, fW
i
and Mi, peers estimate
the expected service delay Dij, and use it along with their overlay link delay d(ni,nj) to calculate the
total expected peer lag from pp if they download from each prospective auctioneer ni as
Lp(nj,k) = Lp(ni,k) + tQ(ni,nj) + d(ni,nj).
Then, using their value mapping function, peers can calculate their candidate auctioneer valuations
vij(Lp(nj,k)), which then can be used alongside fV
i
, Mi and N
j
i to calculate their expected increase
both in the number of winning bids ∆µij and their utility ∆Uij. These, in turn, can be used to drive the
peer selection procedure (Algorithm 2) in order to obtain the number mji of bids that each bidder pj will
send to each auctioneer ni.
5.5.5 Chunk Swarming: Simulation Experiments
Sincebothswarmingprotocolsandincentivemechanismsareessentiallyresourceallocationmechanisms
with possibly conﬂicting goals, the design of systems that achieve both can be very challenging. As a5.5. EXAMPLE: CHUNK SWARMING FOR REAL-TIME STREAMING 104
ci Set of all chunks that peer ni can upload, either because it has already downloaded
them, or created them (in the case of the peercaster).
Ct Set of all chunks that are available for download at time t
Ct
−j Set of all chunks that peer nj has yet to download
mji(n∗
i) Number of bids for auctioneer ni that pj has scheduled
R
j
k Set of candidate auctioneers ni to which bidder pj has already scheduled a bid for ck
N
j
k Number of times that bidder pj expects to receive chunk ck
Pk Set of all potential auctioneers ni that have chunk ck
A
j
k Set of candidate auctioneers that have chunk ck, but have not been scheduled by pj
for a bid yet
∆Uij(mji) Expected additional utility that pj would obtain by bidding mji + 1 times instead of
just mji times with auctioneer ni
∆µij(mji) Expected number of additional chunks that pj would obtain by bidding mji +1 times
instead of just mji times with auctioneer ni
Table 5.4: Chunk swarming bidder process notation
Algorithm 3 Bidding behaviour for all peers
Require: vij, fV (ni)
for all t : 1 < t < tmax do
cp = cp ∪ ct {Every round, the peercaster generates a new chunk}
Ct =
S
nj∈G cj
for all nj ∈ G (in random order) do
{Iterate over all peers nj}
Ct
−j = Ct \ cj {nj extracts the set of chunks that it has not yet downloaded}
mji = 0 ∀ni ∈ G {Initialise mji}
for all ck ∈ Ct
−j do
{Iterate over the interesting chunks for nj}
R
j
k = ∅ {nj initialises R
j
k}
N
j
k = 0 {nj initialises N
j
k}
P
j
k = set of all potential auctioneers ni ∈ G that have chunk ck
while N(ck) < 1 do
{Iterate until, in expectation, ck is received once}
A
j
k = Pk \ R
j
k {Set of peers that have ck, but are not scheduled for a bid yet}
for all ni ∈ A
j
k do
{Iterate over candidate auctioneers}
Calculate ∆µij(mji) using current mji
Calculate ∆Uij(mji) using current mji
end for
{Select auctioneer n∗
i for which ∆Uji(mji) is maximal}
n∗
i = argmaxni∈A
j
k ∆Uij(mji,ni)
∆µ∗
ij = ∆µij(mji,n∗
i)
Send a bid of value vij to peer n∗
i
R
j
k = R
j
k ∪ n∗
i {Add n∗
i to the list of peers with scheduled bids for ck}
N
j
k = N
j
k + ∆µ∗
ij {Add ∆µ∗
ij to the expected number of times that ni will receive ck}
mji(n∗
i) = mji(n∗
i) + 1 {Increment the total number of scheduled bids for peer n∗
i}
end while
end for
end for
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consequence, the clean delineation of which protocol elements have swarm construction or incentives
mechanism goals is of interest.
In the case of the chunk swarming scheme just presented, chunk auctions are the main tool to
balance stream lag optimisation with peer capacity constraints, and rank quality mapping is the main
incentive mechanism tool. The value function vij brings these two elements together, in such a way
that different peers can have different tradeoffs between swarm overlay optimisation and the quality
differentiation provided by the incentives mechanism.
In this case, however, the swarm optimisation element is much more complex than the incentive
mechanism. This was done as an explicit design choice, so that the characterisation of the incentive
mechanism could be essentially completed in Section 5.2.2. The swarm building characteristics of the
system, however, have not been addressed and their complexity precludes a casual mathematical formal-
ism. We now turn to a simulation-based analysis of the swarming subsystem.
5.5.5.1 Peer Distribution in Delay Space
Although synthetic coordinates can be used for arbitrary metric spaces, in this case and for ease of
presentation, a ﬁnite, two-dimensional Euclidean plane is used; we call it the delay plane. This means
that peers are created with a position in delay space that is a vector (x,y) ∈ R such that 0 < x < 100
and 0 < y < 100, and the delay between peers is the Euclidean distance between their coordinates. The
distribution of the peers in delay space is varied to achieve different levels of clustering.
We present three different peer placement conﬁgurations in delay space. The ﬁrst one is a simple
uniform distribution, where the coordinates of each peer are randomly drawn from a two dimensional
uniform distribution. Two cases of interest are explored in this case: a peercaster artiﬁcially placed at
the mean of the distribution (at the middle of the delay plane), and a peercaster asymmetrically placed to
one of the sides of the delay space. The second synthetic delay conﬁguration is a clustered distribution
based on the superposition of uniform distributions. Essentially, ﬁve different two dimensional uniform
distributions are created: four of them lie predominantly in one of the quadrants of the delay plane, and
the ﬁfth one spans the entire delay plane. Each of these ﬁve densities is used one ﬁfth of the time when
generating a new peer. The ﬁnal delay conﬁguration is obtained by embedding a small subset of the
King dataset to the Euclidean plane. This is done using a simple quadratic error minimisation algorithm
roughly based on Vivaldi [90, 94]. The embedding to a two dimensional Euclidean surface is, of course,
of limited accuracy, but this does not affect the speciﬁcs of the algorithm to be tested.
5.5.5.2 System Performance Measures
In order to assess the performance of our example protocol in the different delay distribution scenarios
presented in Section 5.5.5.1, we shall make use of the following measures.
• TheDiscretePeer Lagcorrespondsto thenumberof chunksbetween thelatestchunk producedby
the peercaster and the latest chunk that a peer has for which the previous 10 chunks were received
successfully. Thus, it is a measure of how long does it take for a peer to acquire enough chunks so
that the stream can be considered stable, and measures the distribution efﬁciency of the overlay. It
is deﬁned as
Lp(ni) = cp − ck,
where cp is the index of the latest chunk produced by the peercaster, and ck is the index of the
latest chunk on ni such that {ck−10,ck−9,...,ck} have all been correctly received by ni. We call
this set of 10 chunks used for the determination of the peer discrete lag the lag interval of the peer.
• The Stream Lag corresponds to the minimum delay required for a chunk to get to the receiving
peer through the overlay, disregarding processing time at each peer. It is deﬁned as the sum of5.5. EXAMPLE: CHUNK SWARMING FOR REAL-TIME STREAMING 106
the delays of the overlay links required to deliver the chunk to ni through the overlay. We can
formalise this if we deﬁne Ppi as the overlay route taken by the chunk from the peercaster to the
receiving peer ni. Then, we have that
Ls(ni) =
X
(nj,nk)∈Ppi
d(nj,nk).
• The Stream Lag Stretch corresponds to the ratio between the time required to send a chunk
through the overlay, disregarding processing time at each peer, and the time it would take for the
chunk to arrive to the receiving peer directly from the peercaster (a straight line in delay space).
Therefore, it is a purely topological measure of the efﬁciency of the distribution paths taken by the
chunks. It is deﬁned as the sum of the delays of the overlay links required to deliver the chunk to
ni through the overlay and the delay of the direct overlay link (np,ni) from the peercaster to the
target peer. Formally, we have that
C(ni) =
1
d(np,ni)
X
(nj,nk)∈Ppi
d(nj,nk) =
Ls(ni)
d(np,ni)
.
• The Leading Edge Continuity is the ratio of the number of chunks that the peer has successfully
received from the start of its lag interval to its newest chunk, and the total number of chunks in
this interval, including those that the peer has not received yet. It is a measure of variability in
the acquisition of chunks, and may be used to detect mismatches between the stream rate and the
effective rate at which the overlay can deliver the stream.
• The Peer Currency Balance is simply the difference between the total peer income and its total
cost, as a result from buying and selling chunks in auctions. It is a measure of the role of a peer as
either consumer of resources or provider of resources.
• The Normalised Lost Bid Rate: This is the ratio between the total number of losing bids (those
that did not win a chunk) and the total number of peers in the system. It is a measure of how busy
a peer is.
• The Protocol Performance Measure is a synthetic measure of how well the protocol behaved in
a given delay distribution. It is calculated as
m(ni) =
Lp(ni)C(ni)
NT
, (5.15)
where Lp(ni) and C(ni) are the peer lag and the leading edge continuity as deﬁned above, and
NT corresponds to the number of chunks that the peercaster has generated. Since 0 < C(ni) < 1
and 0 < Lc(ni) < NT, we have that 0 < m(ni) < 1.
5.5.5.3 Protocol Behaviour in Different Peer Delay Distributions
At the start of the simulation run, the system generates a peer delay distribution as reported in Section
5.5.5.1 and distinguishes one peer as the peercaster. This peer is removed from its position in delay space
and placed either at the centre of the delay plane, or at one side. This simple change has a profound
impact on protocol performance, as shown by the representative delay conﬁgurations (and their induced
trafﬁc distribution dynamics) found on Figure 5.5.5.3.
The system deﬁnes a stream rate of 1 chunk per round, and a limit of 5 bids per peer for any single
chunk. The value distribution fV
i
is implemented with histograms with 30 bins over the domain of5.5. EXAMPLE: CHUNK SWARMING FOR REAL-TIME STREAMING 107
possible values. Upload capacity is expressed in chunks per round, and it is generated using a uniform
distribution over the integers n ∈ [3,9] with a mean of 6 chunks per round (we consider such over-
provisioned peers because, as shown below, the algorithm that we discuss generates very unequally
distributed loads among overlay peers, with a small number of peers carrying most of the load).
Simulation then proceeds by episodes called rounds. Each simulation round commences with each
peer calculating its stream lag, chunk lag and border continuity, since they will be needed for the evalu-
ation of the valuation function vij. In this case, the valuation function is a linear, decreasing function of
the lag such as
vij = Ξ − Ls(ni) − d(ni,nj),
for an arbitrary Ξ ∈ R≥0 large enough to avoid having negative values in the simulation. After the
basic performance indicators detailed in the previous section are calculated, the peercaster generates a
new chunk and makes it available for download. Then, every peer performs peer selection according to
Algorithm 3 (see Section 5.5.4), with each peer maintaining a list of its received bids. After bidding has
ﬁnished, each peer sorts its list of received bids according to bid value, rejecting all but the top Mi bids
where Mi is its upload capacity in chunks per round. After the winning bids are selected, any relevant
measurement variables are updated, along with the chunk availability and delay maps of each peer.
The results of running the aforementioned simulation in the six delay scenarios of Section 5.5.5.1
yield the graphs presented in Figure 5.11. In Figure 5.11(a), we see that lag stretch was the smallest
for the centred case of the King and clustered scenarios, and signiﬁcantly longer for the rest. Overall,
however, lag stretch was low: fewer than 20% of the peers have overlay delays more than 30% longer
than a direct download from the peercaster, even in the worst case (the off-centre King delay distribution
scenario). It is interesting to note that the protocol has a much higher propensity for the selection of
longer delay paths in the off-centre King scenario when compared with the others, and this is because
of the aggressive local value maximisation behaviour for each peer, which in this delay scenario yields
curved end to end paths, rather than “straight” ones (see Figure 5.10(f)).
With respect to chunk lag (see Figure 5.11(b)), the protocol under-performs for the off-centre sce-
narios due to the large number of hops that the emergent distribution topologies have in those cases -
again the off-centre King scenario is the worst performing, for the same reason as before. The chunk
lag performance of the protocol was very similar for both the centred King and centred clustered delay
distributions, and slightly worse for the centred uniform scenario. An interesting detail in Figure 5.11(b)
is that the chunk lag curve for the off-centre uniform scenario has a large discontinuity at a chunk lag of
11 chunks, suggesting that a large proportion of the peers had this exact chunk lag. This can easily be
explained using the availability/stream delay chunk map for this scenario.
The availability/stream delay chunk maps for both scenarios using a uniform peer distribution are
shown in Figure 5.9. Each one of these maps has, over the horizontal axis, the indexes corresponding
to all the rounds in a simulation up to a given time - in particular, the two chunk maps shown cover
the ﬁrst 100 rounds of their respective simulation. Over the vertical axis, each map has the indexes
corresponding to all the peers participating in a given simulation. The colour that each coordinate has
corresponds to the stream lag for that chunk, when the peer received it (the colourbar beside each plot
shows the relation of lag with graph colour). We see that the protocol exhibits, in both scenarios, rounds
where there was increased loss and delay (these are easily visible as vertical lines in the maps). These
episodes, whichoccurwithgreaterfrequencyintheuniformoff-centrescenario, mightbeassociatedwith
cascading failure scenarios where a peer fails to secure a given chunk because its “usual” provider has
consumed its upload bandwidth without uploading the chunk, which means that the entire distribution
overlay depending on it will have to get the chunk from higher delay sources.5.5. EXAMPLE: CHUNK SWARMING FOR REAL-TIME STREAMING 108
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(b) Uniform off-centre delay distribution
Figure 5.9: Availability and stream lag chunk maps
Figure 5.11(c) shows the leading edge continuity results for our six delay distribution scenarios.
Again, the protocol under-performs for off-centred scenarios, which suggests that chunk diffusion is
much more predictable on the cases where the peercaster is placed in the centre. An interesting detail
we can see in the leading edge continuity curve for the clustered scenario with a centred peercaster is
the presence of a distinct set of peers that have lower continuity, in the range [0.84,0.93]. These might
correspond to peers that rely on a larger set of uploaders, rather than a few high capacity ones, and
consequently incur in higher variability.
With regard to peer currency balance (see Figure 5.11(d)), all topologies have approximately the
same proportion of peers with positive balances and negative balances. From Figure 5.5.5.3, it is clear
that not all peers are actively uploading chunks all the time - a distinction emerges by the execution of
the algorithm between peers that become part of the “stream distribution infrastructure” and have higher
upload utilisation, and purely consumer peers at the edges, that become incapable of further selling the
chunks they buy and quickly enter into negative balances. Wealth distribution tends to be more unequal
in the scenarios with centred peercasters than in the other ones, which is consistent with the previously
discussed idea that the protocol is much better suited to diffuse chunks effectively in the scenarios with
centred peercasters than in the others.
Our analysis of the number of bids that each peer rejects per round conﬁrms the emergence of a
small subset of peers that take most of the responsibility for chunk dissemination, and a much larger
subset of peers that become passive consumers. The ﬁrst important detail to observe in Figure 5.11(e)
is that the CDF values at a lost bid rate of zero (for all delay distribution scenarios) were very similar,
in the range [.81,.93]. This means that, in all cases, the proportion of peers that rejected bids was lower
than 20%. Within the peers that did reject bids, however, the rates of bid rejection are extremely high,
with all delay conﬁgurations having a small set of peers that rejected slightly more than one bid per node
in the overlay per round. This is unsurprising, since all peers submit bids for all the chunks that they are
missing, which means that the peercaster receives at least as many bids every round for its newly created
chunk as there are peers in the overlay. This same phenomenon, to a lesser extent, happens for all peers
in the distribution overlay.
The last metric we present is the synthetic performance metric (5.15). Since (5.15) will yield values
close to 1 for those peers who are closest to the peercaster in lag, while having low variability on their
chunk downloads, Figure 5.11(f) suggests, in agreement with our other measures, that the protocol was5.6. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 109
much more successful in the three scenarios with a centred peercaster.
An overall conclusion from all the simulation runs performed is that the proposed protocol behaves
much better in the scenarios where the peercaster is placed in the centre of the space, rather than those
where it is placed on an edge. This could be construed as unsurprising, since so doing increases the the
average delay from all peers to the peercaster, which might suggest a comparable decrease in overlay
performance. However, even lag stretch, designed to take this into account by normalisation, shows
quality degradation for off-centre scenarios.
On the other hand, stream lag stretch is consistently good, indicating efﬁcient distribution topolo-
gies. Overall, we believe that the simple example protocol presented demonstrates the power of the
general model of Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
5.6 Discussion of Potential Improvements
In this chapter we presented a swarming algorithm based in multi-item Vickrey auctions that balances
the efﬁcient construction of the QoS overlay with the requirements of an incentive mechanism.
With regard to possible improvements to model presented in this chapter, the ﬁrst assumption that
could be relaxed is that the peers themselves have a valuation function at all. One possible solution to
this would be the peers constructing a valuation function by learning. Another option would be to change
from a Vickrey auction model to a different one, where peers are unable to directly observe their own
type, and must rely instead on (possibly noisy) signalling to infer it.
Finally, another possible improvement would be the substitution of the greedy utilisation-
maximising peer selection algorithm of Section 5.3 with one that attempted a more complete opti-
misation procedure. Rather than making the locally optimal choice, some utility function could be
optimised over the whole set of combinations of bid requests.5.6. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 110
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Figure 5.10: Peer delay space distributions and their resultant trafﬁc patterns. In subﬁgures 5.10(a) and
5.10(b) peers are placed uniformly at random in delay space, in 5.10(c) and 5.10(d) they are placed so
that four clear clusters can be found over the simulated delay space, and in 5.10(e) and 5.10(f) a subset
of the King delay data set was extracted and embedded in a two dimensional coordinate system using
the Euclidean metric and a square-error minimisation technique based on [90, 94]. The width and colour
of links is indicative of the number of chunks exchanged between the peers at their endpoints after 100
simulation rounds. The size of the peer is indicative of upload bandwidth, and its colour of its upload
bandwidth utilisation.5.6. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 111
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Figure 5.11: Simulation variables for selected delay conﬁgurations.6
Hidden Action in Live Peer-to-Peer Streaming
Peer-to-peer networks providing QoS-enabled services are sensitive to hidden action situations, where
the actions of a server peer are hidden from the peers who receive services from it. Thus, servers peers
impose an externality on the clients: servers can choose to minimise their effort strategically, and client
peers may be unable to distinguish between cases in which the server exerted insufﬁcient effort and cases
in which the server kept its advertised effort levels but the end-to-end conditions in the network were
sufﬁciently adverse.
In this chapter, we propose a principal-agent model for hidden action that gives server peers suf-
ﬁcient incentives to meet their advertised effort levels, without client peers having to decide for each
transaction whether the outcome was due to server behaviour or network conditions1. Essentially, our
proposed algorithm forces server peers to accept part of the externality that would have been exclusively
endured by the client peers. We achieve this by allowing client peers to draft optimal contracts that pro-
vide incentives for truthful revelation of QoS capabilities, and to have predictable transaction quality. We
then exemplify the model for the case of a mesh-based, pull-oriented streaming system with low delay
requirements. For this example, we treat each transfer of a delay-sensitive chunk as a moral hazard situ-
ation in which server peers can force negative externalities upon client peers. We show how to estimate
the model parameters as a function of the prevailing network conditions, and how to enforce contract
fulﬁlment through a reciprocative strategy on a repeated game. Finally, we show that a probabilistic
interaction tracker can deﬁne the resulting Nash equilibrium to be a cooperative one by specifying the
minimum discount parameter.
6.1 Exploiting Information Asymmetry
The design of QoS overlays over best-effort networks is still an open research problem [292, 308, 204].
A particular aspect of this is the problem of QoS as an observable indicator of peer behaviour: although
the peer-experienced QoS will depend on the underlay network conditions, it will be also affected by
the behaviour of the serving overlay peers. This creates a situation with information asymmetry: there is
1In this chapter we assume that peers have reliable identities, and therefore we do not address sybil or whitewashing attacks
[105, 117].
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information known to a peer (the true effort that a peer made in responding to requests), which is hidden
to others (peers who receive services whose quality which might have been affected by the underlying
network).
We propose an incentive mechanism that provides an incentive for server peers to deliver their
advertised levels of effort, even if client peers are unable to determine unequivocally if the unsatisfactory
outcome of a transaction is due to insufﬁcient server effort or to network variability. We will focus on
peer-to-peer overlays with strategic, selﬁsh peers.
Although there is a large amount of work on the economic and game theoretical modelling of
peer-to-peer systems (in particular as it relates to the freeloader problem [27, 116, 276, 114, 111]), it is
frequently assumed that peers can determine the level of server effort by observing their own experienced
QoS. Based on this, peers choose the service quality that they provide to other peers as a function of the
service quality these other peers have, in turn, provided to the system.
Unfortunately, clients are very often unable to observe the actual server effort, since it is obscured
by shifting network and peer conditions that affect transfer operations. The design for QoS contracts
between peers connected through a best-effort network has been less widely studied.
The main difﬁculty in the analysis of peer-to-peer QoS contract design is that the effect of the
behaviour of the server is externalised to the client. This means that if a server peer fails to deliver a
high-enough contribution effort, and this leads to low QoS for the client, the server does not naturally
bear the negative consequences of this action. Instead, these consequences are externalised to the peer
who requested the service.
Firm
Manager
Owner
Server
Client
Principal
Agent
Figure 6.1: Applying the principal-agent model of economic theory to peer-to-peer overlays
Since the client is unable to measure directly the actions of the server, the fact that the server might
have not delivered its advertised service quality can be only indirectly inferred. In this chapter, we
propose a principal-agent model for hidden action that gives server peers sufﬁcient incentives to meet
their advertised effort levels, without them having to decide for each transaction whether the observable
outcome (the actual QoS linked to the transaction) was due to server behaviour or network conditions.
This is accomplished by allowing peers to draft contracts that provide incentives for truthful revelation
of system contribution capabilities. This, in turn, helps strategic peers to obtain more predictable service
levels.
We will apply the model presented in Section 3.4.1 to a client-server scenario with information
asymmetry. We identify the server as the agent, the stakeholder whose task is to provide a service, but
that can impose an externality on the other party through its behaviour. Consequently, we identify the
client with the principal, which delegates the performance of a service to the agent. On this basis, we6.2. APPLYING HIDDEN ACTION MODELS TO QOS OVERLAYS 114
propose an algorithm for the calculation of the probabilistically optimal payments on a QoS-dependent
contract offering greater payment if the transaction is concluded with high QoS, and a lower payment
otherwise. Although we propose a general expression for the calculation of these payments, every par-
ticular application will require its own probabilistic model of the relationship between the effort that the
server puts into a transaction, the prevailing network conditions and the QoS experienced by the client.
We present such a model for an speciﬁc example: a mesh-based, pull-oriented streaming system with
low delay requirements.
6.2 Applying Hidden Action Models to QoS Overlays
Although the model brieﬂy outlined in Section 6.1 is more general, in this thesis we focus on the mod-
elling of quality-aware peer-to-peer overlays and hence restrict our attention to these.
In the case of peer-to-peer QoS overlays, the client plays the part of the principal and the server
plays the part of the agent: the client trusts the server to provide its advertised effort, but the experienced
QoS of the interaction will also depend on the variability of the network on which the service takes
place. Thus, the server will have some degree of plausible deniability if its service is unsatisfactory, as
degradation might be indicative of ﬂuctuating network conditions and not lack of effort on its side.
In order to use the principal-agent model, we must assume the existence of a market and currency
system M. The role of M includes informing all peers of the effort guarantees advertised by other
peers, communicating pricing and resource availability information, securely maintaining the amount of
currency that peers possess, and executing currency transfers between peers. Functionally, M is the open
market on which peers advertise their resources and formalise transactions. We assume that services are
found, purchased and paid for using currency and procedures deﬁned in M.
There is a vast body of research regarding the distributed implementation of M using either struc-
tured or unstructured overlays [307, 309, 78, 302, 121, 313, 295, 328, 32], and our technique can be
easily adapted to be used on any one of these systems. Instead of proposing our own implementation of
M, we propose an open model applicable to a wide range of possible M implementations. Of course,
PledgeRoute (see Chapter 4) could be used as the payment mechanism for monetary transactions within
M.
Through M, clients search for prospective servers according to the QoS characteristics that the
servers themselves advertise. This takes the form of either a distributed hash table (DHT) query, or
directed broadcast on an unstructured overlay. Of course, servers will only truthfully reveal their QoS
capabilities if the beneﬁt they can obtain if they do so is greater that the beneﬁt they can obtain if they
lie. We will explore this issue in Section 6.3.
A peer ni with a server role will only provide a service to a client nj if the utility that a transaction
with nj offers is at least as large as the average utility that ni could obtain from a transaction with
any other peer nk. Then, if we deﬁne Ur as the average utility that a peer can expect as a result of a
transaction, we have that the minimum utility that ni will accept from an interaction with nj is Ur (we
call this the rationality condition).We assume that peers can query M to learn Ur, and that Ur is updated
by M with every successful transaction.
Once ni has accepted a request from nj, it has to determine the treatment it will give to it: ni might
give different priority to different requests, or it might have other local processes competing for scarce
CPU or upload bandwidth resources. Thus, ni can respond to the request from nj with various levels of
effort φ ∈ R≥0. The service quality q ∈ R≥0 that nj experiences as an outcome of the transaction will
be contingent on φ: higher values of q are positively correlated with higher values of φ.2
2We are deliberately vague in the deﬁnition of φ and q, as they are application-dependent. For some overlays φ and q might
be deﬁned in terms of delay, while for others they might be better deﬁned in terms of jitter and average throughput. We provide a
speciﬁc mapping of φ and q to time-sensitive chunk transfer in Section 6.3.6.2. APPLYING HIDDEN ACTION MODELS TO QOS OVERLAYS 115
φ Level of effort by the server
Us Utility function for the server
Uc Utility function for the client
q QoS enjoyed by the client
ψ Payment given by the client to the server
p Probability of the client getting high quality service as a
function of the effort by the server.
Ur Rationality utility for the server
Table 6.1: Principal-Agent model notation
However, we assume that the client is unable to observe φ - this is private information of the server.
Additionally, we assume that there is uncertainty in QoS outcomes: due to varying delay and throughput
conditions in the network, it is impossible for nj to infer φ directly from the observed transaction QoS
q. Therefore, an unobservable decision by ni (its choice of φ) has an effect on the utility experienced
by nj, and we have a situation where the principal-agent model applies [228]. The client is unable to
infer unambiguously the behaviour of the server from the observation of the transaction outcome, and is
vulnerable to exploitation by it. This implies that the server needs to be given an incentive (in the form
of an outcome-dependent payment ψ ∈ R≥0 measured in the currency units of M) to give its best effort
by assimilating some of the risk associated with the network conditions that might affect the transaction
outcome. These variables are summarised in Table 6.1.
6.2.1 Mapping the Principal-Agent Model to QoS Overlays
The objective of the model is to obtain the payments that the client needs to offer the server as a function
of the quality of service it receives, in order to ensure that the server puts maximal effort into maintaining
its advertised effort levels. The client therefore calculates payments as a function of the server-advertised
effort (and the estimated condition of the overlay network link between them) and creates a contract for
the server. The server can either accept the contract as it stands, or reject it immediately.
If the server is able to maintain the effort commitments that it advertised in M, it is considered to
have devoted high effort to the transaction, and φ = φ+. On the other hand, if the server is unable to
maintain its advertised effort, it is considered to have devoted low effort, and φ = φ−. Of course, low
levels of effort increase the chance of the outcome having low QoS, and we seek to create an incentive
mechanism against them3.
A transaction is deﬁned to have failed if the quality that the client experiences is lower than the
minimum quality that the client is willing to tolerate, as set in the initial client-server contract. Thus, for
any successful transaction, the outcome for the client can be either high QoS (and q = q+) or low QoS
(with q = q−). We address transaction failure in Section 6.4.
We continue the derivation of the optimal contract payments by deﬁning the utility function for the
client (the principal) as
Uc(q,ψ) = qβ − ψ , where β ∈ (0,1),
and a corresponding utility function for the server (the agent)4 as
Us(ψ,φ) = ψα − φ , where α ∈ (0,1).
Theorem 6.1. The solution for the principal-agent optimisation problem (3.3) with Uc(q,ψ) = qβ − ψ
3The mapping between φ+, φ−, q+ and q− and observable parameters for an example peer-to-peer streaming application is
analysed in Section 6.3.
4α and β are external parameters that can be used to ﬁt these functions to experimental measurements. For the rest of this
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and Us(ψ,φ) = ψα − φ is given by
ψ− =

Ur +
p+φ− − p−φ+
p+ − p−
 1
α
(6.1)
ψ+ =

Ur +
(1 − p−)φ+ − (1 − p+)φ−
p+ − p−
 1
α
. (6.2)
Proof. In this case, the optimisation problem (3.3) can be stated as
Maximise: p+(q
β
+ − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(q
β
− − ψ−) (6.3)
Subject to: p+ψα
+ + (1 − p+)ψα
− − φ+ ≥ Ur
And: p+ψα
+ + (1 − p+)ψα
− − φ+ ≥ p−ψα
+ + (1 − p−)ψα
− − φ−.
Following (3.4), we construct the Lagrangian, which in this case is
LH(ψ+,ψ−) = p+(q
β
+ − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(q
β
− − ψ−)
+ λ(p+ψα
+ + (1 − p+)ψα
− − φ+ − Ur)
+ µ((p+ − p−)(ψα
+ − ψα
−) − φ+ + φ−),
and obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions
αψ
(α−1)
+ (p+λ + µ(p+ − p−)) = p+
αψ
(α−1)
− ((1 − p+)λ + µ(p+ − p−)) = (1 − p+)
p+ψα
+ + (1 − p+)ψα
− = Ur + φ+ (6.4)
(p+ − p−)(ψα
+ − ψα
−) = φ+ − φ−. (6.5)
By obtaining ψα
+ from (6.4) and substituting on (6.5), we ﬁnd that
Ur + φ+ − ψα
− =
p+(φ+ − φ−)
p+ − p−
,
which implies that
ψ− =

Ur +
p+φ− − p−φ+
p+ − p−
 1
α
. (6.6)
Finally, by substituting (6.6) on (6.5) we ﬁnd that
ψ+ =

Ur +
(1 − p−)φ+ − (1 − p+)φ−
p+ − p−
 1
α
.
6.3 Delay-sensitive Chunk Transfer in Streaming Systems
In this section, we focus on modelling hidden action in a mesh-based, pull-oriented peer-to-peer media
streaming system. In mesh-based systems, the media stream is divided into constant-sized chunks at its
source, and each one of these is transported through the overlay in a more or less independent fashion. In
pull-oriented systems, every chunk is negotiated in individual interactions where a request for a speciﬁc6.3. DELAY-SENSITIVE CHUNK TRANSFER IN STREAMING SYSTEMS 117
chunk is issued. We call each of these interactions a transaction. A transaction consists of a peer (the
client) issuing a request to another peer (the server) for a chunk, and the server responding with either the
chunk in question or a message refusing the request. Of course, we require no asymmetrical restriction
in roles: peers can be simultaneously clients and servers to other peers. Additionally, peers freely select
to which peers to upload and from which peers to download, and each chunk is individually requested
through a logically separate operation. Examples of these include DONet [327], PULSE [253] or Bullet
[194].
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that signalling and stream trafﬁc is exchanged using
TCP over already open connections5.
We assume that the servers advertise, using M, the effort levels that they are willing to commit to.
Finally, weassumethatpeersneedtoschedulechunkdownloadsfromotherpeersinapredictablemanner
in order to be able to maximise their QoS. Therefore, each client peer is assumed to solve an optimisation
problem to decide which servers to ask for which chunks as a function of the effort parameters that they
advertise, and its local codec play-out requirements. Our problem is then to design an incentives system
that ensures that the server peers respond according to their advertised effort levels.
We model a transaction as shown in Figure 6.2 (the variables therein are explained in Table 6.2).
The total delay that a client experiences on a transaction is:
D = tRTT +
Sr
Tc
+ tP +
NsSc
Ts
(6.7)
}
}
}
tP
NsSc
Ts
Sr/Tc
client server
}
D
Figure 6.2: Components of the total transaction delay
Clearly, the variables in Table 6.2 fall into two kinds: those under the control of the server (tP and
Ns) and those that are a property of the protocol speciﬁcation or the TCP connection between the client
and the server (tRTT, Sr, Tc and Ts). Thus, it is tP and Ns that constitute the “advertised effort levels”
that are disseminated through M.
We model the effort put by the server on a given transaction by deﬁning two deadlines: the ﬁrst
one, t+, denotes the maximum transaction resolution time if the server actually delivers its advertised
effort. The second deadline, t−, is the absolute maximum delay that the client is willing to tolerate for
the transaction. If a transaction was not rejected by the server immediately after its request, the elapsing
5We choose TCP only for analytical convenience. Extending the model to use other transport protocols, such as RTP [279]
or TFRC [157], would require more explicit consideration of the channel loss probability, but is otherwise a simple matter. The
performance of TCP for media streaming, however, has been analytically studied and found to be good if the achievable throughput
is roughly twice the media bit-rate [310].6.3. DELAY-SENSITIVE CHUNK TRANSFER IN STREAMING SYSTEMS 118
D Chunk delivery delay
tRTT Layer 3 RTT
Sr Request message size
Tc Client to server throughput
Sc Chunk Size
Ts Server to client throughput
tP Request processing time at the server
Ns Number of peers amongst which the server
upload is shared
Table 6.2: Transaction delay components notation
Sp Packet size at layer 3
pL Packet loss probability at layer 3
tRTO Retransmission timeout
Table 6.3: TCP Channel model notation
of t− without the client having fully received the requested chunk will be interpreted by the client as
deviation from a socially enforced rule, triggering penalties for the server (as detailed in Section 6.4).
To complete our characterisation of the behaviour of the client, we also deﬁne a time tc during
which the server has the opportunity to reject the transaction. If the client does not receive a rejection
message before tc elapses, it will silently assume that the server has accepted the request and it will
deliver a chunk with the effort level that it advertised through M.
Thus, we have deﬁned a two-tier differentiated service scheme: if the observed delay D of the trans-
action is lower than or equal to t+ (that has been calculated to be consistent with the server-advertised
parameters), the outcome quality q = q+ is considered to belong to the high QoS tier and ψ = ψ+. On
the other hand, if t+ < D < t−, the outcome quality q = q− is considered to belong to the low QoS tier
and ψ = ψ−. Finally, if D > t− the transaction is considered to have failed, and the server is penalised.
In order to apply the model in Section 6.2.1 (and in so doing obtain the optimum contract prices ψ−
and ψ+), peers need to estimate p+, p−, φ+ and φ− as a function of the prevailing network conditions
and the desired deadline for the transaction, t+.6
To accomplish this, we require a model linking the transaction-level delay (the process that deﬁnes
the QoS received by clients) with the packet-level delay (the varying network conditions). Thus, we
seek to express the distribution the transaction delay in terms of the relevant parameters of the round trip
packet delay and the model (6.7) (Figure 6.2). To do this, we note that the RTT delays can be modelled
using a shifted gamma distribution [234, 54], so that the two shape parameters of the gamma distribution
(θ and k), along with a shift parameter ∆ can be ﬁt from data on the prevailing characteristics of the RTT
delay on the link. This means that we can express the RTT delay probability density function as
r(x) =
1
θkΓ(k)
(x − ∆)k−1 exp

−
x − ∆
θ

, (6.8)
where Γ(k) is the Gamma function,
Γ(k) =
Z ∞
0
tk−1e−tdt,
and the shift parameter ∆, the scale parameter θ and the shape parameter k can then be obtained from
RTT measurements using maximum likelihood estimation [74].
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We require a model linking the strategic behaviour of the server and the expected behaviour of the
network. If we assume that tRTT is constant for the entirety of the transaction, that there are identical
TCP stack conﬁgurations in the client and the server, and that TCP sharing is approximately fair amongst
ﬂows in the server, we can use the TCP model from [246] to obtain an expression for the transport layer
throughput. If we use the nomenclature in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, we have that
Tc = Ts =
Sp
tRTT
q
2pL
3 + tRTO(3
q
3pL
8 )pL(1 + 32p2
L)
. (6.9)
Substituting (6.9) in (6.7) we have that
D = ξ1tRTT + tP + ξ2, (6.10)
where
ξ1 = 1 +
r
2pL
3
Sr + Sc
Sp
and (6.11)
ξ2 = tRTO(3
r
3pL
8
)pL(1 + 32p2
L)
Sr + NsSc
Sp
. (6.12)
By considering the relationship between the probability density (PDF) and the cumulative distribution
(CDF) [268] of a random variable X with density r(x), we see that the the PDF of the random variable
T obtained from X through a mapping h so that T = h(X) is given by
d(t) = r(h−1(t))

 

∂(h−1(t))
∂t

 
. (6.13)
Thus, if we consider the network RTT as a random variable X with a density given by (6.8), then the
random variable T representing the total transaction delay is T = h(X), with h being given by (6.10).
Therefore, we have that
h−1(t) =
t − tP − ξ2
ξ1
(6.14)
and thus, directly composing (6.14) with (6.8) and applying (6.13), we obtain
d(t) =
1
θkΓ(k)

t − tP − ξ2
ξ1
− ∆
k−1
exp
 
−
t−tP−ξ2
ξ1 − ∆
θ
!
1
ξ1
,
which can be directly simpliﬁed to
d(t) =
1
(ξ1θ)kΓ(k)
(t − tP − ξ2 − ξ1∆)k−1 exp

−
t − tP − ξ2 − ξ1∆
ξ1θ

. (6.15)
For the cumulative distribution, D(t) = P[T ≤ t] =
R t
0 g(y)dy, and we have that
P[y < t] =
1
Γ(k)
γ

k,
t − tP − ξ2 − ξ1∆
θξ1

,
where γ(k,x) is the lower incomplete gamma function:
γ(k,x) =
Z x
0
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In summary, by transforming the RTT density r(x) in (6.8) according to (6.7) and introducing a
simple model for TCP throughput as parametrised by RTT [246] as shown in (6.9), we ﬁnd that the
transaction-level delay probability density d(t) is (6.15) where ξ1 and ξ2 are given by (6.11) and (6.12)
respectively (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for nomenclature). We see from (6.15) that the transaction level
delay probability density d(t) is also a gamma distribution with the same shape parameter k, but shifted
to the right by tP + ξ2 + ξ1∆ (compared to the shift parameter ∆ for the RTT distribution r(x)), and
with scale parameter θξ1 (compared to just θ for r(x)). Thus, it is to be expected that the transaction-
level delay will have increased mean and variance, when compared to the simple RTT delay. This last
observation stems from the fact that both tP +ξ2 +ξ1∆ > ∆ and θξ1 > θ, since by (6.11) we have that
ξ1 > 1, and both tP and ξ2 are positive and greater than zero.
Fortherestoftheparametersinthemodel, wedeﬁnethemappingbetweentheobservablevariables7
and φ and q as given by
φ = κ1

1
NstP

q = κ2
1
Dη, (6.16)
where κ1 ∈ R≥0,κ2 ∈ R≥0,η ∈ (0,1), ∈ (0,1). For φ+ and q+, the server is assumed to have
operated according to its advertised parameters, and we have that
φ+ = κ1

1
N
+
s t
+
P

q+ = κ2
1
D
η
+
.
To calculate t+, the client queries M for the server-advertised t
+
P and N+
s and deﬁnes a target p+
that represents the tolerance that the client is willing to give to the server (1 − p+ is the probability that
the transaction will conclude after t+ even though the server upholds its advertised t
+
P and N+
s , and
therefore also measures the risk involved for the server). From (6.8), and referring to Figure 6.3, we see
that t+ is found by solving
Γ(k)p+ = γ

k,
t+ − t
+
P − ξ2 − ξ1∆
θξ1

,
where Γ(k) and γ(k,x) are, again, the gamma and lower incomplete gamma functions.
We now model the two classes of service related to the effort levels φ+ and φ−. We refer the reader
to Figure 6.3 for a graphical representation of the time intervals and probabilities related to the following
discussion.
The transaction delay distribution f+ associated with high-QoS can be obtained from (6.15) by
setting tP = t
+
P. In order to obtain f−, we propose that if the server fails to uphold t
+
P and N+
s , it will
choose an alternative effort level deﬁned by t
−
P and N−
s in which it attempts to put as little effort as
possible, while trying to maintain high payment ψ+. For the purpose of this chapter, we assume that the
server reveals Ns truthfully in all circumstances, and thus N−
s = N+
s . Consequently, for φ−, the server
will decrease its effort by increasing its processing delay so that tP = t
−
P < t
+
P, and it will calculate t
−
P
so that the expected value of f− is equal to t+, therefore selecting the lowest effort that, in expectation,
still leads to a high paying outcome. This means that the client chooses the t
−
P (see Figure 6.3) so that
ξ1∆ + ξ2 + t
−
P + kθξ1 = t+. (6.17)
Clearly, the service level deﬁned by (t
−
P,N+
s ) is signiﬁcantly worse than that one implied by
7κ1, κ2, γ,  and η are external parameters that can be used to ﬁt these functions to experimental measurements. For the rest
of this chapter, we consider them external parameters that are given.6.3. DELAY-SENSITIVE CHUNK TRANSFER IN STREAMING SYSTEMS 121
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Figure 6.3: Determination of t
+
P and t
−
P
(t
+
P,N+
s ), as normally the expected transaction resolution time if the server upholds t
+
P is smaller than
t+. Once that t
−
P is deﬁned, we calculate p− by setting tP = t
−
P in (6.15) and ﬁnding the integral up to
t+, so that
p− =
1
Γ(k)
γ

k,
t+ − t
−
P − ξ2 − ξ1∆
θξ1

=
γ(k,k)
Γ(k)
.
For φ− and q−, since the client assumes that the server has actually tried to deliver as low quality of
service as it can get away with, we have that
φ− = κ1

1
N
+
s t
−
P

q− = κ2
1
D
η
−
.
Clearly, it is in the best interest of the server to minimise its probability of being paid ψ−. Thus, the
server will only accept contracts for which it can deliver high values for p+, which in turn gives it an
incentive to reveal truthfully the effort level that it is willing and able to maintain.
Depending on the the value that the client assigns to t−, there might be a possibility that the trans-
action could exceed t−, with no malicious intent by the server. If this probability, pe (see Figure 6.3)
presents an undesirably high risk, the server can choose to reject the contract and refuse service. the
same considerations apply if p+ is too low.
In Figure 6.4 we see a graphical representation of expressions (6.1) and (6.2) in the context of the
model presented in this section. Figure 6.4 shows the payments ψ+ that a client would offer to a server
as a function of its advertised effort, for an scenario with parameters as shown in Table 6.4. As an
example, a server peer that advertises in M that it is able to commit to an effort level corresponding
to N+
s = 4 and t
+
P = 100 msec. can expect to be offered by a prospective client a contract where
ψ+ ≈ 103.716 u 5196 and ψ− ≈ 103.3 u 1995 in M currency units. Thus, the contract would be
drafted with these two payment values. Following the outcome of the transaction, the server will receive
ψ+ if the transaction is successful with high QoS, ψ− if the transaction is successful with low QoS, and
nothing if the transaction is unsuccessful.
It is clear that in both Figures 6.4 and 6.5, there are data points missing for some of the curves
corresponding to low values of Ns. The reason for this is that in optimisation problem (6.3), there is6.4. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 122
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Figure 6.4: ψ+ and ψ− for the simulation run of Table 6.4 (the legend in both graphs shows different
values of Ns, the number of clients that the server is serving simultaneously).
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Figure 6.5: φ+ and φ− for the simulation run of Table 6.4 (the legend in both graphs shows different
values of Ns, the number of clients that the server is serving simultaneously).
not an explicit requirement for the utility of the client to be positive. In fact, it is possible that the fees
required to provide an incentive to the server will drive the client utility below zero. These cases are
dropped, as is understood that the client will not have an incentive to request services from the server in
the ﬁrst place.
The heavily nonlinear behaviour of ψ− near the origin is a product of the sensitivity of our deﬁnition
for φ to very small decreases of tP in the vicinity of zero, as it is clear from (6.16).
6.4 Contract Enforcement
The model in Section 6.2.1 assumes that the contract is enforceable, as it often the case in economics
(usually through reliance on a legal framework). However, in the case of peer-to-peer overlay networks,
such enforcement is difﬁcult to provide because peers can lie about transaction outcomes, and this can be
exploitedtoexecutedenialofserviceattacksagainstparticularpeers, greatlyincreasingthepolicingcosts
associated with each transaction. The application of well-known techniques of community enforcement
[187] is complicated by the fact that peer interactions are unobservable beyond the relevant actors for the
transaction, and therefore open to slander attacks. Instead, we propose a scheme based on the creation of
social capital [86] by directly controlling the interaction graph of the peers. We model this peer-based
enforcement as reciprocity-based trigger strategies on a repeated game.6.4. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 123
Mean tRTT 110 msec
k 3
θ 3
Sr 200 bytes
Sc 64 kbyte
Sp 1500 bytes
pL 10−3
tRTO 100 msec
Ur 30
α = η =  .5
β .8
τ 5
κ1 1000
κ2 1.5811 × 106
Table 6.4: Principal-Agent model simulation parameters
Server Server
Cooperate Defect
Client Cooperate (U+
c ,Ur) (−τ,0)
Client Defect (Ud
c ,−φ+) (−τ,0)
Table 6.5: Repeated game, normal form for moral hazard (Principal-Agent model)
We assume that peers follow the algorithm in Section 6.2.1 for the creation of contracts, which are
susceptible to moral hazard8. We then proceed to model contract compliance as a repeated game where
each stage game has the normal form shown in Table 6.5, where Ud
c , the defection utility, corresponds to
Ud
c = p+q
β
+ + (1 − p+)q
β
−,
and τ is a measure of time lost to the client waiting for a server response before timeout.
We model each transaction as a stage in a repeated game. We assume peers to have two strategies:
adherence to the protocol, or selﬁsh utility maximisation. Following the usual nomenclature for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, we call adherence to the protocol cooperation and deviation from it (failure to
uphold contractual obligations) as defection.
If M ensures that peers maintain a relatively stable relationship, so that the probability of peers
interacting with each other remains under its control, it is possible to ensure that it is nonproﬁtable for
the peers to fail to uphold their contracts.
To guide the Nash equilibrium of this repeated game, M acts as a probabilistic interaction tracker
by explicitly modifying the information that it provides to the peers in order to ensure a minimum prob-
ability of repeated interaction δ (usually called the discount parameter in game theory). By forcing the δ
between peers to the value where deviation from the protocol becomes unproﬁtable, we can ensure that
only irrational peers will deviate. We explore two possible trigger strategies for contract enforcement:
Grim Trigger and Tit-for-Tat [39].
6.4.1 Grim Trigger Enforcement
As usual, in this strategy a given peer ni follows the protocol towards another peer nj as long as nj fol-
lows the protocol towards it. If nj deviates, however, ni retaliates by following a strategy of continuous
defections from then onwards. This means that any protocol deviation receives the harshest punish-
8In situations with moral hazard, agents modify their behaviour toward risky activities depending on whether the consequences
of these risks apply to themselves or to other agents.6.4. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 124
ment possible, and there is no possibility for “forgiveness” and re-introduction of a possible cooperative
regime. In this case, M must ensure that δ ≥ δmin
G , where
δmin
G =
p+ψ+ + (1 − p+)ψ−
p+q
β
+ + (1 − p+)q
β
− + τ
. (6.18)
Proof. From the game normal form, it is clear that only the client has an incentive to defect. Without loss
of generality, we consider the case where the client defects on the ﬁrst round, and the server retaliates by
defecting from then on. If we take into account the discount parameter δ deﬁned by M as the probability
that ni and nj will meet again to play the game, we have that for the expected utility for the client,
Ug = Ud
c −
δ
1 − δ
τ.
By considering the requirement that Ug < U+
c , we have that
p+q
β
+(1 − δ) + (1 − p+)q
β
−(1 − δ) − δτ ≤ p+(q
β
+ − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(q
β
− − ψ−),
and simplifying, we ﬁnd that
δ(p+q
β
+ + (1 − p+)q
β
− + τ) ≥ p+ψ+ + (1 − p+)ψ−.
Thus, it is clear that
δ ≥
p+ψ+ + (1 − p+)ψ−
p+q
β
+ + (1 − p+)q
β
− + τ
.
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Figure 6.6: δmin
T and δmin
G for the simulation run of Table 6.4 (the legend in both graphs shows different
values of Ns, the number of clients that the server is serving simultaneously).
6.4.2 Tit-for-Tat Enforcement
In this strategy a given peer ni at a stage t applies the strategy that its partner nj applied at a stage t−1.
In this case, we have that M must ensure that δ ≥ δmin
T , where
δmin
T =
p+ψ+ + (1 − p+)ψ−
p+(q
β
+ − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(q
β
− − ψ−) + τ
. (6.19)6.5. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 125
Proof. In this case, the ﬁrst defection from the client starts a series of alternating cooperation-defection
episodes. For the expected utility for the client we have that
Ut = Ud
c − δτ + δ2Ud
c − δ3τ + ... = (1 + δ2 + δ4 + ...)(Ud
c − δτ).
Again, by considering the requirement that Ut < U+
c , we have that
1
1 − δ
U+
c ≥
1
1 − δ2(Ut − δτ),
and simplifying, that
δ ≥
Ut − U+
c
U
+
c + τ
.
Finally, we see that
δ ≥
p+ψ+ + (1 − p+)ψ−
p+(q
β
+ − ψ+) + (1 − p+)(q
β
− − ψ−) + τ
.
6.5 Discussion of Potential Improvements
In this Chapter we presented a contract technique to control hidden action situations in QoS overlays
deployed over best-effort networks. An important issue that has not been directly addressed, however,
is the distributed implementation of the probabilistic interaction tracker to which we refer in the Section
6.4.
By far the most complex issue surrounding the implementation of the probabilistic interaction
tracker is the distributed, secure computation of (6.19) and (6.18). Although promising work has been
done in the area of multiparty computation with strategic peers [112], the area is still open for contribu-
tions. Another related issue, the distributed implementation of a real time tracker, has been approached
in the context of uniform node sampling [176], scalable anycast (see [235] and Section 2.4.1) or content-
based routing [217]. We leave these improvements for future work.7
Modelling Incentives in Managed Overlays
The previous three chapters of this thesis have been concerned with quality and incentives in peer-to-
peer overlays in isolation from their underlying substrate. In Chapter 4, we deﬁned the existence of
two quality levels (priority and best effort), and we assumed that the peer in the role of server had total
control over what the quality of service would be for the peer in the role of client. In Chapter 5, serving
peers offer not only two levels of service, but as many levels as they require while maintaining their
resource and incentives constraints. Finally, in Chapter 6 we address the issue of the service quality
which each peer receives being a function not only of the quality allocated by the server peer, but also of
the intervening network.
A common thread of these chapters, though, has been that the quality that the resources that the ISP
substrate allocates to the overlay is taken as a given. However, by incorporating techniques such as P4P
[320] and ALTO [252] it is possible to establish communication through the operator-overlay interface
to more effectively drive resource allocation for services in the network edge.
7.1 ISP Multihoming and Managed Overlay Incentives
There has been growing interest in the exploration of communication and control interfaces between
managed overlays and their underlying ISPs. The Application Layer Trafﬁc Optimisation working group
[252] focuses on providing an interface to ISP information that can be used to aid in peer selection for
application layer overlays. In this chapter we assume a model like that shown in Figure 7.1, which
consists of the following entities:
• Edge Service Providers (ESP), managed overlays that provide QoS-based services on the net-
work edge. Examples would be managed overlay multimedia operators (like PPLive) or content
delivery networks such as Akamai or Limelight [22, 2, 24].
• Network Providers (ISP), that provide network resources to end customers and ESPs. They can
either own their own physical infrastructure and switching hardware, or purchase layer 2 services
from an underlying set of telecommunications providers. We assume that they have complete
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Figure 7.1: ALTO/P4P and an interface between overlay-based Edge Service Providers and ISPs.
control over their layer 3 infrastructure, possibly up to implementing their own QoS and routing
algorithms.
The role of the ALTO/P4P interface in Figure 7.1 is to resolve the incentive tensions between the
ESPs and the ISPs by providing each one with a way to express its preferences, which might be aligned
with each other and can lead to mutually beneﬁcial outcomes. We assume that this will be done in
the simplest possible manner: the ISP will reveal its preferences through an end-to-end ﬂow price pji
between network endpoints j and i, and each overlay will take this into account to plan its own trafﬁc
matrix bji for all pairs of endpoints (j,i). Simplistically, the ISP will impose high prices on those routes
for which it wants demand to fall, and it will decrease them for those for which it wants it to increase.
We are interested in the general case where the ESP is multihomed, and therefore can express its
own preferences and respond to changing prices by reallocating its trafﬁc between two given sites among
a number of different ISPs1. Thus, we assume that every ESP has access to a set of ISPs, and that it is
free to allocate its trafﬁc freely between them. To make this preference expressivity by the ESP explicit,
we assume that the ISP bills the ESPs for the source-destination ﬂows between sites by volume, and
according to the prices pji that were in effect when those ﬂows took place.
We assume that each ESP will attempt to maximise the utility it gets from the connectivity provided
by its underlying ISPs as a function of its own preferences, the network quality it experiences, and the
end-to-end prices offered by them2. Each ISP, on the other hand, will attempt to maximise its proﬁt as
a function of the aggregated trafﬁc matrix of all the ESPs it serves and its infrastructure link and router
prices. Depending on the number of competing ISPs, the full range of monopoly/oligopoly/open-market
situations can be realised on some ESP-ISP ecosystem.
The ISP might, in the simplest scenario, take the ESP trafﬁc matrices as given, and calculate its end-
to-end prices pji in an incremental fashion using an iterative technique such as supergradient ascent (as
originally presented in [320]). However, it might also beneﬁt from constructing a model of how a single
ESP (or even the set of all ESPs) will respond to a given change in price. This more detailed model of
the ESP price behaviour can be used as a component for ISP optimisation processes, in particular proﬁt
1Of course, the practical implications of multihoming to policy routing, service survivability and the development of innovative
business models go well beyond those we address. For brevity, we focus on the a very speciﬁc set of multihoming implications for
the modelling of managed overlay incentives, as detailed in Section 7.2.
2Since we focus on managed overlays, we do not consider situations where each ESP member site or peer optimises its own
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optimisation (as shown in Section 7.3.3).
Our contributions in this chapter are twofold. First, we propose a ﬁrst-principles model for the price
incentives of an ESP based on some simple assumptions regarding its preferences. Second, we provide
a data-driven method based on least-squares regression to estimate the aggregate demand function of an
ESP or a set of ESPs, and then show how can the ISP use this model to maximise its proﬁt.
7.2 Preference Modelling of ESP Demand
The objective of this section is to develop, starting with elementary assumptions on the incentives of
ESPs, a model for the price behaviour of ESPs that ISPs can use to predict the trafﬁc matrix that an ESP
will choose, given an input price per unit bandwidth for each origin-destination ﬂow in the network. The
deﬁnitions for the main elements of our model follow.
In our model, an ESP is formed by a set of sites N that reside at the network edge, usually in
geographically and administratively distributed areas. These edge sites are assumed to wish to exchange
trafﬁc among them, forming a fully meshed overlay over one or more ISPs, each one formed by a set of
routers N and a set of links L connected in any given topology. We will denote the set of all ISPs as
I, and the set of all ESPs as E.
Further, in our model any ESP m ∈ E can decide to send trafﬁc between any two sites (k,i) along
any ISP s ∈ I. This 3-tuple, consisting an origin site k, a destination site i and the ISP s used to
communicate them will be called a ﬂow ξ = (s,k,i), and will be annotated with a ﬂow volume bski
which represents the amount of trafﬁc that the ﬂow carries, a ﬂow price per unit bandwidth pski and a
ﬂow quality qski. The set of all possible ﬂows between all sites will be denoted as L.
We start by assuming that each ESP will behave as a utility maximiser, taking the prices exposed by
the ISP as input. We now formalise the ESP optimisation problem, assuming that each one of the sites
of the ESP will have a utility Ui (see Table 7.1 for variable deﬁnitions) such that
Ui = βi


X
k∈N,s∈I
b
αi
skiq
γi
ski


δi
−
X
k∈N,s∈I
pskibski. (7.1)
The ﬁrst term in (7.1) models the beneﬁt that site i of an ESP obtains from the trafﬁc it receives
through all ISPs, and the second term the cost that it pays for it. Although the utility (7.1) is essen-
tially arbitrary, it does capture many intuitions regarding the usefulness of an overlay-based service. We
formalise these intuitions by analysing the following properties of our utility function.
• Increasing utility with increasing trafﬁc exchange between any two sites (βi > 0, αi > 0, δi > 0).
We assume that, if cost per unit capacity were not an issue, the protocol operations of the overlay
operator might be signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed by replicating all trafﬁc at every site in the network.
The cost savings that can be achieved by avoiding this and using intelligent stream processing
algorithms has been one of the driving forces behind the development of locality-aware swarming
protocols and distributed optimal load balancing techniques. This means that, in a cost-constrained
scenario, being able to move more trafﬁc between two overlay sites will result in an increased
utility, albeit with diminishing returns measured by 1 > αi > 0 and 1 > δi > 0.
• Increasing utility with increasing quality on exchanges between any two sites (γi > 0, δi > 0). We
assume that overlay links will be annotated with some notion of quality qski, so that transferring
the same amount of trafﬁc between two sites yields greater utility if the quality of the overlay link
between them increases. This effect is particularly important for real-time content distribution
overlays, such as media and gaming streams.7.2. PREFERENCE MODELLING OF ESP DEMAND 129
Ui ∈ R≥0 Utility that site i obtains from participation
in the system
bski ∈ R≥0 Amount of trafﬁc ﬂow from site k to site i
over ISP s
qski ∈ R≥0 Beneﬁtthataunitbandwidthﬂowfromsite
k to site i over ISP s provides to the ESP.
pski ∈ R≥0 Cost per unit bandwidth that the ESP must
pay to transfer data from k to i over ISP s
I Set of all ISPs
E Set of all ESPs
N Set of all infrastructure routers in an ISP
L Set of all infrastructure links in an ISP
N Set of all sites in the ESP
L Set of all overlay links in an ISP (origin-
destination pairs of sites)
αi ∈ (0,1) Per-site diminishing trafﬁc volume beneﬁt
for site i
γi ∈ (0,1) Per-site diminishing trafﬁc quality beneﬁt
for site i
βi ∈ (0,1) Total proportional trafﬁc beneﬁt for site i
δi ∈ (0,1) Total diminishing trafﬁc volume beneﬁt for
site i
Table 7.1: ESP Utility model notation
• ESPs pay an increasing cost with increasing trafﬁc volumes exchanged between any two overlay
sites (pski > 0, bski > 0). We are assuming a simple pay-per-volume model where time is
divided into discrete intervals of length T and each ISP s advertises source-destination prices per
unit bandwidth psji between any two sites j and i that remain constant over the entirety of T.
The situation where a ISP offers tiered services with differentiated costs can be easily addressed
by decomposing the ISP into distinct ISPs, each one having a single quality class, and a single
end-to-end price per unit volume for every overlay link.
• Diminishing marginal utility on the amount of resources provided by a single site (αi < 1). This
models the fact that, if bandwidth costs are of importance, overlay sites can implement protocols
where important data is exchanged with priority over less important data. Thus, any given site will
have decreasing marginal usefulness for getting increasing amounts of trafﬁc from a given overlay
site.
• Diminishing marginal utility on the quality that a given site is able to provide (γi < 1). In many
cases, such as voice or video streaming, once the quality of the received stream is high enough to
decode the stream, no further improvement in playback quality will be achieved by increasing the
transfer quality at the overlay network level.
• Diminishing marginal utility on the number of sites that supply a site with resources (δi < 1).
We assume that different overlay network sites might have access to different kinds of content or
data of interest to other overlay sites, so that utility increases with the number of supplier sites
that a given site has. However, it is improbable that all sites will yield equivalent usefulness to the
requesting site, which will then contact them in decreasing order of usefulness. Consequently, this
utility will also increase at a decreasing rate.
We assume that there will be competition between the different ESPs and between the different
ESPs, so that neither an ISP monopoly or an ESP monopsony is assumed at the outset.7.2. PREFERENCE MODELLING OF ESP DEMAND 130
If we assume that the price that the ESP can charge its customers will be an increasing function of
the utility of each one of their sites, then each ESP will function as a social welfare maximiser. Thus, its
objective function will be the addition of all site utilities, and we can formulate the optimisation problem
for the ESP as
Maximise: U =
X
i∈N
Ui (7.2)
=
X
i∈N


βi


X
k∈N,s∈I
b
αi
skiq
γi
ski


δi
−
X
k∈N,s∈I
pskibski


.
In our model, each ESP maximises the sum of the utilities of all its sites, where the utility of a site
is given by (7.1). For this chapter, we will consider two cases in turn. In the ﬁrst one the ESP is assumed
to have unlimited wealth, an assumption that will be dropped for the second, more general case where
we consider a budget constraint. Although only the latter case is important in practice, we present both
because the solution for the second case relies on that of the ﬁrst one.
7.2.1 Case 1: No Budget Constraints for the ESP
Here, we assume that the ESP has inﬁnitely large currency reserves, and thus concentrate our attention on
ﬁndingtheutility-maximisingtrafﬁcmatrixthattheESPwillsubmittoeachISPwithoutcostrestrictions.
Since only non-restricted optimisation is required, we can apply ﬁrst order conditions to (7.2) directly.
By considering the optimality criterion ∇U = 0, we have the following ﬁrst order conditions, one for
each end-to-end ﬂow ji on each ISP s:
∂U
∂bsji
= βiαiδi
q
γi
sjib
αi−1
sji
P
k∈N,t∈I q
γi
tkib
αi
tki
1−δi − psji = 0. (7.3)
It is clear that the denominator in (7.3) does not depend on j, the origin of the ﬂow, nor on its
carrying ISP s - it is only a function of i, the site that is receiving the ﬂow and hence assessing its utility.
Thus, if we express (7.3) in terms of another, arbitrary ﬂow terminating on the same site i but originating
on a different origin site k and ﬂowing through a different ISP y, and we take the ratio of the resulting
expressions, the denominator and the destination-related multiplicative factors cancel out and we see that
q
γi
sjib
αi−1
sji
q
γi
ykib
αi−1
yki
=
psji
pyki
, (7.4)
that can be rearranged to underscore the relationship between bsji and byki, such that

bsji
byki
1−αi
=
q
γi
sji
psji
q
γi
yki
pyki
,
which means that, discounted by a diminishing returns exponent 1−αi, the ratio between the bandwidth
allocated to two ﬂows sji and yki terminating in the same site will be equal to the ratio between their
cost-beneﬁts, deﬁned as the ratios between their qualities and their prices.
We now continue the derivation of the optimal bsji. Going back to (7.4), we see that it can also be
rearranged to give
q
γi
sjib
αi
sji
q
γi
ykib
αi
yki
 
q
γi
sji
q
γi
yki
! 1
αi−1
=

psji
pyki
 αi
αi−1
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If we isolate the term involving byki, we ﬁnd that
q
γi
ykib
αi
yki =

pyki
psji
 αi
αi−1
 
q
γi
sji
q
γi
yki
! 1
αi−1
q
γi
sjib
αi
sji,
and summing over k and y, we have that
X
k∈N,t∈I
q
γi
ykib
αi
yki = q
γi
sjib
αi
sji
X
k∈N,y∈I

pyki
psji
 αi
αi−1
 
q
γi
sji
q
γi
yki
! 1
αi−1
.
Of course, the summation in the left is exactly the same one present in the denominator of (7.3), with
only the indexes changed. Therefore, substituting in (7.3), we have that
q
γi
sjib
αi−1
sji =
psji
βiαiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I

ptki
psji
 αi
αi−1
 
q
γi
sji
q
γi
tki
! 1
αi−1


1−δi
. (7.5)
By extracting psji and qsji from the summation and simplifying we ﬁnd that
b
1−αiδi
1−δi
sji = (βiαiδi)
1
1−δi

q
γi
sji
psji
 1−αiδi
(1−αi)(1−δi)
P
k∈N,t∈I ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi ,
(7.6)
which ﬁnally yields for bsji, the optimal bandwidth allocation for a ﬂow between sites j and i over ISP
s, that
bsji = (βiαiδi)
1
1−αiδi

q
γi
sji
psji
 1
1−αi

P
k∈N,t∈I ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi
 1−δi
1−αiδi
.
(7.7)
This expression allows the ISP to estimate the optimal trafﬁc matrix that an ESP might choose, given
the prices exposed its underlying ISPs. Then, (7.7) is an estimated best response to any particular price
vector psji by all the ISPs. As expected, the cost-beneﬁt of ﬂow sji plays a prominent role in (7.6) and
(7.7).
We now continue our analysis of the ESP incentives by considering the total ESP utility for these
optimal bsji. From (7.3), we see that
βiαiδi
q
γi
sjib
αi
sji
P
k∈N,t∈I q
γi
tkib
αi
tki
1−δi = bsjipsji,
and, by performing a summation over s and j, we ﬁnd that
X
j∈N,s∈I
bsjipsji = βiαiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I
q
γi
tkib
αi
tki


δi
, (7.8)
where we recognise the summation on the left as the cost term from (7.2). If we deﬁne U∗ as the optimal7.2. PREFERENCE MODELLING OF ESP DEMAND 132
ESP utility and substitute (7.8) in (7.2), we ﬁnd that:
U∗ =
X
i∈N


βi


X
k∈N,s∈I
b
αi
skiq
γi
ski


δi
− βiαiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I
q
γi
tkib
αi
tki


δi


 (7.9)
=
X
i∈N
βi(1 − αiδi)


X
k∈N,s∈I
b
αi
skiq
γi
ski


δi
.
We now proceed to ﬁnd the closed form for the inner summation in the simpliﬁed presentation of
(7.9). By directly computing b
αi
sji from (7.7), multiplying by q
γi
sji and performing a summation over both
s and j, we ﬁnd that
X
k∈N,t∈I
q
γi
tkib
αi
tki = (βiαiδi)
αi
1−αiδi
P
k∈N,t∈I q
γi
tki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 αi
1−αi

P
k∈N,t∈I ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi
 αi(1−δi)
1−αiδi
,
which simpliﬁes to
X
k∈N,t∈I
q
γi
tkib
αi
tki = (βiαiδi)
αi
1−αiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I
ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi


1−αi
1−αiδi
.
Substituting back in (7.9), we obtain for the optimal utility that
U∗ =
X
i∈N
βi(1 − αiδi)(βiαiδi)
αiδi
1−αiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I
ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi


(1−αi)δi
1−αiδi
=
X
i∈N



2 [(1 − α1δi)(αiδi)] βi


X
k∈N,t∈I
ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi


(1−αi)δi



1
1−αiδi
,
where 2x is the tetration function of order 2:
kx = xx
...x
| {z }
k times
.
7.2.2 Case 2: Binding Budget Constraint for the ESP
We now address the case where the ESP has a budget restriction. In this case, the optimal solution to
the problem is no longer a simple superposition of optima for each ISP. We propose an improved model
which, as we shall see, is a simple extension from the model presented in Section 7.2.1. The optimisation
problem central to this new model can be stated as
Maximise: U =
X
i∈N
Ui =
X
i∈N


βi


X
k∈N,s∈I
b
αi
skiq
γi
ski


δi
−
X
k∈N,s∈I
pskibski



Subject to:
X
i∈N,k∈N,t∈I
bskipski ≤ B, (7.10)7.2. PREFERENCE MODELLING OF ESP DEMAND 133
where (7.10) is our budget constraint and B is the maximum amount of money that the ESP is willing to
pay to the set of its underlying ISPs. The Lagrangian for this case,
LE = U + λ

B −
X
i∈N,k∈N,s∈I
bskipski

,
leads to the following ﬁrst order optimality conditions:
∂L
∂bsji
= βiαiδi
q
γi
sjib
αi−1
sji
P
k∈N,t∈I q
γi
tkib
αi
tki
1−δi − (1 + λ)psji = 0. (7.11)
The derivation proceeds as in the previous case, so that the equivalent expression to (7.5) is
q
γi
sjib
αi−1
sji =
(1 + λ)psji
βiαiδi


X
k∈N,t∈I

ptki
psji
 αi
αi−1
 
q
γi
sji
q
γi
tki
! 1
αi−1


1−δi
.
This expression can be re-arranged and simpliﬁed so that we obtain an expression for the bsji in terms
of the Lagrange multiplier λ, and as a result we have that
bsji = (βiαiδi)
1
1−αiδi

1
1 + λ
 1
1−αi

q
γi
sji
psji
 1
1−αi

P
k∈N,t∈I ptki

q
γi
tki
ptki
 1
1−αi
 1−δi
1−αiδi
. (7.12)
As expected, (7.12) reduces to (7.7) if λ = 0. Furthermore, if we deﬁne ˆ bsji as the ﬂow volume that
would have been allocated between sites i and j in ISP s if the budget constraint had not been binding
(as given by (7.7)), we have that (7.12) reduces to
bsji =

1
1 + λ
 1
1−αi ˆ bsji. (7.13)
If we deﬁne Bi as the total cost that the ESP will have to pay to all ISPs for all the trafﬁc terminating at
site i, and ˆ Bi as the total cost for all trafﬁc terminating at i had the budget condition not been binding,
we have that
Bi =
X
k∈N,s∈I
pskibski (7.14)
=

1
1 + λ
 1
1−αi X
k∈N,s∈I
pskiˆ bski
=

1
1 + λ
 1
1−αi ˆ Bi.
Equipped with (7.14), we now turn to the calculation of λ. In the case of a binding (7.10), we have that
B =
P
i∈N Bi, and the multiplier λ can be obtained by solving3:
X
i∈N

1
1 + λ
 1
1−αi ˆ Bi − B = 0. (7.15)
3In our simulations, this equation is solved using standard trust-region methods [87].7.2. PREFERENCE MODELLING OF ESP DEMAND 134
From the previous exposition, the most convenient procedure that can be used to obtain the trafﬁc
matrix of a budget-constrained ESP is then as follows. First, the ˆ bski are calculated using (7.7) and
aggregated into ˆ Bi using (7.14). If B ≥
P
i∈N ˆ Bi, the budget condition is not binding and bski = ˆ bski.
If, on the other hand, B <
P
i∈N ˆ Bi, the budget constraint binds and we formulate (7.15) to ﬁnd λ, which
can then be used in (7.13) to ﬁnd bski from λ and the previously found ˆ bski.
It is easy to see, from (7.15) that B <
P
i∈N ˆ Bi implies that λ > 0. First, we note that since
0 < αi < 1, the exponent for the expression containing λ will be, for all terms in 7.15, positive and
larger than 1. Because of this, and since we have that all ˆ Bi > 0, in the case of a binding condition we
require 1
1+λ < 1, which in turn implies that λ > 0.
7.2.3 Simulation Experiments
To provide a more intuitive perspective on the properties on the model in the previous section, in Figure
7.2 we show the result of applying it to the following situation.
An ESP with 3 sites i, j and k has a choice of 2 ISPs to send trafﬁc between them (the speciﬁc
model parameters used are shown in Appendix B.1). We shall call these two ISPs NP 1 and NP 2. We
shall now vary the quality and cost of overlay link (i,j), from i to j, and see how the model adapts to
this change.
The effects that changing the quality and price of (i,j) can be found in Figure 7.2(a). The graph
in the left of Figure 7.2(a) shows the bandwidth allocated to (i,j) over NP 1, while the one on the
right shows the bandwidth allocated to (i,j), but over the competing ISP NP 2. As the price of (i,j)
increases in NP 1, the ﬂow volume demanded by the ESP decreases very quickly initially, and then at a
decreasing rate. As the cost-beneﬁt for this link becomes smaller, the ESP re-allocates its trafﬁc between
the other ﬂows to maximise its utility. In particular, the trafﬁc along (i,j) but over NP 2 increases, as its
comparative cost-beneﬁt improves. We see that something similar happens for quality: as the quality of
the overlay link between the i and j decreases in NP 1, less trafﬁc is sent through NP 1 and more trafﬁc
is sent through NP 2. This implies that, qualitatively, price-quality combinations where (i,j) trafﬁc over
NP 1 are higher imply that trafﬁc between the same two sites but over NP 2 are lower, and the ESP is
effectively substituting decreased (i,j) ﬂow volume over NP 1 with increased overlay ﬂow volume over
all its other routes over NP 1 and NP 2.
Figure 7.2(b) shows the total cost for that the ESP has to pay for all its trafﬁc. First, we see that the
budget cap of 5000 units comes into effect in the situation where link price is low and quality is high.
This means that, if this is an accurate model of the behaviour of an ESP, the open multihoming model
that we presented in Section 7.1 gives an incentive for ISPs to deliver better quality at a lower cost, since
that in turn provides an incentive to users to spend more money. This is clearly visible in Figure 7.2(c),
where the provision of high quality overlay links at low cost gives the ESP the highest utility.
Since we did not introduce any explicit trafﬁc volume constraints in the model, we see that the
reduction in trafﬁc induced by increasing cost in the overlay link over NP 1 is not balanced by an
equivalent increase of trafﬁc over NP 2. This is because the ESP is substituting, proportionally to cost-
beneﬁt and with diminishing returns, with trafﬁc to all other destinations. Thus, having a high-quality,
low-cost link is always preferable to the ESP than not having it, and the same general shape seen in the
left of Figure 7.2(a) is seen on Figure 7.2(c), but with a more less deﬁned cutoff. The ability of the ESP
to redistribute its trafﬁc between sites allows it some degree of resilience over price changes on a single
link.
As a ﬁnal comment on the model simulations, we note that all graphs seem to have a much stronger
dependence on price than on quality, suggesting that for the parameter values chosen, ESPs will be more
sensitive to price than to quality. Validating these results will experimental data will be the focus of
future work.7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 135
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Figure 7.2: Simulating quality and price changes for the ESP model
7.3 Experimental Fitting for the ESP Demand
The ﬁrst-principles model of Section 7.2 has the advantage of giving some insight on the tradeoffs
made by ESPs, but has the quite signiﬁcant disadvantage of depending on the estimation of the utility
parameters αi, βi, γi, δi and qski which include not only private information of each ESP, but also
quality measurements on competing ISPs that might not be available. Therefore, a purely experimental
curve-ﬁtting approach might be more fruitful in practice. We will address the problem of ﬁnding the
aggregate demand function for all ESPs of a given ISP, but the technique presented can be easily applied
to estimate the individual demand functions of each ESP.
The procedure begins with the ISP aggregating the trafﬁc matrices requested by each ESP and
producing the total trafﬁc matrix associated with all ESPs. We will ﬁnd it useful to index end-to-end
ﬂows using a single index k instead of site duples (j,i). Thus, instead of dealing with the trafﬁc matrix
bsji, we restrict to a single ISP s and deal with a endpoint-to-endpoint indexed vector bk ∈ L, where the
ﬂow space L is the set of all possible overlay links between sites, and k indexes all origin-destination
pairs (i,j). If we aggregate the different trafﬁc demand vectors provided by the ESPs, the ISP can obtain
the total endpoint-to-endpoint trafﬁc matrix Bk. Thus, if we deﬁne bm
k as the load on the ISP along route
k imposed by ESP m, we have that
Bk =
X
m∈E
bm
k .
To estimate an aggregate demand function for all its ESPs, the ISP will gather data relating the
end-to-end price per unit ﬂow that it offers to the ESPs, and the aggregate ESP trafﬁc matrices that they7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 136
demand at those prices. Then, it will ﬁt this data to a general functional form that is simple, yet ﬂexible
enough to capture the preference structure of the ESP aggregate. We propose to use the well-known
Cobb-Douglas [83] function for this demand model, such that
Bk = Ak
0
Y
ξ∈L
p
η
k
ξ
ξ . (7.16)
This model, if ηk
0 = log(Ak
0), can then be expressed as
logBk = ηk
0 +
X
ξ∈L
ηk
ξ logpξ. (7.17)
The rationale behind this model is that we can explicitly model both the price elasticity of demand
ηk
k and the cross elasticity of demand ηk
ξ for each end-to-end ﬂow as a function of the prices of all other
ﬂows. This can be readily seen from the deﬁnition of the price cross elasticity of demand [144], which is
∂ logBk
∂ logpξ
= ηk
ξ.
7.3.1 Using Elasticity to Model ESP Demand
Inmicroeconomics, thecrosselasticityofdemandmeasurestheresponsivenessofthequantitydemanded
of a good or service to changes in the price of another good or service. Therefore, the cross elasticity
of demand can be used to deﬁne substitution relations between products or services: if increases in the
price for a product decrease the quantity demanded of another product, the products are complements of
each other, and will tend to be used together. Conversely, if increases in the price for a product increase
the quantity demanded of another product, they are substitutes of each other, and will tend to be used
instead of each other. If the price and quantity of two products are uncorrelated, their cross elasticity of
demand will be zero and they are independent from each other (see Table 7.2 for a detailed taxonomy of
the values that the cross elasticity of demand can take, and informal descriptions of their implications).
Thus, by explicitly modelling elasticities, we can model substitution effects between ﬂows directly:
when the cost for a particular set of end-to-end ﬂows increases, the ESPs might compensate by increasing
their consumption of the “cheap” routes and pulling back on consumption for the expensive ones. This
means that the model will be detailed enough to model situations where changes in price provide an
incentive to the ESP aggregate to substitute consumption of a ﬂow with consumption of a different ﬂow.
The cross elasticity of demand generalises the well-known price elasticity of demand, that measures
the responsiveness that the quantity demanded of a good or service has to changes in its own price. Since
the price elasticity of demand ηk
k corresponds simply to the cross elasticity of demand between a ﬂow
and itself, we require no additional framework to account for it. However, since demand is usually
decreasing with price, the price elasticity of demand is usually negative and only the ﬁrst 5 rows of Table
7.2 apply.
In order to estimate the elasticities ηk
ξ, we rely on the P4P-ALTO interaction between the ESPs
and the ISP. This basically involves the ISP supplying a price vector, the ESPs evaluating their demand
function, and returning the bandwidth they are willing to consume at that price vector. By aggregating
and storing these values and performing a simple linear least squares regression, the ISP can estimate the
aggregate demand function.7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 137
Range Category Responsiveness Implications
ηk
ξ → −∞ Complement Perfectly Elastic The demand for ﬂow k becomes zero with
an inﬁnitesimal price increase for ﬂow ξ.
−∞ < ηk
ξ < −1 Complement Elastic The reduction in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is large.
ηk
ξ = −1 Complement Unitary Elastic The reduction in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is com-
parable.
−1 < ηk
ξ < 0 Complement Inelastic The reduction in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is small.
ηk
ξ = 0 Independent Perfectly Inelastic The reduction/increase in the demand for
ﬂow k given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is
zero.
0 < ηk
ξ < 1 Substitute Inelastic The increase in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is small.
ηk
ξ = 1 Substitute Unitary Elastic The increase in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is com-
parable.
1 < ηk
ξ < ∞ Substitute Elastic The increase in the demand for ﬂow k
given a price increase for ﬂow ξ is large.
ηk
ξ → ∞ Substitute Perfectly Elastic The increase in the demand for ﬂow k be-
comes arbitrarily large with an inﬁnitesi-
mal price increase for ﬂow ξ.
Table 7.2: Cross elasticity of demand taxonomy
We now formalise these ideas. First, we note that (7.17) can be expressed in matrix notation, so that



 

logB1
logB2
logB3
. . .



 

=



 

η1
0
η2
0
η3
0
. . .



 

+



 

η1
1 η1
2 η1
3 ···
η2
1 η2
2 η2
3 ···
η3
1 η3
2 η3
3 ···
. . .
. . .
. . .
...



 




 

logp1
logp2
logp2
. . .



 

,
and if we include the independent term ηk
0 in the matrix of elasticities, we see that

 



logB1
logB2
logB3
. . .

 
 

=

 
 

η1
0 η1
1 η1
2 η1
3 ···
η2
0 η2
1 η2
2 η2
3 ···
η2
0 η3
1 η3
2 η3
3 ···
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...

 
 



 

 


1
logp1
logp2
logp2
. . .


 

 


.
We will denote the matrix of elasticities as N, so that N = [ηk
ξ]. Furthermore, we shall denote the
k-th row vector of N as Nk.
The best estimate for each of the Nk corresponding to a given ﬂow k will be found independently by
least squares minimisation. To achieve this, we require a set of measurements that give us the bandwidth
that the ESP aggregate allocated to ﬂow k, and the corresponding price vector that induced it. If we
denote as Bt
k the t-th data point for Bk and pt
ξ as the ξ-th component of the t-th price vector data
point, we can produce two basic measurement matrices for the estimation of Nk. The ﬁrst one relates to7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 138
observed demand, and is
TB
k =


 


logB1
k
logB2
k
logB3
k
. . .


 


;
the second one relates to the price vectors that elicited that demand, and is
Tp =


 


1 logp1
1 logp1
2 logp1
3 ···
1 logp2
1 logp2
2 logp2
3 ···
1 logp3
1 logp3
2 logp3
3 ···
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...

 



.
Having deﬁned TB
k and Tp, we can state the basic optimisation problem for the elasticity-based demand
model. We seek the Nk that best relates (in the squared-error sense) the observed trafﬁc demands in
terms of the supplied price vectors. Thus, the problem formally reads as
Minimise :
N0
k
||TpN0
k − TB
k ||2. (7.18)
where||·||2 denotestheusualEuclideanvectornorm, andwesolveforthetransposeofNk inordertodeal
with a column vector rather than a row vector. For our simulations, we solve the optimisation problem
(7.18) by simply making use of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse [251] of Tp, which immediately yields
the desired result when premultiplied by TB
k .
7.3.2 Simulation Experiments
In order to test the elasticity-based model we have just discussed, we calculate the aggregate trafﬁc
matrix of a set of ESPs, each using the analytical model of Section 7.2 to allocate its own trafﬁc matrix.
Some results of this are presented in Figure 7.3.2 and discussed below.
The simulation was organised in runs, with each run consisting of the generation of 1000 random
price vectors and the calculation of the corresponding trafﬁc allocation by each ESP. Each of these pairs
of price vector and aggregate trafﬁc matrices will be called a data point.
The regression framework detailed in the previous section is not applied to all 1000 data points of
each run, however - only to the ﬁrst 400. For the other 600, aggregate demand is estimated by using the
ηk
ξ coefﬁcients calculated on the basis of the ﬁrst 400.
The system is assumed to have converged from the 230-th data point onwards, so these values (data
points between 231 and 1000) are used to measure the accuracy of the regression/estimation technique.
This is done by generating a new random price vector, obtaining the aggregate demand induced by it,
and comparing it with the aggregate demand predicted by the ηk
ξ matrix estimated on the basis of current
data. The relative squared error differences are kept, and this process repeated 100 times.
In each of these runs, a system with 15 ESPs and 15 sites deployed over a single ISP is simulated.
The parameters used by the simulation are drawn from random distributions as indicated in Table 7.3,
and are recalculated with each one of the 100 simulation repeats.
Figure 7.3(a) shows the relative squared error in ˆ B, the estimation of B given a random price vector
p, for data points 230-1000. The relative squared error is deﬁned as
Erel =
|| ˆ B − B||2
||B||2
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Parameter Distribution Mean Standard Deviation
βi Uniform 30.093 2.8957
αi Uniform .25 0.14434
γi Uniform .35 0.20207
δi Uniform .30 0.17321
qji Uniform .65 0.20207
pji Uniform 525 101.04
Table 7.3: Parameter distributions for elasticity-based model
As evident from Figure 7.3(a), around 90% of all observations after the system have converge have
errors that are within .2% of the true aggregate ESP bandwidth, as allocated by (7.12) at each ESP.
Clearly, (7.17) can closely replicate the behaviour of the ESP aggregate.
It is interesting to discuss the convergence properties of the least squares model of the previous
section as the number of data points in it increases. Figure 7.3(b) shows the relative square error that was
calculated for a test ISP aggregate, as a function of the number of data points generated in the simulation
run. The ﬁrst vertical line (in a dot-dash motif) shows the point from which the system is considered to
be stable, and therefore, from which statistics for Figure 7.3(a) are taken. The second line (in dashed
motif) shows the last data item to be used to update the elasticity matrix. After that point, the coefﬁcients
ηk
ξ are no longer updated.
The large decrease in relative error in 7.3(b) around 210 data points is a consequence of the matrix
T
p
k becoming full rank, and the MATLAB pseudoinverse code updating its algorithm accordingly (it is
due to this that a value of 230 was chosen as the stability boundary for the collection of relative error
statistics for Figure 7.3(a)).
The second discontinuity visible in 7.3(b), at 400 data points, is a consequence of the ηk
ξ values
being no longer updated by the regression process. Consequently, relative errors obtained for all data
points after this one use the same values of ηk
ξ, calculated on the basis of the ﬁrst 400 data points only.
Figure 7.3(c) shows the matrix N, having removed the column which represents the constant term
ηk
0. As visible from the ﬁgure colourbar on the right, most values are small and positive, with the
exception of values on the diagonal which are large and negative (we explore those later). There is
obvious structure in this matrix, particularly a high degree of symmetry. Exploiting this structure remains
as future work.
In Figure 7.3(d) we see the CDF of the cross elasticity of demand, which shows a very large number
of values near zero with a small spread to be expected from noise. If these elements are dropped, the
matrix becomes sparse and can be efﬁciently stored and manipulated. Further, the subplot in Figure
7.3(d) shows a detail of the CDF between the two points shown, and it is evident that the small number
of elasticities with large values are all positive (Figure 7.3(d) only shows the cross elasticity of demand
and thus omits the diagonal of the matrix). This means that, under the model of Section 7.2, all ﬂows
behave as inelastic substitutes for each other. This is supported by Figure 7.3(e), which shows the
price elasticity of demand of all ﬂows (the diagonal in Figure 7.3(d), plus the zero diagonals) is always
negative and greater than one in absolute value, implying that ﬂow demand is elastic with price. This
is not unexpected, given that ESPs can allocate their trafﬁc freely among ISPs and, if price increases in
one of them, they can easily reallocate it to others. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings presented in Section 7.2.3:
since ﬂow demand behaves elastically, small increases in price will trigger large decreases in demand
(ηk
k < −1). On the other hand, cross elasticities of demand are all inelastic but positive 0 < ηk
ξ < 1,
meaningthatﬂowsonlyimperfectlysubstituteeachother, andhavingacheap, goodqualitylinkisalways
better than not having it.7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 140
Finally, with respect to Figure 7.3(f), ηk
0 is always positive, and its magnitude gives a partial view
of the average level of trafﬁc over an overlay link.
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Figure 7.3: Estimating the parameters of the elasticity-based model
7.3.3 Using the Elasticity-based Model for Optimisation
One of the reasons an ISP might be interested in ﬁtting a demand model would be to optimise its own
prices, in order achieve maximum proﬁt. We now turn to this issue.
As is common with some macroeconomic analyses, we assume that ESPs and ISPs can operate over
two disjoint time horizons. In the short-run horizon the strategies of all players are constrained, with7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 141
only those strategies implementable in real time being available. On the long-run horizon all players can
deploy all strategies, and often the convergence of short-run dynamics is assumed. We will focus on the
short-run analysis, and as a result, we consider that the ISP will face constant per-link unit-bandwidth
transmission capacity costs cl, as well as constant per-node unit-bandwidth processing costs cn.
Using the P4P/ALTO interface, the ISP will expose a set of origin-destination unit-bandwidth prices
pji and the ESPs will behave as price takers, responding with a set of end-to-end trafﬁc demands to be
paid at such prices. We assume that they will do this by ﬁnding the end-to-end trafﬁc demands that
maximise their utility, taking the prices given by the ISP as constant (thus, we assume that the demand
for ISP trafﬁc from ESPs is Marshallian [144]).
For this simpliﬁed model, we treat the ISP as a monopolistic provider (this situation might be closer
in spirit to the current state of affairs, where multihoming protocols have not been commonly deployed
yet). Therefore, the pricing determination problem for the ISP amounts to ﬁnding the price vector pξ that
maximises ISP proﬁt, taking into account that Bξ is an unknown function of pξ and has been estimated
using the procedure detailed in the ﬁrst part of this section.
Since we assume that the ISP gives the same price to every ESP, we have for the ISP proﬁt P that
P =
X
ξ∈L
pξBξ −
X
l∈L
clwl −
X
n∈N
cnwn, (7.19)
where cl is the unit cost of the underlying link l, wl the link bandwidth used by ESP trafﬁc on link l, cn
is the unit cost per computation unit on a given ISP router n, and wn is the amount of computation units
which router n will require to process all the ESP trafﬁc going through it.
We continue the development of the model by expressing the cost terms of (7.19) in terms of the
end to end ﬂows ξ. To this end, we note that the mapping from origin-destination ﬂow volumes to trafﬁc
volumes on any given link l is given by the routing matrix RL, where the (l,ξ) element RL
lξ is 1 if
origin-destination ﬂow ξ goes through link l. The mapping from origin-destination ﬂows to the amount
of trafﬁc on any given node n is given by the node routing matrix RN, where the (n,ξ) element RN
nξ is
1 if origin-destination ﬂow ξ goes through node n.
Since load patterns in links and routers tend to be bursty, the ISP might need to provision raw
infrastructure capacities wl and wn such that the level of utilisation by ESP trafﬁc in any node or link
does not exceed a given maximum. If ρN is the maximum router utilisation for ESP trafﬁc and ρL is the
equivalent maximum utilisation for ESP trafﬁc on links, we have the following utilisation restrictions for
the ISP:
X
ξ∈L
RN
nξBξ ≤ ρNwn
X
ξ∈L
RL
lξBξ ≤ ρLwl.
If we assume that these two conditions are always binding (which would be equivalent to assuming
that the ISP behaves as a cost minimiser), we have for the proﬁt of the ISP that
P =
X
ξ∈L
pξBξ −
X
l∈L
1
ρL
cl
X
ξ∈L
RL
lξBξ −
X
n∈N
1
ρN
cn
X
ξ∈L
RN
nξBξ,
and by reversing the summation orders of the ﬂows ξ and the routers and links n and l, we have that
P =
X
ξ∈L
pξBξ −
X
ξ∈L
 
X
l∈L
1
ρL
clRL
lξ +
X
n∈N
1
ρN
cnRN
nξ
!
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P ∈ R≥0 Proﬁt for the ISP applying the model
pξ ∈ R≥0 Per-unit bandwidth price for ﬂow ξ for the
ISP applying the model
Bξ ∈ R≥0 Flow volume for ﬂow ξ over the ISP apply-
ing the model
φξ Per-unit bandwidth cost for ﬂow ξ for the
ISP applying the model
ηk
0 Magnitude parameter for the price-demand
model of ﬂow k
ηk
ξ Cross elasticity of demand between ﬂow k
with respect to ﬂow ξ for the ISP applying
the model
L Set of all infrastructure links for the ISP
applying the model
N Set of all infrastructure routers for the ISP
applying the model
L Set of all site-to-site ﬂows for the ISP ap-
plying the model
Table 7.4: ISP proﬁt maximisation model notation
The magnitude in parenthesis involving cl and cn represents the unit costs associated with a partic-
ular end-to-end ﬂow ξ, and it will remain constant over the short term horizon. Thus, we can deﬁne the
per-unit infrastructure bandwidth cost φξ so that
φξ =
1
ρL
X
l∈L
clRL
lξ +
1
ρN
X
n∈N
cnRN
nξ, (7.21)
and substituting (7.21) in (7.20), we have that
P =
X
ξ∈L
(pξ − φξ)Bξ. (7.22)
Having obtained a model for Bξ as shown in the ﬁrst part of Section 7.3, the ISP can deﬁne its
optimisation problem as follows (variable deﬁnitions can be found in Table 7.4):
Maximise: P =
X
ξ∈L
(pξ − φξ)Bξ
Subject to: logBk = ηk
0 +
X
ξ∈L
ηk
ξ log(pξ),
where there is one restriction for each end-to-end ﬂow k ∈ L. From this we can construct the Lagrangian
LI =
X
ξ∈L
(pξ − φξ)Bξ +
X
k∈L
λk

logBk − ηk
0 −
X
ξ∈L
ηk
ξ log(pξ)

.
We will treat pξ, Bξ and λξ as variables, and thus we have a set of 3|L| equations in 3|L| unknowns.
By differentiating L with respect to pg and assuming pξ > 0∀ξ ∈ L, we obtain the following system of
equations:
pgBg −
X
k∈L
λkη
g
k = 0 ∀g ∈ L,7.3. EXPERIMENTAL FITTING FOR THE ESP DEMAND 143
which can be expressed in matrix form, so that

 



p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .

 



−

 



η1
1 η1
2 η1
3 ···
η2
1 η2
2 η2
3 ···
η3
1 η3
2 η3
3 ···
. . .
. . .
. . .
...

 




 



λ1
λ2
λ3
. . .

 



= 0. (7.23)
By differentiating LI with respect to Bg and assuming Bξ > 0, we obtain the system of equations
(pg − φg)Bg + λg = 0 ∀g ∈ L,
which can again, be expressed in matrix form so that


 


p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .


 


−


 


φ1B1
φ2B2
φ3B3
. . .


 


+


 


λ1
λ2
λ3
. . .


 


= 0. (7.24)
If we denote the matrix of η
g
k as N and substitute (7.24) in (7.23), we have that

 
 

p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .



 

− N



 




 

φ1B1
φ2B2
φ3B3
. . .



 

−



 

p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .



 




 

= 0,
which simpliﬁes to
[I + N]



 

p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .



 

= N



 

φ1B1
φ2B2
φ3B3
. . .



 

,
and if we deﬁne the matrix Θ = [I + N]−1N, we have that



 

p1B1
p2B2
p3B3
. . .



 

= Θ



 

φ1B1
φ2B2
φ3B3
. . .



 

. (7.25)
If we assume that pξ > 0, Bξ > 0 and that Θ is of full rank (detΘ > 0, so that its kernel is null), we
can apply the log function at both sides of the equal sign for each element. Thus doing, we obtain that

 



logp1 + logB1
logp2 + logB2
logp3 + logB3
. . .

 



=

 



log
P
ξ∈L θ1ξφξBξ
log
P
ξ∈L θ2ξφξBξ
log
P
ξ∈L θ3ξφξBξ
. . .

 



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However, from (7.17) we can see that


 


logB1
logB2
logB3
. . .


 


=


 


η1
0
η2
0
η3
0
. . .


 


+ N


 


logp1
logp2
logp2
. . .


 


,
and thus, that 

 


logp1
logp2
logp3
. . .


 


= N−1


 



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

logB1
logB2
logB2
. . .


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
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
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 

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0
η2
0
η3
0
. . .


 




 


.
If we substitute this last expression in (7.26) and we denote the vector with the η
ξ
0 as ¯ η0, we obtain that:

N−1 + I



 


logB1
logB2
logB3
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and if we deﬁne Ψ = [N−1 + I] and ¯ 0 = N−1¯ η0, we obtain the system of nonlinear equations
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We can obtain the best solution to the system of equations (7.27) over R≥0, in the least-squares sense,
using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm[218]. Once a set of Bξ has been determined, we ﬁnd pξ from
(7.25) so that
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If needed, the Lagrange multipliers can be found from (7.23) such that
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7.4 Discussion of Potential Improvements
In this chapter we have shown two different ways of estimating the response of one or more mutihomed
ALTO-managed overlays to changing prices.
The ﬁrst of the models, presented in Section 7.2, is constructive, but requires the estimation of
parameters from competing ISPs. Truthful revelation is of course a concern in that case; even if ISPs7.4. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 145
deployed overlay sites which purchased services from their competitors as if they were conventional
members of an ESP, these sites could be given special treatment in order to guide the estimation of the
model parameters to any desirable outcome. Therefore, the development of end-to-end quality mea-
surement tools that do not rely on the cooperation of intervening ISPs might be a precondition to any
practical proposal in this respect. Of course, network tomography techniques [303, 272, 301] might
be of relevance for this issue. Of course, the extension of the model so that it considers trafﬁc volume
constraints would be a fruitful avenue for further development for this model.
The second model, although structurally much simpler, presents signiﬁcant numerical challenges,
in particular the matrix inversion required to solve (7.18) and the solution of the potentially very large
nonlinear system of equations (7.27) if used for proﬁt maximisation. Research into how to perform these
functions efﬁciently, or into more efﬁcient alternative models, remains an important topic deserving of
further study.8
Conclusions
Although the study of incentive mechanisms is a very mature ﬁeld of study, branching out from fun-
damental problems of both economics and computer science, there is still ample space for contribu-
tions in the area. The main reason for this is that there is no “silver bullet” for the design of incentive
mechanisms: the variety in their theory and implementation mirrors that one present in the design of
peer-to-peer overlays themselves, and the tradeoffs that guided the engineering decisions for each one of
them.
In this context, the contributions presented in this thesis do not represent the “best” solution to
the incentives problem in massively distributed systems, since in this case “best” is an ill deﬁned term.
Different objectives will yield different resource allocation strategies, which will have various degrees
of alignment with those required for incentive mechanism design.
The objective of this thesis is to provide novel techniques that allow incentive mechanism designers
to make efﬁcient tradeoffs between overlay optimality and incentive mechanism resource allocation,
particularly in the context of QoS overlays. Moreover, since the contributions in this thesis arise from
taking situations where incentive tensions are present, and then proposing either an algorithm to resolve
them, or a model that can be used to study them in greater depth, they are relevant both in theoretical or
practical incentive mechanism design situations.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
We now summarise the main contributions of this thesis, and discuss the degree to which they satisfy
the main properties deﬁned in Chapter 1. These properties are restated again here, for the beneﬁt of the
reader.
Property 1 (Fundamental Property of Incentive Mechanisms). An incentive mechanism makes the level
of access to overlay resources, including the service quality obtained from the system, contingent on the
amount and quality of the resource contributions that peers have made to it.
Property 2 (Deferred Indirect Reciprocity). The incentive mechanism is designed to allow peers to
contribute services to a set of peers at a given time, and obtain resources corresponding to those contri-
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butions from a different set of peers at a different time, with no previous direct reciprocity requirement
between them.
Property 3 (Resistance to Identity Attacks). The incentive mechanism is designed to be resistant against
sybil and whitewashing attacks, by ensuring that the proﬁt that peers can obtain from assuming multiple
identities is limited.
Property4(ResistancetoUntruthfulPeers). Theincentivemechanismisdesignedtoberesistantagainst
untruthful peers, by ensuring that peers are unable to proﬁt from modifying or discarding the protocol
messages sent by other peers.
Property 5 (Decentralisation). The incentive mechanism is designed to operate without need for cen-
tralised or federated infrastructure relying on agreements between administrative domains.
Property 6 (Private Storage). The incentive mechanism is designed so that peers store a record only of
the contributions that they have given to other peers and received from other peers, not the contributions
between third parties.
Property 7 (Efﬁciency). The system maximises the aggregate value that the peers obtain from it, by
giving priority to those service requests that bring the most beneﬁt to other peers.
Property 8 (Load-Awareness). The cost of obtaining services from a peer increases as its usage level
approaches its capacity.
Property 9 (Preference Freedom). Each peer is able to deﬁne its own set of preferences over possible
resource allocations. Equivalently, the beneﬁt that a given peer obtains from the system is only decided
by that peer.
Property 10 (Network-Based Service Quality Model). The incentive mechanism includes a model of the
inﬂuence of network conditions on the service quality received by a peer, as a function of the behaviour
of its serving peer and the prevailing network conditions.
Property 11 (Resistance to Hidden Action). The incentive mechanism provides an incentive to serving
peers to deliver their advertised service quality accurately, even if non-compliance could be in theory be
attributed to the prevailing network conditions.
Property 12 (Flexibility). The preferences model for the managed overlay can be applied to a situation
where there is only one overlay and multiple ISPs, multiple overlays and a single ISP, and both multiple
overlays and ISPs.
Property 13 (Ease of Computation). The preferences model for the managed overlay should be scalable,
so that situations with thousands of network endpoints and hundreds of both ISPs and overlays can be
considered.
Property 14 (Parsimony). The preferences model for the managed overlay should make use of the min-
imum number of parameters.
8.1.1 PledgeRoute and Indirect Reciprocity
The ﬁrst contribution of this thesis, presented in Chapter 4, was PledgeRoute: a system that enables
overlay network peers to contribute resources to a set of peers and use these contributions to obtain
resources from a different set of peers at a different time. The system is distinguished, however, by being
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indirect reciprocity techniques, PledgeRoute operates as an incentive mechanism by ensuring higher
service quality for those peers that contribute more resources to the overlay.
We achieved this by analysing the contribution transfer operation using a routing algebra with sybil-
proofness properties similar to those of maximum ﬂow. To make the system scalable, we proposed a
topology sampling algorithm that extracts sparse subgraphs with high contribution transfer potential.
Since the contribution transfer operation tends to reduce the absolute amount of contributions in the
network, we proposed a contribution seeding algorithm based on the detection of credit cycles, which
can the be used to infuse the network with social capital through virtual contributions between peers.
Finally, we presented incentive schemes that work alongside the aforementioned techniques in order
to ensure the correct operation of the protocol in the presence of strategic peers. When coupled with
simple reciprocity policies, PledgeRoute allows contributing peers to obtain higher service quality than
freeloaders, thus becoming an incentive mechanism suitable for peer-to-peer networks.
In Chapter 1 we expressed our interest on Properties 1, 2, 6, 3, 4 and 5 as a motivation for the
contributions in Chapter 4. We now discuss the extent to which the system we proposed actually has
these properties.
By design, the system presented satisﬁes Properties 2, 6, 4 and 5. Although this is very clear
for Properties 2, 6 and 4, it is unclear that the interest digraph H could be effectively maintained in a
distributed fashion. This, fortunately, is irrelevant to the fact that the system will be able to improve upon
whatever content location information that is available; no requirement on the ﬁdelity of H is needed.
Furthermore, the work in both DHTs [210] and epidemic search algorithms [297, 177] suggests that
a fully distributed search overlay can provide a good approximation of H. In light of this, we grant
Property 5 to PledgeRoute and its accessory reciprocity policies.
Finally, withrespecttothefundamentalProperty1, itisclearthatapeerthatoperatespredominantly
in the reciprocative regime will experience a better QoS than a peer that operates predominantly in the
altruistic regime. The precise quality experienced will be a function of the utilisation level of the peers
from which service is being requested, since if these peers are idle, no service degradation is incurred
(there are no requests to give priority over the altruistic ones). However, by imposing a limit on the
amount of resources that can be obtained in the altruistic regime (the safe credit margin), an incentive is
created for peers to switch to the reciprocative regime irrespectively of this.
With respect to the other properties, the system proposed in Chapter 4 is not sufﬁciently nuanced
to exhibit any of them - although it may be argued that it could be trivially modiﬁed to exhibit some
measure of load awareness, by informing peers of the ratio of altruistic and reciprocative requests that
they are serving.
8.1.2 Auctions, Quality and Resource Allocation
The secondcontribution presented in thisthesis, inChapter 5, was a swarmingprotocol forQoS overlays.
This swarming protocol relied on the calculation of some statistics for multi-item Vickrey auctions,
which were provided in closed form. In particular, the expected number of won bids, the standard
deviation of the number of won bids and the expected utility as a function of the bid value distribution at
the auctioneer peer were presented. These statistics were used as input of a simple, greedy peer selection
algorithm that attempts to maximise the expected utility for each sent bid. Once the auction bidders are
determined, eachoneismappedtoaQoSclassdependingonthebalanceofitspastcontributionaccounts,
thus giving better service to those peers who have contributed more to the overlay. This generic model is
then applied to a speciﬁc case: delay sensitive chunk swarming. This is done by providing valuation and
quality mapping functions that encode the engineering objectives of the chunk swarming system, in this
case minimising stream lag from the peercaster. The swarming protocol was then tested in different peer
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The design objectives for the proposed system were Properties 7, 8 and 9. We now address them in
turn, and discuss how well does the proposed system achieve them.
With regards to efﬁciency (Property 7), the fact that the Vickrey auction is efﬁcient is enough to
ensure that if a peer is denied service, the utility lost by this is more than made up with the utility
obtained by the peers that did win the auction. This means that the system decomposes itself in a
series of Pareto-improving episodes, always tending towards a higher aggregate utility - and the system
proposed exhibits Property 7. Moreover, through the expectation equation (5.6), the system can provide
the information necessary to achieve Property 8. Since the system is expressly designed to allow per-peer
valuation equations, it satisﬁes Property 9 by construction.
With respect to the other properties, it is well known that the Vickrey auction is vulnerable to
manipulation by a coalition of losing bidders [242] and thus the auction-based system loses Property 3
from PledgeRoute. However, since the system does not include the additional contract-enforcing policies
presented in addition to PledgeRoute in Chapter 4, it is vulnerable to moral hazard in contract delivery
(see Chapter 6 and Appendix A.4). On the other hand, the system maintains Properties 2, 6, 4 and 5.
8.1.3 Unobservability, QoS Contracts and Hidden Action
The third contribution presented in this thesis can be found in Chapter 6, where we presented a model
for the design and veriﬁcation of QoS contracts in peer-to-peer overlays implemented over best-effort
networks, and applied it to a speciﬁc case: a mesh-based, pull-oriented streaming system with low de-
lay requirements. We treated each transfer of a delay-sensitive chunk as a hidden action situation where
server peers can force negative externalities upon client peers, and we proposed a contract drafting proce-
dure that allowed peers to deploy incentives to counter hidden action. This is an early step in the analytic
treatment of QoS as a strategic peer behaviour, and towards a general theory of service level agreements
among strategic peers. We showed that the construction of optimal contracts through the use of the
principal-agent model can be used to ensure predictable QoS behaviour, even with utility-maximising
rational peers whose service differentiation processes are unobservable. This was achieved by requiring
the server peer to accept part of the externality that would have been exclusively endured by the client.
Additionally, we also presented its application to a chunk transfer scenario with transaction time as the
main QoS indicator. For this case, we presented and analytic model for the model parameters which can
be constructed from truthfully revealed values and the analysis of observable network conditions.
Finally, we studied the enforcement of these contracts as a repeated game, and showed that a cen-
tralised entity can deﬁne the resulting Nash equilibrium to be a cooperative one by specifying the mini-
mum probability of pairwise repeated interaction (discount parameter).
This contribution addressed a very well deﬁned problem which, while not exclusive to QoS-
overlays, has received remarkably little attention from the research community in general [330, 120,
229, 118]. The hidden action model in Chapter 6 was designed to exhibit Properties 11 and 10, which is
explicitly achieved through Theorem 6.1 and equation (6.15). Moreover, from its use of PledgeRoute as
a payment infrastructure the system maintains Properties 2, 6 and 4. Finally, whether the system satisﬁes
Property 5 or not depends on the implementation of the market system M: a distributed marketplace
implies that the system exhibits Property 5. The system does not, however, by itself exhibit Property 3,
as it simply assumes an external trusted identity management system.
8.1.4 Overlay Utility Optimisation, Prices and the Elasticity of Demand
The ﬁnal contribution of this thesis can be found in Chapter 7, where we presented a general model of
the incentives of managed overlays based on a simple utility function that satisﬁes many of the common
intuitions regarding the behaviour and preferences of a service provider that relies on edge-deployed
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case and one with a maximum budget condition. The model is explored numerically, and is showed to
exhibit ﬂow substitution properties: ESPs1 will adapt their consumption patterns, using more bandwidth
on cheap overlay links than on expensive ones (if both have the same quality). Given some practical
limitations on ﬁtting free parameters of this model, another one was proposed that operates in a purely
numerical fashion, minimising the expected error of a constant-elasticity demand function similar to
the Cobb-Douglas production function [83]. This function is shown to have high accuracy and great
ﬂexibility in recovering the behaviour of an aggregate of ESPs. This model is then used analytically to
maximise ISP proﬁt.
Not being an incentive mechanism but, rather, a model for the behaviour of an economic actor, the
model in Chapter 7 will not exhibit many of the properties that we have been discussing. We focus on the
analysis of Properties 12, 13 and 14, which were the stated engineering objectives for this contribution.
Of course, the detailed analytic model of Section 7.2 exhibits Property 12 by design. The nu-
merical approach of Section 7.3, however, only includes the price vector of a single ISP and might be
insufﬁciently detailed to account for price competition between ISPs (although this might change by con-
sidering an expanded matrix ηk
ξζ that considers the cross elasticity of demand between different ﬂows
in different ISPs). Understandably, the greater detail of the analytic model of Section 7.2 means that
much lower computation power is needed for its evaluation, and thus we say that it exhibits Property 13.
This is not as clear in the regression model of Section 7.3, even if we choose to avoid the pseudoinverse
calculation entirely and invert the matrix using iterative methods with better sparsity properties.
Finally, it is evident that the analytic model of Section 7.2 is much more efﬁcient in its use of
parameters than the model of Section 7.3, which then would be considered less parsimonious. This is
conﬁrmed by the fact that many of the coefﬁcients in the elasticity matrix N are close to zero, and thus
essentially useless in the deﬁnition of the demand dynamics of the ESP aggregate.
8.2 Further Work
Although the work in this thesis is self-contained, it can be easily used as a starting point for continued
research. We now discuss some possible avenues for further work.
Regarding sybilproof incentive mechanisms (such as PledgeRoute in Chapter 4), a full mathemat-
ical theory of sybilproofness is still an open research question. Although [71] and [262] have provided
elegant mathematical descriptions of sybilproofness, a fully algebraic characterisation (close in spirit to
what [146] has achieved for routing) could be potentially used, given a suitable metalanguage for the de-
scription of peer preferences and reciprocity algorithms, to the automatic compilation and deployment of
provably sybilproof protocols, which might extend beyond QoS-overlays and into peer-to-peer auctions
[136] or peer-to-peer lending [70].
The main way in which the work in Chapter 5 could be continued would be with a full charac-
terisation of the exact proportional quality mapping algorithm of Section 5.2.2.1. The deﬁnition and
experimental validation of the quality estimation function Fi, as well as the development of robust de-
scriptions of the qc-quality level sets ˆ Ωi(qc) would then be a prerequisite not only to the solution of the
proportional quality mapping problem, but to many other models that involve situations where a link be-
tween resource allocation and application layer service quality is needed. Of course, efﬁcient numerical
methods to solve the quality mapping problem with restrictions in a scalable or distributed fashion, and
its application to a suitable practical example, would be of great interest2.
Regarding the hidden action model presented in Chapter 6, many possible research avenues are
available. The most straightforward one would be theextension of the principal-agent model presented to
1As deﬁned in Chapter 7, an ESP is an Edge Service Provider - a managed overlay.
2The informational efﬁciency techniques from [169, 261, 168] might be of use for this.8.2. FURTHER WORK 151
other situations with hidden action, such as interdomain QoS routing, particularly when paying attention
to revelation incentives. However, the model itself is a very simplistic one, and its generalisation to a full-
ﬂedged moral hazard principal-agent model [196] could yield important results regarding the incentives
of service level agreements. Of course, doing this would require a much more sophisticated model
of principal and agent risk avoidance and preference, which may be signiﬁcantly different when we
compare ISPs, peer-to-peer software users and CDN or managed overlay sites. A possible outcome of
this work would be the development of QoS insurance policies, which itself could become a standard
feature of service level agreements.
Finally, the experimental validation of the models presented in Chapter 7, as well as the creation of
better models based on ISP data would be of great interest. However, the most promising future work
stemming from this work would be the analysis of price convergence dynamics in such a system, and
its relationship to optimal proﬁt outcomes to the ISP when considering accumulated proﬁt over time.
Intuitively, the ISP wants to converge to a proﬁt-maximising price vector as quickly as possible, but
without inducing instability on the demand dynamics of the ESPs. In this case, an iterative supergradient-
based approach [320] does not seem appropriate, and techniques from optimal nonlinear network control
may be required [222].
Finally, this thesis has shown each one of the incentive mechanism components in Chapters 4, 5, 6
and 7 in isolation. The creation of a comprehensive, ﬂexible incentive mechanism that integrates all the
contributions of this thesis to achieve ﬂexible and efﬁcient QoS overlay operation that achieves high user
satisfaction while being predictable to the ISP remains as one more way in which the work in this thesis
could be continued.Part III
Appendices
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Designing Peer-to-Peer Protocols: Can the Social
Sciences Help?
As has been suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, there is no shortage in the social science literature of analyses
relevant to communities of autonomous agents. Here, we present a necessarily brief excerpt of this
material that, although not required to understand the main contributions in this thesis, is interesting
and relevant. The treatment has been focused on the analysis of peer-to-peer network protocols, and the
intention is that it will help incentive mechanism designers in the requirements deﬁnition phase to set
the basic objectives for their systems.
A.1 Strategic Agents
Given that human beings themselves are, in a way, autonomous peer-to-peer agents, it is unsurprising
that many of the problems that arise in the analysis and design of emergent behaviours for peer-to-peer
networks had already been encountered before in economics and sociology, in an ongoing attempt to
answerthequestionofwhatistheaggregatebehaviourofalargesocietycomposedofrational(andnotso
rational) agents. However, we will not attempt to do a complete mapping between these disciplines and
network engineering. Instead, we shall focus on the parallels between humans and peer-to-peer elements
that are quick to emerge, because they correspond to intrinsic characteristics of strategic interaction.
Thus, the focus will be in fundamental behavioural elements of free agents. We now analyse the most
important aspects relating to the behaviour of rational peers.
The ﬁrst insight stemming from the economics of general equilibrium [144] is that distributed re-
source allocation is, essentially, an exercise in information diffusion. Since resource allocation in peer-
to-peer networks depends on peer resource availability and the preferences that guide the behaviour of
each peer, the knowledge required to produce a welfare-maximising resource allocation is decentralised
over the whole network. No single peer can know the allocations that are feasible, let alone those that
are optimal. Thus, distributed resource allocation requires the diffusion of peer information and the
decisions taken on this basis.
The precise way in which information propagates, and how reliable it is, will depend on the be-
haviour of the peers. It follows, then, that a greater understanding of the behaviour of peers will be
useful if we are to model them more accurately. In [283], Shneidman and Parkes propose the following
taxonomy of peers in peer-to-peer systems:
• Obedient peers do not change their deﬁned protocol behaviour to seek their best outcome. Thus,
obedient peers will stick to determined protocols, regardless of the utility that they receive from
their interaction with other peers.
• Rational peers use knowledge of the environment, other peers, the protocol and the underlying
network substrate to maximise the expected utility they can extract from the peer-to-peer system.
Rational peers can thus behave, if in their beneﬁt, as adversarial peers that propagate false in-
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formation, selectively modify or drop other nodes’ communications, or supplant or substitute any
part of the protocol with one more closely aligned with their utility maximisation strategy.
• Irrational peers are strategic, but act according to utility functions that are not under the control
of the mechanism designer. These might be known or unknown.
• Faulty peers have widely varying behaviours, from complete removal from the peer-to-peer over-
lay (failstop peers) to Byzantine failures (arbitrary protocol actions). Since the behaviour of these
peers is essentially random, their effect in any incentive mechanism should be minimised.
Of all these, only the ﬁrst three can propagate information with any degree of accuracy, and only
the ﬁrst two can be directly analysed using a game theoretical formalism. Thus, we shall focus on these
two categories of peers.
A.1.1 Bounded Rationality
The usual assumption in the economic or game-theoretical analysis of autonomous agent behaviour is
that agents are rational: when faced with a particular decision, they will always know (and prefer) the
strategy that maximises their expected utility. However, economic agents have limited information and
limited ability to process it: In practice, this maximisation might impose large computational effort, large
amounts of memory or a large amount of signalling bandwidth.
The usual way of modelling these limitations is through bounded rationality: agents are still ex-
pected to attempt to maximise their utility, but instead of using full-ﬂedged optimisation mechanisms
they will use simple heuristics that provide results that are “sufﬁciently good” (satisfy a minimum utility
criterion).
Thus, boundedly rational agents always need to operate without complete information about market
opportunities, with limited ability to predict the future (and adequately reason about the implications
of these predictions), and with restricted capability to pre-specify optimal responses to future events.
Agents cannot know everything and inevitably make mistakes, and each agent’s knowledge is slanted to
its immediate social or geographical environment.
A.1.2 Strategic and Opportunistic Behaviour
In peer to peer networks, every peer is normally under the administrative control of a distinct user. Thus,
peers are expected to modify their behaviour to maximise the beneﬁt they get from the system. If we
deﬁne the universe of actions that can be taken by each peer as its strategy space, we see that peers will
attempt to select strategies that maximise their utilities. We call this kind of peer behaviour strategic.
Sometimes, strategic peer behaviour is opportunistic: peers will attempt to take advantage of envi-
ronmentalconditionsandthelimitationsofotherpeersinordertoincreasetheirownutility. Opportunism
follows from bounded rationality plus self-interest. When a conﬂict arises between what an agent a can
do to increase its own utility and what it agreed to do for another agent b to increase b’s utility, a will
act on its own interest, insofar as it is costly for b to discover this (b is only boundedly rational) and to
punish a. It is not necessary to assume that every agent always behaves opportunistically in order to have
opportunism as a transaction cost; it is sufﬁcient that some agents act opportunistically some of the time,
and that boundedly rational agents are unable to predict if any other agent will behave opportunistically
or not.
A.1.3 Protocol Design with Strategic Agents
Many of the distributed systems protocols currently in use rely on information dissemination for their
operation. If one considers strategic agents, protocol design becomes substantially more complicated: in
that case, peers can choose to withhold or falsify information in order to modify the resource allocation
process in a manner that is advantageous for them. This problem can be analysed using Mechanism
Design [169, 304] (see Section 3.4.2). In this formulation, a peer-to-peer protocol is an instance of an
economic mechanism. The strategies of the peers are modelled using a game form, and desired protocol
outcomes are given by a goal function. The mechanism is thus designed to produce, given the peer
strategy space, an equilibrium consistent with the goal function. In order for this to be feasible, the
mechanism must place realistic information processing and exchange demands on the peers. Thus, the
design of informationally efﬁcient mechanisms ﬁnds a natural application in the design for peer-to-peer
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A.2 Markets and Social Institutions
A.2.1 Transaction Costs and Governance
In human societies, the problem of regulating self-seeking behaviour was one of the ﬁrst requirements for
society growth after the development of agriculture [199]. This is because of the notion of transaction
costs: the costs incurred in making an economic exchange. Basically, every economic transaction is
dependentonthepredictabilityofitsoutcome. Ifeconomictransactionshaveintrinsicrisksthatoutweigh
their potential beneﬁt, there might not be a rational incentive to participate in them.
There are basically three kinds of transaction costs [199, 18]:
• Search and Information Costs: the costs of ﬁnding an appropriate product/service to satisfy a
given need, and to ﬁnd an appropriate trading party to obtain it from. Typical examples of this
are the efforts that vendor exert in advertising or market research. In peer-to-peer systems, this
amounts to bandwidth and computation needed for ﬁnding and advertising resources. In the case
of delay-sensitive overlays, this represents the cost of ﬁnding, within the limited time provided
by the media play-out buffer, a set of peers that have the chunks that it requires, and that can
provide them reliably (at an appropriate level of QoS) during an appropriately long time interval.
These operations need to be done in conditions of constant variation in network RTT, end to end
throughput and peer churn.
• Exchange Costs: the costs of actually performing the exchange in a mutually beneﬁcial fashion.
Usually this implies that the parties must bargain until they agree on the terms of the trade and
draw an appropriate contract. Typical examples of this are the effort that a vendor needs to exert in
ordertosellhis/herwares(transportingthemtothemarket, maintainingtheshop/stall, etc.) andthe
effort incurred by both parties in price determination. In real-time peer-to-peer streaming systems,
this amounts to the cost of actually obtaining the relevant chunks in an environment of strategic
peers: bandwidth and computation related to trade conditions agreement (such as price setting),
actual service delivery (download bandwidth for ﬁles, or QoS streaming for video systems) and
the establishment of exchange networks (swarming scheduling algorithms).
• Policing Costs: the costs of preventing, detecting and punishing opportunistic behaviour even
though it might be non-observable and only inferrable through transaction outcomes. In short,
making sure that other party sticks to the terms of the contract. Typical examples of this are
the effort that legislating bodies need to exert to create laws to punish theft and fraud, and the
effort that police forces need to exert to enforce these laws. In peer-to-peer systems, an example
of this is the bandwidth and computation needed for bootstrapping and maintaining reputation
systems (like upload/download ratio systems in BitTorrent communities), or the withholding of
reciprocation even after an adequate service has been performed. As the actions of peers can only
be observed statistically, network variability can be confused with peer opportunistic behaviour.
This implies that peers need to follow enforcement behaviours that are able to recover from these
errors, while maintaining a reliable cooperative regime.
A.2.2 Market Governance and Social Institutions
In general, market mechanisms work well for situations that have low transaction costs. For highly costly
transactions, where the market imposes too high overheads, other forms of governance1[45] might be
necessary to regulate exchange.
The determinant characteristics of transaction costs are, then, according to [30, 317]:
• Frequency: If an agent a requires the services of an agent b very frequently, it will be beneﬁcial
to both to deﬁne streamlined procedures that can take into advantage the agents’ mutual depen-
dence. Thus, for highly frequent agent interactions, efﬁciency can be increased by bypassing the
market and relying on non-market governance instead. An example of this would be a relation-
ship that, developed through continuous interaction, becomes more reliant on trust management
mechanisms, such as reputation systems, than on market governance.
• Speciﬁcity: A transaction has high speciﬁcity when the assets intended for use in it can not be
easily transferred to other uses. Highly speciﬁc assets represent sunk costs 2that have relatively
1From [18]: Governance is that separate process or certain part of management or leadership processes that makes decisions
that deﬁne expectations, grant power, or verify performance. Frequently a government is established to administer these processes
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little value beyond their use in the context of a speciﬁc transaction. It follows that, if both agents
a and b engage in exchanges with high speciﬁcity, the value of this exchanges is much greater for
each other than for any other arbitrary agent. Under this circumstances, efﬁciency can be increased
by bypassing the market and relying on non-market governance instead.
• Uncertainty: In transactions with uncertainty, there is an essential difﬁculty in foreseeing the
the eventualities that might occur during the course of the transaction. Clearly, one very important
element in whether a transaction is uncertain or not is the length of time over which the transaction
will take place. Transactions that take place instantaneously will have little uncertainty, because
the risks involved in incorrectly predicting the other agent’s actions and circumstances in the future
is nonexistent. This is the basis for spot markets3, where transactions are simpliﬁed by eliminating
credit risk.
A.2.3 Information and Markets
Any resource allocation that is realised through pairwise exchange implies that both peers involved in
each exchange will be in a “better” state than before the transaction (for any deﬁnition of “better” that
guides peer decisions). Thus, every trade moves the system towards Pareto optimality. This, unfortu-
nately, does not mean that the equilibrium reached by this process is especially efﬁcient or fair. It will,
however, be implementable in a distributed fashion by strategic agents.
Resource allocation through trade is not a “zero-sum game”: it is a mutually beneﬁcial activity.
However, for each trade to be as optimal as possible, every peer should have a reliable, up-to-date view
of all its current trading possibilities with every other peer in the system. This particular model of perfect
competition, rooted in perfect information (where every bit of information in the system is leveraged in
every economic decision, so that economic decisions are correctly valued) is not only very difﬁcult to
achieve, but also not scalable. In Hayek’s words [162]:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined pre-
cisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never
exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The eco-
nomic problem of society is then not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources
- if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem
set by these “data.” It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known
to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know. Or, to put it brieﬂy, it is a problem of the utilisation of knowledge which is not given
to anyone in its totality.
(quote from [162]; emphasis added)
As a consequence, distributed markets with perfect information (where all participants can reliably
know the strategies and actions of every other participant) tend to be very expensive and difﬁcult to
implement in practice.
A.2.4 Market Failure
If the system outcome achieved by a market solution is inefﬁcient: some peers could have greater utilities
without decreasing the utility of any other peer. One usual reason why markets fail is that they have
excessively high transaction costs, which in turn is dependent on transaction uncertainty. Transactions
that are resolved instantaneously tend to have low uncertainty. On the other hand, transactions that
involve a commitment over some time have some minimum intrinsic uncertainty, w which then increases
with the length of time over which the commitment is maintained. In general, uncertainty is dependent
on the characteristics of the agents:
• Bounded Rationality: Agents that are computationally and informationally strong, and conse-
quently more capable of acting as ideal rational agents, are less inﬂuenced by uncertainty than
2Sunk Costs are costs incurred in the course of a transaction, or in the production of goods and services, that cannot be
recovered later on - not even by the possible sale of the asset they were used to produce. Therefore, they represent barriers to
exit: an economic actor that has incurred high sunk costs will prefer to continue its current course of action, which legitimates the
expenditure of the sunk cost, rather than choosing another course of action that would make the sunk cost a loss. This can lead to
irrational agent behaviour, in the form of loss aversion.
3Spot Markets are markets in which goods are sold for cash and delivered immediately. This means that contracts are immedi-
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those that are more limited. Thus, all things being equal, more limited agents will exhibit greater
transaction costs due to uncertainty than those agents that cannot reliably extrapolate the possible
outcomes of a transactions based on their past and current experience. Smart agents, then, tend
to perform better in uncertain markets than more severely limited ones. Conversely, if a given
environment calls for cheap, limited agents, market-based allocation may be too costly.
• Information Asymmetry: Agents that know almost as much as their trading parties can make much
better guesses regarding their behaviour than those agents with greater information asymmetries.
Then, all things being equal, agents which suffer from larger information asymmetry will exhibit
greater transaction costs due to uncertainty than those agents who can somehow learn the infor-
mation that their trading parties have.
• OpportunisticBehaviour: Agentsthatcanrelyontheirpartiestoupholdthecommitmentsbetween
them are in a much better position to predict the outcome of their transactions than agents that do
not know whether their trading parties will uphold their contracts. This means that, all things being
equal, agents which unable to conduct most of their interactions with trusted agents will exhibit
greater transaction costs due to uncertainty than those who trade with a close knit group of trusted
peers. Market-inspired resource management thus works particularly well amongst peers that have
long trading histories, or that can rely on external trust bindings.
A.2.5 Social Institutions
The emergence and maintenance of social institutions in human societies can be instructive to the prob-
lem of designing distributed incentive mechanisms for strategic agents. From an evolutionary anthro-
pology perspective, the face-to-face interaction situations of the primitive man could be modelled using
an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [199]. Thus, both in terms of gene and meme evolution, those social
behaviours that increased human ﬁtness in instinctively achieving high payoffs would be preferentially
selected, leading to the adoption of reciprocal altruism as a stable strategy [96, 299, 107]. Social institu-
tions were born as the cultural outcome of this natural selection process on the arena of self-replicating
units of thought and behaviour.
Therefore, cultural evolution is a good model explaining how human markets developed, even
though boundedly rational, strategic peers in environments with information asymmetry tend to have
large transaction costs. In human society, markets are supplemented with social institutions that at-
tempt to reduce transaction costs, either by regulating trade or by deterring, detecting and punishing
self-seeking behaviour. These may be either formal (law) or informal (morality). The main difference
between these two cases is the way society enforces them, but their ﬁnal result is to place socially im-
posed costs on the individual that can change the potential beneﬁt of selﬁshness. It follows that, even
though agents could in principle have a positive utility for acting like self-seeking egotists which lie,
cheat, steal, and freeload if they can, society will impose costs that will shift the rational decisions of
agents to reach a socially more desirable outcome. In short, opportunistic behaviour can be controlled
through social rules enforced by all peers through social institutions. However, this implies some
measure of accountability, and this can be difﬁcult to achieve in peer-to-peer settings (see Section A.3.4).
The issue of how social norms emerge from individual behaviour is directly analysed in [124],
where [124] posits that social norms are created to “re-internalise” externalities. This happens usually
when a given social action imposes externalities on many individuals in a group, but the rights to control
the execution of the action cannot be easily established. Thus, the costs of establishing rights of control
over the action make it unproﬁtable for any of the affected individuals to attempt to do it. And since
nobody can claim rights of control over it, nobody can attempt to proﬁt from doing so.
It follows that it is not enough for a social rule to be useful and necessary: it is necessary to for
the social group to be able to overcome the freeloader problem endogenous to its enforcement. If a
given member of society takes upon herself to punish social rule violators, the rest of the community can
freeload on her and not participate in the punishment of violators4.
A.2.6 Currency
Conventionally, currency in economies is used as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account and as a
store of value.
4There is evidence, however, that punish non-cooperators even in one-shot interactions [109]. This altruistic punishment, that
in part explains the high levels of cooperation that human communities can sustain, has been validated by anthropological models
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• Medium of exchange: This means that, conventionally, money simpliﬁes trading by permitting
barter to evolve into a much more ﬂexible transaction involving easily convertible units. This
relaxes the need for the two parties of a bartering relationship to have a coincidence of wants
before trading can take place, and thus enables widespread and efﬁcient economic activity.
• Unit of Account: Roughly, this means that currency must be able to support pricing. Therefore,
currency can be used to describe the value of products and services.
• Store of Value: To act as a store of value, a commodity, a form of money, or ﬁnancial capital
must be able to be reliably saved, stored, and retrieved - and be predictably useful when it is so
retrieved.
Barter transactions can be broken up into atomic transactions mediated by currency, thus alleviating
the need for ﬁnding a simultaneous coincidence of wants. This, in itself, can help increase market
efﬁciency signiﬁcantly. However, the use of currency allows time-deferred enjoyment of contributions
made to the system. If currency can be used as a store of value, peers can choose to store it, so that it can
be used when needed. Thus, peers can continuously participate in the peer-to-peer overlay, accumulating
currency as they contribute resources to the system which they can enjoy at a later time. However, the
use of market also brings with it problems that barter-based systems do not have. The destruction or
counterfeiting of currency are usual examples of this.
Another currency-related source of inefﬁciency arising in virtual economies is that there might
be starvation: It is possible for a peer to have available resources and another peer that needs them
to be unable to use them because it has insufﬁcient funds to do so. Additionally, if money can be
used to store value, economic actors may attempt to hoard money in order to manipulate the market or
inﬂuence the price of products or services. Then, economies where money has the ability to store value
are susceptible to inﬂation/deﬂation cycles triggered by market resonances with the circulation money
supply. A common way to address this shortcoming is the direct modiﬁcation of the money supply, an
act usually carried out by central banks).
A.2.6.1 Demurrage
A solution that has been suggested for the problems noted in Section A.2.6 is demurrage [134]. Demur-
rage is a cost associated with holding currency outside the market. It works as a negative-rate interest,
leading to a reduction in the amount of currency proportional to the length of time it remains stored.
In a currency system with demurrage, capital is a much better store of value than currency, and such
a system provides strong incentives for investment. In demurrage free systems, speculators can invest in
high yield, short term enterprises, and sell their shares for money before they become unproﬁtable due
to unsustainable practices. This money will not lose value, and thus real gains can be made supporting
non-sustainable infrastructure. In demurrage-driven systems, however, any money earned by any in-
vestor should be immediately re-invested, as storing it will lead to lost value (demurrage makes hoarding
unproﬁtable). Thus, demurrage forces economic actors to focus in long-term sustainable growth invest-
ments (property, infrastructure, education, technology, health, etc), rather than immediate gains that may
be unsustainable. Demurrage theorists posit that demurrage acts like monetary inﬂation: stimulating
the circulation of the currency, encouraging economic activity, and increasing employment. However,
its effects have not been extensively studied, nor have its beneﬁts (or disadvantages) been rigorously
demonstrated.
Obviously, if currency loses value very quickly after it has been spent, it can fulﬁl the ﬁrst two
characteristics above while giving up the third one. It may advantageous to the design of currency based
resource allocation systems to decouple these functions, so demurrage may be an interesting tool for
incentive mechanism design. Practical research systems that include demurrage are detailed in Section
2.5.6.
A.2.7 Prices
Many resource allocation systems that make use of prices do so because they can take advantage of any
one of the basic functions of prices:
• Information diffusion: Prices act as signalling devices, informing peers where to devote their
local resources in order to increase system performance the most. Due to the interactions between
supply and demand, scarce network resources will have increasing price, and thus will be more
attractive for redistribution. On the other hand, idle resources would fetch low prices, providing
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system is having resource shortage) it is in its best interest to free as much resources as possible
to devote them to the system, to take advantage of the increased margins provided by high prices.
If, however, prices are low, suppliers are provided an incentive to aggressively seek out as many
consumers as possible, to maintain their income levels even if the revenue margin per unit traded
is small. In this case, prices transmit information about user tastes (demand), network resource
quality and availability (supply), and content and fragment availability (market state). In principle,
prices can be overall indicators of a very wide range of system information.
• Value estimation: Through distributed price-setting through supply and demand, each peer’s as-
sessmentofthecurrentsystemstateandtheactionsofotherpeersisintegratedinasingleindicator.
Therefore, if information is distributed through the network in a quick and reliable fashion, prices
will converge to the true value of resources: peers demanding prices too far away from the equilib-
rium prices will have a lower aggregate income, and correct accordingly. Therefore, the average
margin that every peer can extract out of every transaction can only be realistically increased by
reducing its costs. Market dynamics provide an incentive for peers to adopt the least costly meth-
ods for stream distribution, and to use available network resources for the most highly valued uses.
This, in turn, promotes the most efﬁcient utilisation of available peer bandwidth, and allows peers
to beneﬁt from the distribution of fragments to peers to which high quality transmission is possi-
ble, exploiting locality properties of the Internet. In the same token, market dynamics discourage
the traversal of low delay fragments through high delay paths, as this destroys the effort (QoS) put
by all prior peers involved in their dissemination, decreases their value, and consequently has an
impact on their price.
• Resource allocation: Prices determine who gets what, and in which quantity. Thus, prices are a
resource allocation tool that deﬁnes the distribution of income and resources. Higher contributions
to the system made where and when most needed would fetch higher prices, directing resources
where and when most needed. In essence, the property of prices of redistributing income is the
fundamental reason for which they can be used as incentives. If the beneﬁts that a peer obtains
fromthesystemdonotdependinanywayonitsactions(thatis, ifpricesarenotusedtoredistribute
income), then there is no reason for it to take the information carried by prices into account. The
incentive for each peer to act in accordance with that information disappears, and prices are unable
to fulﬁl any of its other functions. On the other hand, if the “income” of a peer depends on the
difference between the prices that he receives for contributing resources to other peers and the
prices it has to pay for consuming resources itself, then it has a strong incentive to attain the
highest QoS for other peers (and itself, of course) while investing as little network resources itself.
This involves increasing the supply of scarce resources, and in the process, helping the system
deliver increased QoS in the case of increasing system load.
A.3 Social Rules and Institutions
After analysing market transaction governance, we now move to the analysis of governance through
social institutions.
A.3.1 Social Capital and Trust
In its most basic deﬁnition, trust is a relationship of reliance between two parties that is assumed to
extend into the future, based on what one party knows of the other. As such, it can be very helpful in
controlling uncertainty, and consequently, transaction costs. Social interactions that create trust have
value, in the sense that they affect the economic decisions of agents. Social organisation and social rules
constrain and give context to the actions of economic agents, and are therefore important in the deﬁnition
of the economy [86].
The value represented by social networks can be objectively analysed and quantiﬁed. It has usually
been called social capital, and it has been repeatedly studied by researchers [143, 127, 126, 85, 124, 86].
By starting from rational decision-making, [86] proposes that social capital is deﬁned by social structure
and the “strength” of social links, and it mediates and facilitates social activities for the social actors
involved. Just like ﬁnancial capital (and other kinds of capital), social capital is productive: it allows the
actors to achieve that in its absence would not be possible.
Social capital therefore represents the transformative capability of social networks. Just as physical
capital is produced by the transformation of raw material into implements that can further production
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in the production process through skills and knowledge, social capital leverages the interconnectedness
and trust relations of social structure in order to allocate production resources to social actors and bring
about change, usually by helping disseminating information and arbitrating and facilitating resource
access.
Another perspective on social capital comes from [56], where Bourdieu deﬁnes social capital as
“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network
of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. It is clear from
the previous arguments that, although in engineering and mathematical modelling terms it is tempting to
frame social capital as a function of topology and interconnectedness alone, it is trust what transforms
social relations into a transformative resource. In other words, the trust relations among social actors
are fundamental on transforming a given social network in a source of social capital. On [257], Putnam
focuses on this relationship by deﬁning social capital as a set of features of social life that enable par-
ticipants to act together more effectively and to pursue shared objectives. In general, Putnam identiﬁes
social capital as referring to social network connections and their attendant norms and trust.
Although Putnam recognises that social and monetary capital are certainly different, they can be
made equivalent through a generalised barter structure. In particular, if a given social agent A does
something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an expectation in A and an
obligation on the part of B. This obligation can be conceived as a credit slip held by A for performance
by B. If A holds a large number of these credit slips, for a number of persons with whom A has relations,
then the analogy to ﬁnancial capital is direct. These credit slips constitute a large body of credit that A
can call in if necessary - unless, of course, the placement of trust has been unwise, and these are bad
debts that will not be repaid [86]. Thus, in [86] Coleman identiﬁes the equivalence of social and market
capital as stemming from a generalised barter system based on reciprocal altruism (see Section A.4.3).
The social capital of reciprocal altruism in a given society is a function of two related but indepen-
dent variables: the trustworthiness of the social actors (upon which rests the probability that contracted
obligations will be repaid), and the actual extent of obligations held (the number of contracts each social
actor has). Therefore, trust is a fundamental enabler of social capital, and will have a central role on any
peer-to-peer system.
Another form of social capital is the information ﬂow inherent in social construction, since an agent
can use the same exchanges used to form social ties to obtain information that is individually interesting
to it. Peers can use actual fragment exchanges in which they participate to ascertain supply and demand,
and drive downloading decisions on these - this is the basis for the rarest ﬁrst policy of BitTorrent.
Additionally, the ability that a peer has to piggyback requests and replies for information in the basic
network keepalive messages is a form of social capital.
Social norms, when effective, constitute powerful sources of support for social capital. As has
been explained before (See Section A.2.1), norms can be used to control transaction costs through the
reduction of externalities, and can even be used to build alternative allocation structures for cases where
market governance is unsuitable.
A.3.2 Network Topology and Social Enforcement
Social structures (network topologies, in case of peer-to-peer networks) that exhibit closure5 facilitate
the formation of social capital [86]. Network closure is a necessary precondition for the stabilisation
of social norms because it allows the actions of a given agent to have an effect on the utility of any
other agent, even if this effect is indirect. This helps control externalities, one of the main problems for
resource allocation on a market basis. If a peer, in contravention of a known social rule, exploits another
peer and there are not enough inﬂuence paths through the network so that the wronged peer can retaliate
against it, it might be difﬁcult to make cheating unproﬁtable: the retribution cost that the cheating node
suffers will be smaller than the beneﬁt it gained from the exploitation. Therefore, network topologies
without closure cannot support social norms, as they will be essentially unenforceable, and strategic
peers will simply choose to disregard them.
Of course, if a sizable set peers fail to observe the social rule, there will be clear system-wide
economic losses. However, this damage will be exerted not only on the exploiting nodes, but on all the
5Network Closure is a sociological concept that relates to a topological property of a directed graph. Basically, a social
network has closure if the providers of a given peer p can be compelled to retaliate against it if p exploits any peer for whom it is a
provider. From a graph theoretical point of view, a trust graph exhibits closure if it is possible to ﬁnd directed paths (ideally, a large
number of these) from every node in the outgoing node neighbourhood of p to every node in its incoming node neighbourhood (see
Section 3.1.1). Thus, any peer v exploited by p can threaten to retaliate on one of its successors and this inﬂuence can propagate
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rest of the peers that do follow the social rule. Thus, exploitative peers externalise their economic losses,
and social norms cannot act: there is no way to punish noncompliance. Thus, in a society pervaded with
externalities (or a topology not exhibiting closure), norm-violating behaviours can continue unabated
because the victims can only punish the perpetrator personally, instead of leveraging their social network
resources to retaliate upon the perpetrator6.
Given that social capital depends critically on the interconnectedness of social networks, it is in
many respects similar to a public good, and can fall victim to freeloading (underinvestment and ex-
ploitation, as detailed in the Tragedy of the Commons7). This is because the social structures that make
possible social norms, and the social rules and sanctions that enforce them, do not beneﬁt primarily the
peers whose efforts actually build such structures, but rather, they beneﬁt all peers roughly equally. For
instance, in a Gnutella-like peer-to-peer system, if dense subnetworks between large numbers of nodes
exist, these are the result of a small number of peers acting as superpeers and processing a dispropor-
tionally large number of queries. However, every single peer beneﬁts from this. On the other hand, the
beneﬁt that a superpeer can extract of its own privileged position is limited, and only a subset of the ben-
eﬁts of the social capital crystallised in the complete network topology. Therefore, it may be perfectly
rational for a superpeer node to relinquish this role and transform into a leaf node: its perceived loss in
searching capabilities can be partially subsumed by the superpeers that remain in their roles, and, in its
new role as a leaf node, it will enjoy greater available bandwidth.
In general, this is the case with social capital:
When an individual asks a favour from another, incurring in an obligation, he does
so because it brings him a needed beneﬁt; he does not consider that it does the other a
beneﬁt as well by adding to a drawing fund of social capital available in a time of need. If
the ﬁrst individual can satisfy his need through self-sufﬁciency, or through aid from some
ofﬁcial source without incurring an obligation, he will do so - and thus fail to add to the
social capital outstanding in the community. Similar statements can be made with respect
to trustworthiness as social capital. An actor choosing to keep trust or not (or choosing
whether to devote resources to an attempt to keep trust) is doing so on the basis of costs and
beneﬁts he himself will experience. That his trustworthiness will facilitate others’ actions or
that his lack of trustworthiness will inhibit others’ actions does not enter into his decision. A
similar but more qualiﬁed statement can be made for information as a form of social capital.
An individual who serves as a source of information for another because he is well informed
ordinarily acquires that information for his own beneﬁt, not for the others who make use of
him.
(quote from [86])
The fact that most social capital behaves as if it were a public good implies that it is fundamentally
different from other kinds of capital with respect to incentive mechanisms. Social capital (such as gossip-
based searching or information diffusion) is an important resource for peers, and may affect greatly their
ability to interact with other peers and their perceived quality of experience. However, even though
it is peers themselves who bring social capital into being through their interconnection topology and
its related trust network, the beneﬁts of network construction and maintenance (the actions that bring
social capital into being) are largely experienced by peers other than themselves. Therefore, it is often
not in their interest to bring the network into being in the ﬁrst place: there is always an open incentive
to freeload. In practice, most forms of social capital are created or destroyed as by-products of other
activities, such as ﬁle transfer. This is the case of BitTorrent, for instance, where the swarm is set up
for ﬁle transfer and only has meaning in terms of it: BitTorrent does not support the creation of social
capital independently of ﬁle transfer (however, BitTorrent communities achieve this outside the conﬁnes
of the peer-to-peer network).
There is, however, a private capital angle to social capital. In [127], Fukuyama discusses this
in terms of selﬁsh motivation: as every agent needs cooperation as a means of achieving its selﬁsh
ends, social capital (cooperation and trust) will be produced out of strictly self-seeking behaviour. In
particular, Fukuyama makes the case that if repeated interaction is modelled using an iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a Tit-for-Tat strategy would be conducive to a cooperative outcome. Thus, Fukuyama posits
6Of course, in social models this concept is important for models of legality, corruption and criminal behaviour.
7Hardin sates himself that he does not use “tragedy” as a synonym for sad or unfortunate. Rather, he uses it as an expression to
identify a deterministic process that once set up, will inexorably continue. Hardin thus underlines the self-sustaining nature of the
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thatvaluesystemsandsocialconstructsthatsupportareciprocativeinteractionpolicywouldbefavoured.
In particular, Fukuyama proposes that value systems based on honesty, industriousness, and prudence
can be explained as arising from reciprocity in market transactions. In a sense, Fukuyama posits that
social norms and value systems evolved from reciprocity between individuals. For those humans that
were born when they were already in place, these rules acted as control mechanisms that ensured the
maintenance of the cooperative outcome. This means that one dimension of social norms is that they are
self-sustaining strategies to control freeloading, and they can arise out of self-interest in situations where
utility maximisation calls for a cooperative outcome.
Thus, selﬁsh behaviour of the peers can be used to control their own selﬁsh behaviour. The
question arises then: How to develop overlay network protocols and peer behaviour algorithms so that,
in the aggregate, freeloading is controlled? If social norms (in the shape of reputation systems and
decision-making policies based on the reputation ratings of peers) are used to control freeloading, then
it follows that the basic punishment that a peer can receive if it deviates from the node is disconnection
from its trading parties: the loss of social capital.
A.3.3 Network Topology and Trust
The basic engineering appeal of social capital as a modelling construct is that it facilitates protocol de-
sign through the delegation of micromanagement to the peers themselves. This is done by explicitly
modelling trust between agents, and through this, exercising distributed normative control. In this sense,
our model shares with [127] the idea that social capital can help reduce the transaction costs associated
with coordination mechanisms like contracts or marketplace interactions. Therefore, although markets
can be used for resource allocation and distributed coordination, their costs can be reduced by an appro-
priate system of social rules. In this sense, social capital is useful because its open endedness: the cost
of social rule violation is essentially unbounded, in the sense that it is very hard to predict accurately
the amount of social capital loss that would be involved in the social retribution following the betrayal
of a given economic agent. Like [127], we posit that social capital models manifest themselves as a
“goodwill” of sorts that prevents the parties from taking advantage of unforeseen loopholes in market
transactions.
In essence, trust is the basic protocol element deﬁning interaction between strategic peers.
According to [85, 124], trust has the following characteristics:
1. Placement of trust allows actions that would be otherwise impossible for boundedly rational
agents. This is due to the fact that it relaxes the requirement for complete information on de-
cision making scenarios, and therefore enables boundedly rational peers to conduct actions with
only incomplete information.
2. If the trustee (the agent in whom trust is placed) is genuinely trustworthy, the trustor (the agent
that takes a risk by placing trust in another agent) will be better off than if it had not trusted.
Conversely, if the trustee is not trustworthy, the trustor will be worse off than if he or she had not
trusted. However, if one of the agents is trustworthy and the other is not, the untrustworthy agent
will be able to cheat the trustworthy, trusting peer and extract a high utility at a very low cost. In
this sense, placing trust is strongly reminiscent of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
3. Trust, as an action, involves the voluntary placement of productive resources at the disposal of
the trustee, with no hard commitment from it. Because of this, many trust situations involve a
Principal-Agent situation with moral hazard (See Section A.4).
4. A time lag exists between the extension of trust and the result of the trusting behaviour. Thus, trust
is a characteristic of time-extended markets, as opposed to spot markets.
If we view trust as an essential component for boundedly rational agents to develop effective and
dependable interaction heuristics, a more in-depth analysis of trust and its relation to social capital may
be useful for protocol design. In sociological terms, usually two kinds of trust are considered [257]:
1. Thick trust: trust between social agents that know each other, that is, that have interacted in
the past and have a deﬁnite expectation on future interactions on the basis of this past history.
Consequently, thick trust is a property of intimate social networks, and tends coincide with dense,
cliqued network topologies.
2. Thin trust: trust between social agents that do not know each other. This kind of trust is just a
baseline on the generalised trust that random community members have with one another, and
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This notion can be further reﬁned by explicitly adding a topological dimension. In [126], Fukuyama
generalises the notion of “kinds of trust” by referring to trust radii. By this he means that a high-trust
subnetwork of people, among whom co-operative norms operate, can be embedded in a generic social
network with much lower mean trust8.
Therefore, Fukuyama analyses social groups as circles of trust, where the groups are formed by
selﬁsh motivation, but externalities may be created that extend beyond the initial scope of the group
members:
All groups embodying social capital have a certain radius of trust, that is, the circle
of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. If a group’s social capital pro-
duces positive externalities, the radius of trust can be larger than the group itself. It is
also possible for the radius of trust to be smaller than the membership of the group, as
in large organisations that foster cooperative norms only among the group’s leadership or
permanent staff.
(quote from [127])
Fukuyama states that the clustering deﬁned by close-knit communities with ample social capital is
independent from the social labelling that the community members themselves create, and to the organi-
sational characteristics of the community. A large, geographically distributed society is then modelled as
a series of trust circles with varying radii, that overlap each other through members that are part of dis-
tinct high-trust groups. These interlocking trust groups are brought together by transitive trust relations
among the members that connect them.
Figure A.1: The trust model of overlapping circles presented in [127], with trust radii dependent on the
nature of the social relationship. (Image taken from [127])
The idea that different social links can be qualitatively different has led to the most common dis-
tinction established when discussing social capital from a network-topology standpoint: the difference
between bridging and bonding. These different kinds of social links have the following characteristics:
1. Bonding Links: these are usually built with thick trust relations among members of homogeneous
groups. Theyusuallyimplyastrongsenseof“groupidentity”, andthustendtofavourcliquishness.
A typical example of this in a human context would be ethnic fraternal organisations. Even though
these links are highly reliable, peers may ﬁnd that their usefulness is limited: as group members
tend to be similar to one another and tend to develop in similar circumstances, what they can get
from one another that they not already have is limited. Thus, these links are good for “getting by”
[257]: they can be used as support for everyday requirements and activities, but are not useful for
further development or access to new resources.
2. Bridging Links: these are usually built with thin trust relations between members of distinct
groups. Theyrequiremembershipopennessbetweengroups, andtendtoappearonsociallydiverse
environments. In human societies, bridging social capital refers to relations with distant friends,
associatesandcolleagues: linksthataremorefunctionalorsituationalthanethnicorcultural. Even
though these links may be unreliable, peers may ﬁnd them extremely useful: as peers on each side
8 Intriguingly, Fukuyama further suggests that in many Latin American societies, a small subnetwork diameter (a narrow radius
of trust) tends to produce a two-tier moral system, with good behaviour reserved for family and personal friends, and a lower
standard of behaviour in the public sphere. Thus, in the case of naturally evolved incentive systems, the interaction topology of the
agents and the strategies deﬁned by the incentive mechanism are interrelated and have a manifest feedback.A.3. SOCIAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONS 164
of the link tend to be different from one another and to develop in different circumstances, their
opportunities for fruitful trade are very large. Therefore, these links may be weaker and more
diverse, but are fundamental for ”getting ahead” [257]: they can be used as gateways to new
social worlds, to obtain new resources or information that would be otherwise out of reach. These
correspond to the weak ties proposed in [143]9.
In terms of peer-to-peer system design, it is simple to envisage high-trust peer communities with
low transaction costs, but pretty homogeneous in terms of their “QoS coordinates” and their content.
These groups might be connected by long-distance relationships which might have lower trust levels, but
that are critical for collapsing the entire peer-to-peer network into a Small World [44, 315]. Following
[143], we have that trading within small-high trust cliques might be enough for peers to “get by”, but
ﬁnding new content quickly demands long-distance connections.
The opportunities for the application of sociological models of trust to peer-to-peer networks may
be of great beneﬁt, as they provide a natural framework for the expression of strategic peer behaviour
while focusing on the equilibrium states of emergent behaviour. One abstraction that allows ﬂexible
algorithm design is trust and its attendant social capital. Even though not framed in the vocabulary
of sociology, peer-to-peer researchers have approached trust issues repeatedly, and it remains a topic
of ongoing research. For instance, in [316] Wilcox-O’Hearn identify strategic peer behaviour and its
interplay with social capital as a public good as a fundamental problem and avenue for further research:
Perhaps the most challenging unsolved problem is that of mutual distrust. While a net-
work architect is tempted to assume that all peers in the system behave as he designed them
to behave, this assumption may prove fatal once a network is deployed into multiple disjoint
administrative zones. A fundamentally related issue is that of “motivation to cooperate”.
Why does a peer choose to offer services to the network as well as to make requests of the
network? Is there anything preventing a user from altering their copy of the software, or
writing their own compatible implementation, which uses the resources of the other peers
but refuses to provide its own resource to them? Also closely related is the notion of “attack
resistance”. If a peer can use the resources of other peers without offering them service
in return, then it is able to act as a drain on the resources of the network as a whole, pos-
sibly constituting a denial-of-service attack on the entire network. On the other hand, if
a peer can be coerced into cooperating, perhaps by cutting that peer off from the services
of the network in retaliation for its lack of cooperation, how can we be sure that the same
mechanism cannot be used to attack speciﬁc (innocent) peers, or even to attack the network
itself?
(quote from [316])
This set of challenges has been successfully, but only partially, addressed by the latest peer-to-peer
systems, like BitTorrent. There still remain, however, signiﬁcant opportunities for research in this area.
A.3.4 Accountability and Identity
If one considers a peer-to-peer system as a distributed, engineered system, its main role is to perform
efﬁcient, predictable resource allocation with strategic (and/or untrustworthy) peers. Resource allocation
has been traditionally approached through the notion of accountability: peers are made responsible
for their resource usage. Typically, for centralised systems, this is done by separating the four basic
components of an accountability system10:
• Authentication: Typical resource allocation systems rely on users having stable identities, and
adequate credential management systems to manage this identities. Authentication is the process
of ascertaining whether a user claiming certain identity is actually the user whose that identity
belongs to, and it is performed by verifying that the credentials presented for a claimed identity
match those credentials bound to that identity on a trusted repository.
• Authorisation: Once that identity has been ascertained (through authentication), typical resource
access systems match identities to capability and access proﬁles. Thus, the authenticated user is
9Granovetter posits that the degree of overlap of two individuals’ friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their
tie to one another, and therefore it is these weak ties that have the greatest network-wide cohesive power.
10Usual AAA protocols include RADIUS (RFC 2865, RFC 2866 ), DIAMETER (RFC 3588), TACACS (RFC 1492, RFC 0927)
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granted access to system resources depending on its identity, the current system state and a set of
centrally-deﬁned policies.
• Accounting: Once a user has been authorised to use system resources according to system-wide
policy, its actual system resource consumption is tracked and recorded, usually for planning and
billing purposes.
• Auditing: All system usage must be correlated with an authenticated user, its authorised resources
and its actual resource usage. Because of this, resource allocation systems usually have auditing
capabilities that can be used for fraud detection, usage anomaly detection and forensics.
These deﬁnitions, requiring central trust anchoring and repositories, are unwieldy for peer-to-peer
systems. However, by distributing these centralised functions, peer-to-peer equivalents arise.
In a peer-to-peer system, for instance, there is no trust anchor for identity management. Usu-
ally, identity in peer-to-peer systems cannot be absolutely assured, and the system must settle for
pseudonymity instead. However, the question still remains of how to bind pseudonyms to peers. This is
usually done using asymmetric cryptography techniques (such as elliptic curve cryptography [226], RSA
[267] or ElGamal [129]). In this case, although each peer can prove its own identity by using self-signed
digital certiﬁcates, these can be changed at will and do not constitute protection against sybil attacks.
However, we can leverage the concepts in Section A.3.1 for identity management. If a peer deﬁnes its
own identity and then embeds itself in a social network, its relations with other peers will constitute
social capital. If the peer were to create a new identity from scratch, this identity will not have the trust
links that the previous one had - the social capital would be lost. Thus, the user behind the peer loses
capital by abandoning an old identity and creating a new one. This social capital loss becomes a disin-
centive for short-lived identities, and becomes a self-imposed identity management system: it is in the
best interest of nodes to maintain their own identities, at least for non-exploitative peers. Additionally,
it is in the best interest of each peer within a reputation system to correctly identify which peers it is
interacting with. Therefore, identity management (as detailed above) coupled with peer self-interest and
risk minimisation constitute a distributed authentication system for strategic peers.
In the case of exploitative peers, two basic preconditions for this system to work would be:
1. Social capital is always non-negative.
2. Unknown peers have zero starting social capital.
Thus, ifnewpeersdonothavea“free”allocationofresourceswhenjoiningthesystem, sybilattacks
(pseudospooﬁng, in the vocabulary of Detweiler [1]) becomes unproﬁtable, and therefore burdened with
a heavy negative incentive.
The peer-to-peer equivalent of authorisation is a reputation system working alongside a (possibly
market-based) resource allocation system. Thus, the access that peers have to system resources is de-
cided, on a peer to peer basis, by their previous actions. This implies that, on the basis of past experience,
peers might refuse service, grant priority service or provide only best-effort service. Of course, a funda-
mental consideration at this point is risk: peers participating on a transaction could limit access to their
resources to an amount roughly equivalent to their expected gain from it.
Once a peer has decided to grant access to its resources to another peer, it needs to be able to
adequately measure how much resources were actually delivered. This might be much more complex
than it might initially seem, as contention will make the provision of a given level of service much harder
in some instances than in others. Therefore, a dynamic way to ascertain peer resource value is needed,
and an immediate candidate is a market-based pricing system.
From the discussion above, we see that identity is deﬁned by social embeddedness, trust and social
capital, and can be authenticated in a peer-to-peer basis by using self-signed certiﬁcates. Resource
access (authorisation) can be managed through a reputation system, and measured (accounting) through
a currency-based exchange system or market.
It has been argued that market-based currency systems can be used for risk management and re-
source access as well [100]. However, to do so requires each transaction to build its own trust proﬁle
by starting with small value exchanges, incrementally increasing the exchanges as trust is accumulated.
This has the advantage of requiring no persistent reputation storage, but may be slow to converge 11.
11One can ﬁnd parallels between this mechanism and simple contract signing protocols in cryptography [278].A.4. RECIPROCITY 166
A.4 Reciprocity
AsnotedinSectionsA.3andA.2, reciprocityhasbeenfundamentalintheconstructionofhumanmarkets
and societies. We now analyse the issue further.
A.4.1 Reciprocity, Reputation and Trust
Reputation Systems have been repeatedly proposed (and used) as a tool for facilitating cooperation and
combating freeloading. In [233], Mui et al. propose a computational model for reputation that cleanly
separates reputation, trust and reciprocity. The following deﬁnitions are used:
• Reciprocity: mutual exchange of deeds (such as favour or revenge).
• Reputation: perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions and norms.
• Trust: a subjective expectation an agent has about the future behaviour of another agent, based on
the history of their encounters.
The ﬁrst objective of reputation systems is to allow independent agents to conduct fruitful exchange
transactions on environments with moral hazard[92] and information asymmetries[29].
In peer-to-peer networks, moral hazard presents when two peers come into an agreement, but each
one stands to gain from ignoring it if the other one does not. This behaviour is commonly modelled
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma [179], and reputation mechanisms can deter it by acting as sanctioning
devices [97]. If badly behaved peers are punished by other peers, and if the expected gains from cheating
are smaller that the expected losses by punishment, the threat of public disclosure of a peer’s cheating
conduct provides sufﬁcient incentive to cooperate.
Information asymmetry manifests itself naturally in the context of peer-to-peer systems, as usually
there is information known to some, but not all, of the parties that stand to lose or gain as a result of it.
Reputation mechanisms alleviate this problem by acting as signalling devices that induce peers to learn
this hidden information in an indirect fashion.
If resource contribution on a peer-to-peer network is framed as an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [39],
the expectation of reciprocity for future interactions (including retaliation) can be strong incentive for
cooperation [39]. However, the high churn rates typical of peer-to-peer networks mean that any given
client may be interacting essentially with strangers [233]12. The problem is further complicated if the
subset of peers that have the content that a peer seeks are not the ones that it had contributed to in the
past, thus making past contributions useless in the present. In these circumstances, a reciprocity system
that allows contributions given to a peer to be taken into account by other peers may be the only way to
foster cooperation between strategic peers seeking private utility maximisation.
Therefore, in general, reciprocity based schemes rely on peers being able to learn about the past
behaviour of other peers and use this information in their interactions with them. We can distinguish two
different kinds of reciprocity:
• Direct or Private Reciprocity, where the interaction between two peers is only inﬂuenced by the
interactions between them in the past.
• Indirect or Public Reciprocity, where the interaction between two peers is not only inﬂuenced
by the interactions between them, but by their interactions with all other peers as well.
Thus, direct-reciprocity schemes are more appropriate for long-lived relationships where there is
ample opportunity for each of the peers to appropriately reciprocate the behaviour of other peers (see
Section A.4.3 for a discussion on reciprocal altruism and the conditions on which it develops). However,
it has been shown that direct reciprocity schemes for peer-to-peer networks tend to be slow (or may even
fail) to converge[198].
A number of indirect reciprocity schemes have been proposed, differing mainly in the way that
the reputation scores are calculated and propagated. Indirect reciprocity schemes, compared to direct
reciprocity schemes, have much better convergence properties, but are susceptible to manipulation by
slander, collusion or sybil attacks.
12Even though it has been shown that a sizable proportion of peers are highly stable [290], Stutzbach and Rejaie focus on
information dissemination and bootstrapping. Relying exclusively on such long-lived peers for resource contribution would be to
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A.4.2 Direct Reciprocity
Empirical research has shown that human beings do not behave as self-interested, rational agents in
the mathematical sense [285]. Rather, they exhibit non-negligible amounts of cooperation, even in the
absence of a reputation system[55]. This might have its origin in natural selection [299], and, in the
same spirit, is further reinforced by memes [96] that themselves have successfully replicated and thus
have been favoured by cultural evolution. The warm-glow model [34] is based on this, and it postulates
that socialised humans derive a direct beneﬁt (a warm-glow) in the act of giving itself. Additionally,
social embeddedness provides additional motivators for altruistic behaviour, in the shape of morals and
value judgements which trigger emotions - in particular pride and shame [107].
The development of a theory of cooperation based on selﬁsh individual drives (utility maximisation)
mediated by a set of social restrictions (social capital or reputation) has lead to a large amount of research
on reciprocal altruism. We now discuss some of this research.
A.4.3 Reciprocal Altruism
In [299], Trivers examines the emergence of reciprocal altruism in biological systems. Altruistic be-
haviour can be described as a set of actions performed by an organism that beneﬁt another organism
which does not carry the genes of the ﬁrst. Therefore, in beneﬁting the second organism, the ﬁrst one
may incur opportunity costs or risks that may be apparently detrimental to it. This immediate analysis
is, however, short sighted. Expected agent utilities will depend on the speciﬁc costs involved in each of
the one shot games. In particular, Trivers notes that:
One human being saving another, who is not closely related and is about to drown, is
an instance of altruism. Assume that the chance of the drowning man dying is one-half if no
one leaps in to save him, but that the chance that his potential rescuer will drown if he leaps
in to save him is much smaller, say, one in twenty. Assume that the drowning man always
drowns when his rescuer does and that he is always saved when the rescuer survives the
rescue attempt. Also assume that the energy costs involved in rescuing are trivial compared
to the survival probabilities. Were this an isolated event, it is clear that the rescuer should
not bother to save the drowning man. But if the drowning man reciprocates at some future
time, and if the survival chances are then exactly reversed, it will have been to the beneﬁt
of each participant to have risked his life for the other. Each participant will have traded a
one-half chance of dying for about a one-tenth chance.
(quote from [299])
Thus, altruistic behaviour increases the survival probability of organisms, and their general ﬁtness.
If there is a large probability for every member of the population of drowning, those individuals that risk
their lives to save each other and reciprocate in kind will have greater probability of producing offspring
than those that refuse to help others and face drowning on their own. However, the altruist decision is
only warranted rationally if its beneﬁt of the to the recipient is greater than its cost to the performer.
Otherwise, even if the probability of ulterior reciprocation is close to 1, the net cost incurred by the
altruist peer outweighs its beneﬁt, and altruism does not take place.
Even if beneﬁt of the to the recipient is much greater than the cost to the performer, altruism will
only be rationally chosen if the probability of the recipient reciprocating is high enough. However,
from the standpoint of the recipient, it might not be rational to reciprocate: it has already been saved,
and therefore does not derive beneﬁt endangering itself by reciprocating. There is an incentive for the
recipient to cheat. In order for altruist behaviour to be sustained, cheating must have later adverse
effects on the cheating recipient which outweigh the beneﬁt of non-reciprocation. Then, selection will
discriminate against cheaters if the social reprisal from the wronged individual (and possibly the social
group) has later costs that exceed the beneﬁt of failing to reciprocate. Thus, if individuals follow a trigger
strategy where the altruist responds to the cheating by curtailing all future possible altruistic gestures to
this individual, and the beneﬁts of these lost altruistic acts outweigh the costs involved in reciprocating,
the cheater will be selected against. On the other hand, those individuals who follow a strategy conducive
to cooperation, exchange many altruistic acts and have increased chances of survival and reproduction -
and cooperators will ﬁnd their genes quickly disseminating[299].
In light of this, reciprocal altruism can only exist in peer-to-peer systems with a reputation
system and a trigger strategy, even if it only relies in the private experience of each peer. If we
deﬁne an altruistic situation as any one in which one peer can beneﬁt a second one in a greater amount
than the cost of the act to itself (again following [299]), altruism will be sustainable in the following
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• When the probability of encountering another peer in an altruistic situation is high
• Whenagivenpeerrepeatedlyinteractswiththesamesmallsetofpeers, insuchawaythataltruistic
behaviour can be reciprocated
• When peers can recognise each other, and recall whether another peer is a cheater or not
• When pairs of peers play symmetric roles in altruistic situations, so that both are able to beneﬁt
each other roughly equally, at roughly equivalent costs.
In the biological world, this leads to a model for reciprocally altruistic behaviour based on a set
of population-dynamic parameters. In the context of peer-to-peer systems, we can modify those and
propose them as engineering objectives to support reciprocal altruism:
1. Peers should have long lifetimes. If peers have long lifetimes in the peer-to-peer system, the
chance that any two peers will encounter many altruistic situations is maximised. If peers only
track the reputations of peers they have directly interacted with, long lifetimes increase the prob-
ability of two peers meeting again after a previous altruistic episode, and thus being able to re-
ciprocate. If peers track reputations of peers they have not directly interacted with, long peer
lifetimes allow to check with experience the reputation ratings of peers, helping in the control
untrustworthiness in reputation reporting.
2. Peers should aggregate in communities. If peers belong to the same community during all or
a signiﬁcant portion of their lifetime, the chance that any individual will interact repeatedly with
the same set of neighbours increases. This allows a much better computation of reputation, and it
allows trust anchoring to be done in a distributed fashion.
3. Peers should be mutually dependent. If a set A of peers can obtain from peers belonging to
another set B signiﬁcant amounts of resources, peers from A will tend to establish relationships
with peers from B, and thus the rate at which they interact with each other will be larger than the
interaction rate with nodes outside either A or B. Thus, peers from A and B will tend to interact
more, and the chance they will encounter altruistic situations together will increase.
4. Peers should be free not to cooperate with each other. If some peers are obedient and other
peers are strategic, a linear dominance 13, asymmetric hierarchy is formed: strategic peers can
exploit obedient peers with no fear of retaliation14. Thus, strategic peers become dominant over
obedient peers, but not vice-versa. In this circumstance, there is nothing the obedient peer can do
to punish lack of reciprocation from a cheater peer, and this undermines the beneﬁts of altruism.
5. Peers should be free to cooperate with each other. Reciprocal altruism relies on a peer being
able to provide to another peer a service that it cannot perform itself. Ideally, if there is scope
for cooperation between two peers, these two peers should be able to ﬁnd each other, describe the
scope of cooperation, and act upon it.
A.4.4 Indirect Reciprocity
Although direct reciprocity schemes have the advantage of being easily implementable on the peers,
it has been shown that they have nontrivial convergence issues[198]. It follows that direct-reciprocity
schemes are more appropriate for long-lived relationships where there is opportunity for each of the
peers to appropriately reciprocate. For other situations, indirect reciprocity may be the only technique
with adequate stability properties.
One of the most popular techniques for the implementation of indirect reciprocity in peer-to-peer
networks is the use of reputation systems15. Reputation systems harness the bi-directional communica-
tion capabilities of the Internet to engineer large scale word-of-mouth networks [97]. Some of the most
practically successful e-businesses are based upon reputation systems, such as eBay [264], and Amazon.
In [100], Dingledine et al. proposes the following list of requirements for a reputation system:
• Peer History Awareness: The reputation system should distinguish new entities of unknown
quality from entities with bad long-term performance.
13In a linear dominance hierarchy, each individual has a rank in the hierarchy, so that higher-rank animals have privileges over
lower-rank animals. A typical example of this is the pecking order amongst poultry.
14Of course, obedient peers are assumed to be “programmed” for cooperation. Otherwise, the system itself is unsustainable.
15The equivalent sociological/anthropological model for this is the image scoring model by Kandori [187].A.4. RECIPROCITY 169
• Known Accuracy: The reputation system should report, additionally to reputation scores, the
conﬁdence of any given score - the likelihood this score corresponds to reality.
• High Precision: The reputation system should be stable, returning the same ratings consistently
for the same peers under the same system state.
• Weighting towards current behaviour: The system should reﬂect recent trends in entity per-
formance quickly. Thus, entities that might have behaved well for a long time but start behaving
maliciously are quickly recognised and their trust values modiﬁed accordingly.
• Efﬁciency: The system should not require system-wide synchronisation or signalling, complex
distributed calculation or any kind of centrally coordinated computation. It must only rely on local
peer knowledge, and should reconverge quickly after state changes.
• Robustness against lies, slander and collusion: The system should resist any attempts by a group
of spoofed peers under common control (sybil attack), or a set of colluding peers to inﬂuence
reputation ratings in any way. Reputation ratings should truthfully reﬂect the actual quality of the
peers.
• Anomaly detection capability: The system should be able to detect outlying data points repre-
sentative of anomalous behaviour and act accordingly.
• Truthfulness: The reputation system should ensure that peers that report the performance of other
peers do so in a completely free manner: no peer should be punished for truthfully revealing
system information. This might involve making it impossible for a rated peer to learn the ratings
that each of the rating peers gave16, or it might involve making it unproﬁtable for peers to retaliate
against other peers who tell the truth.
• Smoothness: Adding a single rating or a small number of ratings should not severely distort the
state of the reputation system.
• Understandability: Any reputation system traces its rationale back to the incentives of the users
behind the peers. Thus, it should be relatively easy to explain to the users what reputation scores
mean, and the policies that peers follow as a result.
• Veriﬁability: The peers should be able to provide some sort of evidence to support their reputation
management decisions, even though this evidence is not unconditionally trusted. This implies that
transactions must leave behind veriﬁable evidence, and disputes can be resolved by weighting the
evidence presented by the relevant parties.
• Feedback Elicitation: The reputation system should ensure that peers report back the results of
their interaction, even if they were successful and therefore have no incentive for retaliation.
It is important to note that, even though it might be a starting point for mathematical modelling,
reputation scores cannot be universal, scalar quantities describing the overall “quality” of a peer. This
is because, in order to be useful in predicting the outcome of an speciﬁc interaction, reputation scores
must pertain to that particular kind of interaction. Thus, a ﬂexible reputation system that can be used
to predict the outcome of different kinds of related interactions in different contexts will need to be,
at least, a vector of different context-sensitive reputation scores. In particular, it is important that the
reputation system is able to take into account the credibility of each peer when processing its reports.
Architecturally, this means that reputation score and credibility need to be separate dimensions of the
reputation system.
Additionally, it is possible that peers that behaved in a given way when the system was in a given
state can behave in a completely different way when the system is in a different state. Then, if reputation
system measurements are supplemented with system state information, their predictive power increases,
and it, the usefulness of the system.
In their most general conception, reputation systems should cluster similar transactions carried out
in similar system states to maximise their predictive capability. Usually, transactions are classiﬁed as
belonging to given categories, and similar transactions are aggregated over these categories. However,
it may be that the categories for clustering are unknown or unclear; and in that case, Data Mining can
be used to extract those variables that hold greatest predictive power with respect to the transaction
outcomes of interest in a given context.
16One way of achieving this would be the use of algorithms like Chaum’s unconditional secrecy channel[68].A.5. SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT AND REPUTATION 170
A.5 Social Enforcement and Reputation
As explained in Sections A.2.1 and A.3.1, market based systems usually manage their transaction costs
by means of social rules. These rules essentially increase the capacity of boundedly rational agents to
predict the outcome of a given transaction, and thus to minimise their exposure to risk. This reduces
their policing and exchange costs.
In the case of streaming peer-to-peer systems, it is clear that, while market-inspired techniques are
useful for the measurement of value and for resource allocation, they might insufﬁcient for the establish-
ment of adequate procedures to ensure system stability, particularly in the presence of arbitrarily hacked
clients behaving in arbitrary ways. This situation can be vastly improved by using a reputation system.
Essentially, peers use the reputation system to minimise the impact of any attack on the system by
minimising the impact of any attack on themselves, and thus actively managing their own risk.
A.5.1 Markets and Altruism
It is tempting to think that a pure altruism system supported by a reputation system may be sufﬁcient
to maintain the health of the system. In over-provisioned systems, or in systems where QoS is not
delivered real time, this might be the case: an example in hand is the seeding of torrents in BitTorrent
(see Section 2.6.1). However, in systems where scarcity (in this case, congestion and application layer
contention) needs to be managed much more effectively, these simple systems tend to under-perform.
This is not because reputation systems are inherently worse or more limited than market systems. The
reason for this is much more fundamental: it is because, in transactions based on pure altruism, it is
usually very difﬁcult to provide the relevant peers with the information that is relevant for the
response to achieve any given engineering objective. It is very difﬁcult for individual peers to judge
what is globally desirable, or what local actions can be taken that will beneﬁt the system the most.
Boundedly rational peers are necessarily limited; usually these peers cannot envisage or control the
more distant effects of their actions. This might only imply a small performance hit when considering
non-real time systems, but for real time overlays it is a fundamental engineering objective. For instance,
in BitTorrent, the topological position of a seeder is of no consequence, as long as it can send missing
rare fragments every now and then. In real time streaming systems, it is of paramount importance:
bandwidth rich peers can become de-facto local distribution centres whose content will be deﬁned by
the community they are serving. It does not matter that an appropriate number of real time streaming
peers “seed” a particular stream, if these peers are not positioned in the network in such a way that their
combined effort can be amassed to generate a high-QoS stream for the greatest number of consumers.
This is a global property, that depends not only in the local decisions of the peers, but on the trafﬁc
conditions in a given network, a given AS or even the Internet at large, and the demand patterns of the
users. Thus, even if peers are assumed to be perfectly altruistic, a market-based incentive mechanism
system is useful to help them ﬁnd high-QoS and high-reliability paths at the overlay level.
This is because incentives transmitted through the price system are automatically accompanied by
the information that is relevant to the effective operation of the incentive. Thus, high-QoS paths represent
better cost-beneﬁt trade routes, and the consuming end peer will prefer them over others. Paths spanning
trustworthy peers will be preferred over intermittent, unreliable paths, just because they will have a better
cost-beneﬁt ratio. However, suboptimal paths will not be ignored: they will used as well, as long as the
increased cost is balanced by increased redundancy or independence from local Internet effects, such as
congestion hot-spots or misconﬁgured routers/ﬁrewalls.B
Simulation Parameters
B.1 Simulation Parameters for Section 7.2.3


β1
β2
β3

 =


12.519
12.426
20.946




α1
α2
α3

 =


0.55843
0.73457
0.71524




δ1
δ2
δ3

 =


0.70421
0.75578
0.50354




γ1
γ2
γ3

 =


.53454
.20000
.46675




q111 q112 q113
q121 q122 q123
q131 q132 q133

 =


0.00000 1.00000 1.67559
1.53490 0.00000 1.32990
1.87273 1.34256 0.00000




q211 q212 q213
q221 q222 q223
q231 q232 q233

 =


0.00000 2.00000 2.35860
2.62494 0.00000 2.53543
2.34937 3.65700 0.00000




p111 p112 p113
p121 p122 p123
p131 p132 p133

 =


0.077206 0.096902 0.064249
0.097260 0.081284 0.098252
0.066885 0.090100 0.068617




p211 p212 p213
p221 p222 p223
p231 p232 p233

 =


0.11022 0.11602 0.18819
0.13559 0.12398 0.13065
0.16901 0.18183 0.14284


171Nomenclature
αi Per-site diminishing trafﬁc volume beneﬁt for site i (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
βi Total proportional trafﬁc beneﬁt for site i (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
χ An isomorphism for graph G, page 55
∆Qi(k) Inter-rank quality improvement function for rank k (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 98
δi Total diminishing trafﬁc volume beneﬁt for site i (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
δmin
G Minimal Grim Trigger discount parameter for cooperation (Hidden Action Model), page 124
δmin
T Minimal Tit-for-Tat discount parameter for cooperation (Hidden Action Model), page 125
ηk
0 Magnitude parameter for ﬂow k (Elasticity-based Model), page 136
ηk
k Price elasticity of demand of ﬂow k (Elasticity-based Model), page 136
ηk
ξ Cross elasticity of demand of ﬂow k with respect to ﬂow ξ (Elasticity-based Model), page 136
R
F Proportion of reciprocators vs. freeloaders (PledgeRoute), page 82
γi Per-site diminishing trafﬁc quality beneﬁt for site i (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
ˆ Bi Total cost that the ESP would have had to pay to all ISPs for all the trafﬁc terminating at site i
had the budget condition not been binding (Managed Overlay Model), page 134
ˆ Ωi(qc) qc-quality level set for peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
ˆ Ωi(qj) Feasible proportional quality subspace for winning bidder pj in auctioneer ni in exact propor-
tional quality mapping, page 96
ˆ bski Amount of trafﬁc ﬂow from site k to site i over ISP s that would have been allocated had the
budget condition not been binding (Managed Overlay Model), page 134
ˆ s(k) Aggregate valuation of a social outcome k to all agents, according to their reported valuation
functions in an economic mechanism, page 65
ˆ wij The amount of contributions that nj has given to ni as response to reciprocative requests in a
contribution network G (PledgeRoute), page 71
κ Basic amount of altruistic service (PledgeRoute), page 76
Λ(S) Link neighbourhood of a connected subgraph S, page 52
Λ(ni) Link neighbourhood of node ni, page 52
Pai The power set of Pai, page 57
Aj Set of possible actions for player pj in a strategic game G, page 58
Bi TotalcostthattheESPwillhavetopaytoallISPsforallthetrafﬁcterminatingatsitei(Managed
Overlay Model), page 134
C Currency system, page 114
172Dij(wji) Expected number of chunk slots that a request from bidder pj will require for service in
auctioneer ni if it has previous contributions wji (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example),
page 103
E Set of all ESPs (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
G Directed Graph, page 51
Gi Partial view that peer ni extracts of contribution network G (PledgeRoute), page 73
H Interest digraph: an edge (ni,nj) in H implies that peer ni is interested in requesting services
from peer nj (PledgeRoute), page 82
I Set of all ISPs (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
K Set of all possible social outcomes in an economic mechanism, page 65
LA Lagrangian for the client utility (Hidden Action Abstract Model), page 61
LE Lagrangian for the constrained ESP model (Managed Overlay Model), page 133
LH Lagrangian for the client utility (Hidden Action Model), page 116
LI Lagrangian for the ISP proﬁt optimisation model (ISP Proﬁt Optimisation Model), page 142
M Market system, page 114
O Set of all possible outcomes of a strategic game G, page 58
P(A) The power set of A - the set that contains as elements all the subsets of A, page 57
Q Service Quality space in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
Sj Set of possible strategies for player pj in a strategic game G, page 58
U(ni,P) Unvisited neighbour set of ni for path P (PledgeRoute), page 73
W(Pij) Maximum contribution transfer capacity along path Pij (PledgeRoute), page 79
W(s,i) Maximum contribution transfer capacity between a peer ns and another peer ni (PledgeRoute),
page 78
Z Set of possible all type player type combinations in a strategic game G, page 58
Zj Set of possible types for player pj in a strategic game G, page 58
N Set of all routers in an ISP (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
Pai The set of edge-disjoint paths between na and ni that maximises ﬂow reputation from na to ni,
page 57
cj(s−j) Cost that can be applied to agent pj as a function of the strategies of all peers except itself, in
an economic mechanism, page 65
D(t) Transaction Delay cumulative distribution function (Hidden Action Model), page 119
d(t) Transaction Delay probability density function (Hidden Action Model), page 119
Fi Quality estimation function for peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
F
−1
i Inverse quality mapping correspondence for peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping,
page 96
fa(G,ni) Anchor-ﬂow reputation function for graph G anchored in na and evaluated at ni, page 57
G A strategic game, page 58
hj Part of a quasilinear utility function that represents a monetary payment, page 58
173hj Payment to agent pj in an economic mechanism, page 65
k Social outcome in an economic mechanism, page 65
L Link set of a directed graph G, page 51
L Set of all links in an ISP (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
m(ni) Protocol performance measure (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example), page 106
N Node set of a directed graph G, page 51
N Set of all sites in the ESP (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
o(s) Outcome function that maps a strategy proﬁle s to its outcome in a strategic game G, page 58
P Set of players in a strategic game G, page 58
pj A player in a strategic game G, page 58
Pai The set of all edge-disjoint paths between na and ni on a graph G, page 57
Qi(k) Rank quality mapping function for rank k (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 98
r(x) Layer 3 RTT probability density function (Hidden Action Model), page 118
S A connected subgraph of a directed graph G, page 52
s1 Previous Debt Reciprocation Policy (PledgeRoute), page 82
s2 Previous Contribution Reciprocation Policy (PledgeRoute), page 82
TB
k Data point vector for bandwidth demands (Elasticity-based Model), page 138
Tp Data point matrix for prices (Elasticity-based Model), page 138
V−j(k) Total value achieved by an economic mechanism if agent pj does not participate, page 66
µij Expected number of won bids (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 91
µU
ij Expected utility obtained from all won bids (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 94
ν Price that bidder pj pays for participating in a single-item Vickrey auction, page 63
ω∗
j Resource allocation for winning bidder pj in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
Ωi Resource space of peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
Ωi
k Resource subspace k of peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
⊕ Operator that aggregates paths to give end-to-end values (PledgeRoute), page 78
⊗ Operator that aggregates links to give path values (PledgeRoute), page 78
φ Agent effort in the PA model, page 60
φ Level of effort by the server (Hidden Action Model), page 115
φξ Per-unit infrastructure bandwidth cost for ﬂow ξ for the ISP (Proﬁt Maximisation Model),
page 142
Π(S) Node neighbourhood of a connected subgraph S, page 52
Π(ni) Node neighbourhood of node ni, page 52
ψ Outcome-dependent payment in the PA model, page 60
ψ Payment given by the client to the server (Hidden Action Model), page 115
174ρstop Probability that the trust path discovery random walk terminates at any given peer (PledgeR-
oute), page 73
σ2
ij Variance in the number of won bids (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 91
χCTRM Contribution compensation in case of CTRM transaction interruption (PledgeRoute), page 78
χPAM Contribution ﬁne to act as a negative incentive to the termination of PAM walks (PledgeRoute),
page 77
υij Maximum amount of unreciprocated contributions that ni will give to a neighbour nj in a con-
tribution network G (PledgeRoute), page 71
ϕ Winning bid “rank offset”, ϕ = N
j
i − Mi (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 90
ϑj Best response function for player pj given its type and the strategy and type proﬁle of all other
peers in a strategic game G, page 59
ζj Type of a player pj in a strategic game G, page 58
Bk Total amount of trafﬁc ﬂow over origin-destination pair k (Elasticity-based Model), page 135
bm
k Trafﬁc ﬂow over origin-destination pair k corresponding to ESP m (Elasticity-based Model),
page 135
Bnm Trail between nodes nn and nm in a directed graph G, page 52
bski Amount of trafﬁc ﬂow from site k to site i over ISP s (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
C(ni) Stream Lag Stretch (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example), page 106
cl Unit ISP cost per unit of bandwidth transferred over infrastructure link l (Proﬁt Maximisation
Model), page 141
cn Unit ISP cost per unit of bandwidth routed over infrastructure router n (Proﬁt Maximisation
Model), page 141
CTRM Contribution Transfer Request Message (PledgeRoute), page 74
D Chunk delivery delay (Hidden Action Model), page 118
d(nj,nk) Synthetic coordinate delay from nj to nk (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example),
page 102
f(N) reputation function deﬁned over N, the set of nodes of a graph G, page 54
fV
i
(v) Bid value distribution at auctioneer ni (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 88
FV
i
(k)(v) Cumulative distribution function for the k-th order statistic of random variable V i (Auction-
based Swarming Model), page 90
fV
i
(k)(v) Probability density function for the k-th order statistic of random variable V i (Auction-based
Swarming Model), page 90
fW
i
(v) Past contribution distribution at auctioneer ni (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 98
Fi Transaction Fail message created by i and sent towards the CTRM originator s (PledgeRoute),
page 74
g(Pai) The reputation ﬂow function of fa(G,ni) (g(Pai) : Pai 7→ R), page 57
Ht CTRM Header (PledgeRoute), page 75
Lc(cn,nk) Continuous chunk lag for chunk cn at peer nk (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example),
page 102
Lp(ni) Discrete Peer Lag (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example), page 106
175Lp(nj,k) Continuous peer lag for peer nj with a lag window of k chunks (Auction-based Chunk
Swarming Example), page 102
Ls(ni) Stream Lag (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example), page 106
Mi Contribution Transfer Request Message (CTRM) after being encapsulated by peer i (PledgeR-
oute), page 74
Mi Total number of bids that auctioneer ni receives (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 88
Ms Contribution Transfer Request Message (CTRM) at its source, s (PledgeRoute), page 74
Mt Contribution Transfer Request Message (CTRM) response at its source, the destination peer t
(PledgeRoute), page 74
mji Total number of bids that bidder pj sends to auctioneer ni (Auction-based Swarming Model),
page 88
N
j
i Total number of competing bids that auctioneer ni receives, as assessed by pj (Auction-based
Swarming Model), page 88
NH Average peer outdegree in H (PledgeRoute), page 82
Ni Total number of bids that auctioneer ni receives (Auction-based Swarming Model), page 88
Ns Number of peers amongst which the server upload is shared (Hidden Action Model), page 118
P Proﬁt for the ISP (Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
p Probability of the client getting high quality service as a function of the effort by the server
(Hidden Action Model), page 115
p
t+1
j (s) Probability that a PAM starting at peer ns visits peer nj at time t (PledgeRoute), page 73
pL Packet loss probability at layer 3 (Hidden Action Model), page 118
pξ Per-unit bandwidth price for ﬂow ξ for the ISP (Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
Pij Contribution path from ni to nj in a contribution network G (PledgeRoute), page 70
Pnm Simple path between from nn to nm in a directed graph G, page 52
pski Cost per unit bandwidth that the ESP must pay to transfer data from k to i over ISP s (Managed
Overlay Model), page 128
PAM Pledge Announcement Message (PledgeRoute), page 73
q Principal income in the PA model, page 60
q QoS enjoyed by the client (Hidden Action Model), page 115
qi
T Target aggregate quality for peer ni in exact proportional quality mapping, page 96
qski Beneﬁt that a unit bandwidth trafﬁc ﬂow from site k to site i over ISP s provides to the ESP
(Managed Overlay Model), page 128
RL Link routing matrix (Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
RL
lξ Link routing matrix element: 1 if origin-destination ﬂow ξ goes through link l, 0 otherwise
(Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
RN Node routing matrix (Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
RN
nξ Node routing matrix element: 1 if origin-destination ﬂow ξ goes through node n, 0 otherwise
(Proﬁt Maximisation Model), page 141
rt
ij Probability that a PAM is forwarded from node i to node j at time t (PledgeRoute), page 73
176Rs Service request message that includes a trust granting ticket obtained through a trust shift oper-
ation. (PledgeRoute), page 74
s A particular strategy proﬁle on a strategic game G, page 58
Sc Chunk Size (Hidden Action Model), page 118
sj(k) Valuation of a social outcome k that agent pj reports to the mechanism designer in an economic
mechanism, page 65
s
+
j Best response for player pj given its type and the strategy and type proﬁle of all other peers in a
strategic game G, page 59
Sp Packet size at layer 3 (Hidden Action Model), page 118
Sr Request message size (Hidden Action Model), page 118
Tc Client to server throughput (Hidden Action Model), page 118
tP Request processing time at the server (Hidden Action Model), page 118
tQ(nj,nk) Time from the start of the service interval T that will elapse before nj ﬁnishes its chunk
transfer to nk (Auction-based Chunk Swarming Example), page 102
Ts Server to client throughput (Hidden Action Model), page 118
Tt Trust granting ticket Tt for the request Rs (PledgeRoute), page 75
told Message expiry timeout value for replay protection (PledgeRoute), page 73
tT Transaction expiry timeout value for the soft reservation protocol (PledgeRoute), page 75
tRTO Retransmission timeout (Hidden Action Model), page 118
tRTT Layer 3 RTT (Hidden Action Model), page 118
Uc Utility function for the client (Hidden Action Model), page 115
Uc principal utility in the PA model, page 60
Ud
c Defection Utility (Hidden Action Model), page 123
Ui Utility that site i obtains from participation in the system (Managed Overlay Model), page 128
Uj Utility for bidder pj in a single-item Vickrey auction, page 63
Uj Utility for player pj in a strategic game G, page 58
Uj(k) Utility of agent pj for social outcome k in an economic mechanism, page 65
Ur Rationality utility for the PA model, page 60
Ur Rationality utility for the server (Hidden Action Model), page 115
Ur Reservation utility for the server (Hidden Action Model), page 115
Us Agent utility in the PA model, page 60
Us Utility function for the server (Hidden Action Model), page 115
vj(k) Valuation of a social outcome k by agent pj in an economic mechanism, page 65
vj Valuation for bidder pj in a single-item Vickrey auction, page 63
w+(ni) Pledged resources (weighted indegree) of ni in a graph G, page 70
w−(ni) Social capital (weighted outdegree) of ni in a contribution network G, page 70
177wl Provisioned bandwidth capacity for ESP trafﬁc over infrastructure link l (Proﬁt Maximisation
Model), page 141
wn Provisioned bandwidth routing capacity for ESP trafﬁc over infrastructure router n(Proﬁt Max-
imisation Model), page 141
wij Contributions from ni to nj in a contribution network G (PledgeRoute), page 70
Wnm Walk between nodes nn and nm in a directed graph G, page 52
Xij Number of winning bids on auctioneer ni that were sent by bidder pj (Auction-based Swarming
Model), page 88
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